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Across the EU, citizens and governments of Member States are becoming increasingly concerned that – 
for the first time in decades – younger generations will have fewer opportunities for upward social 
mobility than preceding generations. This concern is shared by those on low incomes and the middle 
classes. This report sheds new light on the debate on social mobility in EU Member States and provides 
new evidence on patterns of intergenerational social mobility. It examines to what extent family 
background has determined people’s prospects for social mobility over the last few decades. It identifies 
key barriers to social mobility and reviews policies aimed at facilitating upward social mobility and equal 
opportunities specifically in the areas of childcare, early education, schooling and the labour market. 
This report is the first to examine patterns of social mobility across all 28 Member States. It considers 
absolute social mobility (the extent and nature of structural, occupational change and societal progress) 
as well as relative social mobility (or ‘social fluidity’) – people’s chances of moving between certain 
occupational classes. Unlike many previous works in the field, the report analyses quantitative data 
regarding patterns of social mobility for men and women separately, underlining the increasingly 
important gender dimension. The qualitative information highlights the most pressing issues in terms of 
policy debate, the key barriers to social mobility, and policies for fostering equal opportunities and social 
mobility. In these analyses, occupational status is taken as the key indicator for measuring social mobility. 
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1Introduction
Across the EU, citizens and governments of Member
States are becoming increasingly concerned that – for
the first time in decades – younger generations will have
fewer opportunities for upward social mobility than
preceding generations. This concern is shared by those
on low incomes and the middle classes. This report
sheds new light on the debate on social mobility in EU
Member States and provides new evidence on patterns
of intergenerational social mobility. It examines to what
extent family background has determined people’s
prospects for social mobility over the last few decades.
It identifies key barriers to social mobility and reviews
policies aimed at facilitating upward social mobility and
equal opportunities specifically in the areas of
childcare, early education, schooling and the labour
market. 
This report is the first to examine patterns of social
mobility across all 28 Member States. It considers
absolute social mobility (the extent and nature of
structural, occupational change and societal progress)
as well as relative social mobility (or ‘social fluidity’) –
people’s chances of moving between certain
occupational classes. Unlike many previous works in the
field, the report analyses quantitative data regarding
patterns of social mobility for men and women
separately, underlining the increasingly important
gender dimension. The qualitative information
highlights the most pressing issues in terms of policy
debate, the key barriers to social mobility, and policies
for fostering equal opportunities and social mobility. In
these analyses, occupational status is taken as the key
indicator for measuring social mobility. 
Policy context
The Europe 2020 strategy views social mobility
essentially in terms of equal opportunity: ‘It is about
ensuring access and opportunities for all throughout
the lifecycle.’ The European Commission has put the
issue of fairness among its top priorities. The ongoing
European Commission consultation for the European
Pillar of Social Rights points to the negative impact of
widening inequalities on social mobility, identifying
unequal access to childcare, education and health as
key barriers to achieving equal opportunities. 
The research identified the most common drivers of the
debate regarding a ‘fair society’ in the Member States –
one in which people have equal chances to enjoy good
living conditions and have access to resources – as:
widening income inequalities, diminished access to
public services, persistent inequalities in education,
intergenerational transmission of poverty, widespread
gender inequalities, integration of immigrants,
nepotism and corruption and growing regional
disparities.
Key findings
£ Structural changes (change of occupational
structure, and size of population in various
occupations) enabled upward social mobility across
three generations in the 20th century.
£ More recently, structural shifts have resulted in the
level of absolute social mobility among men and
women becoming more similar. 
£ Levels of relative social mobility in EU Member
States have converged over the 20th century: they
are more similar for the cohort born 1946–1964
than for the cohort born 1927–1946. However, for
those born after 1965 a slowing down of
convergence – if not divergence – between
countries is visible. 
£ In six countries, social fluidity has been
continuously increasing over the three cohorts
examined: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the
Netherlands and Slovakia. 
£ In four countries, the cohort born 1965–1975 has
experienced a decrease in social fluidity: Austria,
Bulgaria, France and Sweden. 
£ In four countries, social fluidity (relative mobility)
has remained stable over the period examined:
Germany, Ireland, Poland and UK.
£ Social fluidity among men has decreased
(especially for the 1965–1975 cohort) in Austria,
Bulgaria, Estonia, France,  Sweden and the UK.  
£ Social fluidity among men has increased in
Germany and Spain. It has also increased in
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the
Netherlands and Slovakia  – countries where social
fluidity is high for both sexes. 
£ Social fluidity has in general changed less for
women than for men. It has increased in Belgium,
the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands and
the UK. In contrast, it has  decreased in Austria,
Germany, Spain and Sweden. 
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2Policy pointers
The policy debate on social mobility should be carefully
framed in order to distinguish absolute social mobility
from relative social mobility and to understand what
these concepts mean for policy. The interpretation of
research results for policy measures must take into
account the characteristics and quality of data, the
population assessed and how mobility is defined by
other methodological issues – all these make a
substantial difference to results. As the findings show
that social background continues to have a profound
effect on life chances, policymakers at EU, national and
regional levels should recognise its importance and
implement measures to promote equal opportunities
for upward social mobility so that everyone, regardless
of background, has the opportunity to realise their
potential. 
Furthermore, policymakers should reflect on the
indicators of social mobility: most common indicators
to measure social mobility, including both income and
occupation, have been chosen to capture standards of
living. One drawback is that they relate to people who
have a mature occupational or income status.
Stakeholders could examine the need to adjust and
develop the indicators further to reflect changes at
earlier life stages, such as education or employment
status.
Reflect on the indicators of social mobility: Most
common indicators to measure social mobility include
either income or occupation. Stakeholders could reflect
on the need to adjust and develop the indicators further
to take into account changes taking place on the labour
market (for example, changing jobs structure and new
forms of employment) and broader societal
developments (for example, the growing importance of
wealth). 
Investigate the reasons for success or failure in
promoting social fluidity: Six countries (Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands and
Slovakia) have managed to maintain high levels of
social fluidity for both men and women over the last
decades. Research should examine the key drivers
behind this, and investigate the reasons for stagnating –
even decreasing – fluidity in many countries (especially
among people born after 1964). 
Prioritise men of Generation X in policymaking: More
attention should be given to the decreasing life chances
among men born after 1964, whose prospects have
significantly deteriorated in many countries. Policies
should be put in place to reverse this trend.  
Identify and combat barriers to equal opportunities:
Institutional barriers can be addressed by increasing the
openness of closed occupational groups or professions,
creating fair and transparent access to occupations and
countering nepotism. Meanwhile, social investment can
boost equality of opportunity – through, for instance,
improving the quality and coverage of early education,
providing compensatory funding for disadvantaged
pupils and enabling better access to healthcare. 
Ensure that the most economically advanced Member
States maintain their policy focus on equal
opportunities: Social fluidity is not likely to continue
indefinitely upwards; it may have stagnated in the most
developed EU Member States. These countries should
still strive to remain socially fluid and ensure
opportunities for newcomers (ethnic minorities and
immigrants).
Organise educational tracking to benefit all pupils:
Early selection and tracking is a potential barrier to
social mobility. However, when based on objective
standards and monitoring, it can also prevent early
school-leaving for less academic children. The focus of
the debate, therefore, should not be on early selection
as such, but on ensuring that it is organised so that
students of all abilities benefit from it.
Strive to moderate residential segregation: The
concentration of disadvantaged households in
particular areas negatively affects people’s life chances.
Policymakers, especially at the local level, should pay
more attention to the creation of areas with more mixed
housing and different types of schools. Such mixed
developments can mitigate the effects of social and
economic inequalities.  
Build social mobility into the country-specific
recommendations: Given that the broad objectives of
social mobility are to promote fair and equal life
chances, the main elements are in keeping with the
recommendations of the Annual Growth Survey 2016
regarding investment in people and services. The
country-specific recommendations should consistently
seek to address inequalities and promote equal
opportunities.  
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3For many decades, policy goals to promote upward
social mobility and equal chances for all have been
strongly aligned with the features of many European
countries. However, until recently, some policymakers
may not have been overly concerned with the level of
inequality as long as there was a high degree of
mobility, widespread opportunities for all and a
reasonable chance of succeeding in life (Brookings
Institution, 2008). 
The topic of equal opportunities for all has featured
strongly in the political and public arena in many
Member States. This has been reflected in the policy
debate both at national and EU level. Many citizens and
governments are becoming increasingly concerned that
– for the first time in decades – younger generations of
adults will have fewer opportunities for upward mobility
than today’s older generations enjoyed. This is a
widespread concern, relevant not only to those on low
incomes but also to the middle classes, albeit with
rather different characteristics in different Member
States (Atkinson, 2015; OECD, 2015a). 
The generation born in the decade or so after the
Second World War benefited from major structural and
sectoral changes in Europe. There was an expansion in
education and in the number of professional and
middle-class jobs. Changes in occupational structure
were evident broadly in the move towards a more
service-oriented economy, with white-collar jobs
replacing blue-collar ones, enabling qualified people to
move into higher occupational positions (Stiglitz, 2016):
hence, more people could be upwardly mobile. The
impact of economic growth was often captured in the
phrase ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’, commonly attributed
to US President John F. Kennedy (Washington Post,
2005). In short, during the ‘golden age’ of upward social
mobility (Goldthorpe, 2016), a range of factors,
especially growth in education and employment
opportunities, resulted in ‘more room at the top’ and
better general living standards.
Since the onset of the economic crisis in 2007, many
Europeans are facing lower living standards and social
and income inequalities appear to be increasing in
many Member States (Social Protection Committee,
2016). Young people find it increasingly hard to
graduate from formal education without having
accumulated debt, to find affordable housing and to get
a job that will allow them a good standard of living. The
numbers of people at risk of poverty and social
exclusion have increased; only in 2015 did they return to
the levels of 2008. Labour markets have become more
polarised between high-skilled/high-wage jobs and
low-skilled/low-paid work, with few prospects of
upward mobility (OECD, 2011, Eurofound, 2015a).
Evidently, the degree to which different countries have
experienced these changes varies greatly.
As income and social inequalities have widened to
historically high levels in many EU Member States, and
economic growth has slowed, attention has increasingly
been directed to the social and economic situation of
younger people, the lack of equal opportunities and the
transmission of disadvantage. There are concerns that
societies have become less fair and less equal.
Downward mobility appears to be more in evidence
than upward mobility. At the EU level, there has been
mounting concern over large differences in the level of
living standards between and within countries. 
Policymakers have been asking questions: Are these
concerns justified? How fluid and fair is European
society and how has it changed over the last few
decades? Are diminished levels of social mobility
evident in Europe? How does the story of social mobility
differ between Member States, and how does it relate to
trends in social and economic inequalities?
This report comes at a time of intense public and policy
debate on the role of public policies at the European,
national and regional levels in improving life chances
and fostering greater equality of opportunity. It
highlights the debate on social mobility taking place in
EU Member States and provides new evidence on
patterns of intergenerational social mobility in the
Union. It also introduces quantitative data to examine
to what extent family background is related to the
mobility of individuals born from 1926-1975. The report
uses qualitative information on the last decade to map
the most pronounced barriers to social mobility and
reviews the most relevant policies that facilitate upward
social mobility and equal opportunities. This is a big
subject that is both complex and controversial:
a measured debate on ‘social mobility’ demands clarity
of concepts and clear framing of the research questions.
This is difficult enough in any one Member State; this
report goes further still by seeking to provide an
informed comparison of developments across the EU.
Understanding social mobility
Social mobility can be examined from either an
intergenerational or an intragenerational perspective. 
Intergenerational mobility is understood as the
relationship between the parental and adult children’s
socioeconomic positions – in other words, the
individual’s current circumstances compared with the
circumstances in which that person originated. The
closer the strength of the association between parent
and child, the more limited social mobility has been
Introduction
4(Breen and Luijkx, 2004). Societies can be labelled as
more or less mobile for a defined period of time,
depending on the relationship between the current
socioeconomic situations of people and that of their
parents. Societies in which the current economic and
occupational status of an individual can be attributed to
the talents and efforts of that person rather than as a
result of parental wealth or status are societies that can
be characterised as fair and socially mobile. In such
societies, the potential of all people, including those
from less advantaged backgrounds, is realised
(McKnight, 2015). In short, investigating
intergenerational mobility means comparing the
current socioeconomic characteristics of a person with
those of their parents (usually the father). The indicator
of socioeconomic status may be occupation or income.
When occupation is chosen, usually the parent’s main
occupation is compared to that of their son or daughter
after they reach the age of 35 – when a ‘mature’
occupational status has been achieved.
Intragenerational mobility (not addressed in this
report) focuses on the transitions of individuals during
their lifetime by looking at the change in an individual’s
circumstances over time, most commonly by comparing
their first and their current job. Sometimes the focus is
on income mobility, but other studies have examined
the trajectories of the career of the individual (Torche,
2011; Miles and Vincent, 1993). 
A key distinction is made between absolute social
mobility and relative social mobility. Absolute mobility
refers to the overall numbers of people whose
occupation is in a different level of the social structure
from that of their parents (again, the focus is typically
on the labour market or occupational structure).
Evidently, some proportion of people will experience
upward mobility and another proportion downward
mobility. The exact number will depend upon how
‘mobility’ is precisely defined and measured. Absolute
social mobility most often relates to large-scale societal
and labour market changes that include a large number
of individuals moving between different occupational
classes (for example, in the post-industrial era it was
associated with the rise in service-oriented jobs and the
decline of blue-collar employment) (Hout, 1989;
Marshall, 1998). Absolute social mobility registers the
aggregate (net outcome) of individuals’ movements,
reflecting shifts in the structure of the economy and
society.
Relative social mobility (largely referred to in this report
as ‘social fluidity’) captures the probability that a child
will move from their parents’ place in the social
hierarchy to another category (in terms of occupation or
income) (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Movement
may be upwards or downwards. Phrased differently,
social fluidity refers to the chances of movement
between different classes. The term ‘social fluidity’
derives from the literature, where it is sometimes used
as a synonym for relative mobility. Social mobility (or
social fluidity) was originally introduced as a term by
Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979): it denotes
the inequality between individuals from different
occupational classes in terms of their chances of
occupying one destination class rather than another.
The degree of social fluidity is an indicator of societal
openness. Rates of relative mobility indicate the level of
social fluidity or ‘social openness’ or the degree of
‘equality of opportunity’ in a society (Goldthorpe, 2000).
The advantage of measures of relative social mobility
(or social fluidity) is that they control for the mobility
that may have happened in a society simply because the
economy developed and the occupational structure
changed (for example, the number of farmers
decreased, and the number of professionals increased).
Such measures point to real chances for individuals not
to be limited by their origin, regardless of structural
changes. A fair society needs a high level of social
fluidity so that talented people are able to compete, and
opportunities are not constrained by social origin; the
result otherwise is an ongoing social reproduction of
inequalities. A genuinely meritocratic society is
generally associated with a mobile society, allowing
individuals to rise to the highest ranks, irrespective of
their social background.
The important point to note is that absolute and relative
mobility rates are different measures: to some extent,
they reflect different phenomena. In a society, it is
possible for high levels of absolute mobility (large
numbers moving up or down) to coexist with low levels
of relative mobility (or social fluidity) and vice versa. The
distance between occupational origin and destination is
likely to be a combination of absolute and relative
mobility.
Eurofound’s contribution to
investigating social mobility
To varying degrees across Member States, there has
been significant and long-standing research examining
patterns of social mobility. This research has involved a
range of indicators used to measure mobility – most
often income or occupation. The countries covered
have usually been individual Member States, with some
notable exceptions (Breen, 2005). Investigating
intergenerational social mobility requires looking back
at fairly long periods of family history: therefore, all
current empirical studies relate to people (and their
parents) born in the last century. 
The overall research questions of Eurofound’s work are:
£ What are the patterns of social mobility in the EU?
£ What are the barriers to social mobility?
£ What are the policy responses to tackle these
challenges?
Social mobility in the EU 
5Taking into account policy relevance, availability of data
and existing research from other organisations, this
report focuses on intergenerational social mobility –
absolute and relative. It examines both the levels of
mobility that are the result of structural changes and
societal progress (absolute mobility) as well as the
extent to which countries have been and are open to
mobility, offering equal opportunities to all of their
citizens (relative mobility, or social fluidity). Both
dimensions are vital for a full understanding of patterns
of social mobility and how the influence of family
background interlinks with broader societal and
technological changes, leading to an examination of
what actions policymakers could take to improve living
standards and opportunities for all citizens. 
This research brings added value to the subject: the
report is unique in that it covers social mobility across
all 28 EU countries and uses both quantitative and
qualitative information to inform comparisons between
countries. Unlike many previous works in the field, this
report examines patterns of social mobility for men and
women separately, underlining the increasingly
important gender dimension. Inevitably, empirical
information on patterns of intergenerational social
mobility involves looking back at developments in the
lives of people who have reached occupational
maturity. The qualitative information from
correspondents in Member States relates more
specifically to the last decade and captures the most
current and pressing issues in terms of policy debate
and policies put in place to address equal opportunities
and social mobility. Finally, in looking at patterns of
social mobility in the EU, special attention is given to
differences between clusters of countries – considering,
in particular, developments in post-socialist countries
after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
Some of the strengths of this study are also limitations.
In particular, since the report aims to present results for
many countries in a short format, analyses and
interpretation are constrained. However, the results
presented can serve as a basis for more in-depth follow-
up work by other organisations. Such work is
particularly needed to assist policymakers and
stakeholders in designing and implementing
appropriate policies and measures aimed at promoting
social mobility. 
In measuring social mobility, Eurofound uses
occupational status as the key indicator. Occupation
has been identified as the indicator that best reflects
social inequalities and has an important impact on a
wide range of individuals’ life chances and life choices
(Goldthorpe, 2016; Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2006).
The strength of this classification by occupation is that
it is associated with three important aspects of our
economic lives: income security, short-term prospects
and longer-term income prospects (Goldthorpe and
McKnight, 2006; McGovern et al, 2008). 
European and international
policy context 
The EU policy agenda has long been driven by the goal
of raising employment and overall standards of living,
reducing levels of poverty and boosting social cohesion.
The Europe 2020 strategy, launched in 2010, is a 10-year
jobs and growth strategy with five headline targets
around employment; research and development;
climate/energy; education; and poverty reduction. One
of the key pillars of Europe 2020 is inclusive growth, to
be promoted by a high-employment economy that
delivers social and territorial cohesion (European
Commission, 2010). Social mobility is referred to in the
Europe 2020 strategy in terms of equal opportunity: ‘It is
about ensuring access and opportunities for all
throughout the lifecycle.’ The economic downturn and
its social and economic consequences have impeded
movement towards the targets, but the EU is still
committed to the principles of inclusive growth, social
cohesion and all Europeans having equal opportunities
to succeed in life. This has been evident in recent policy
statements and analyses that highlight the relevance of
social mobility in EU and national debates. 
The Social Investment Package (launched in 2013)
touches on social mobility from the perspective of
human capital and proactive social policies,
emphasising the importance of investing in people from
early childhood to old age (European Commission,
2013b). In the context of growing inequalities, the EU
Social Protection Committee has focused on the
importance of equality of opportunities (referring
specifically to the role of education, healthcare and
childcare services for occupational achievement). 
Even though it focuses mainly on euro zone countries,
the ‘Five presidents’ report’ (Juncker, 2015),
acknowledges that the success of European Monetary
Union depends on the fair functioning of the labour
markets and the welfare system, citing in particular a
need for equal access to education to prevent
inequalities and social exclusion. 
The current European Commission has put the issue of
fairness among their top priorities, along with jobs,
growth and democratic change. One perspective on
fairness was illustrated by the UK government, which in
2011 published a strategy on social mobility: ‘A fair
society is an open society, one in which every individual
is free to succeed. That is why improving social mobility
is the principal goal of the Government’s social policy’
(HM Government, 2011). The goal of a fairer society also
underpins the ongoing European Commission
consultation for the European Pillar of Social Rights,
which directly refers to the negative impact of widening
inequalities on social mobility (European Commission,
2016). The document goes on to cite unequal access to
childcare, education and health as the main barrier to
Social mobility in the EU
6equal opportunities that can continue into later life,
affecting also labour market participation. 
This ongoing debate about inequalities and equal
opportunities is not restricted to the EU or even to
Europe. Concern about the end of the American Dream,
the idea that everyone can succeed regardless of their
background, has captured recent policy discussion in
the United States – particularly in the recent
presidential election debates. This concern has also
been reflected in academic research (Putnam, 2015).
Australia, Canada and Mexico have also witnessed
increased attention being paid to widening social and
economic inequalities and to growing inequality of
opportunity. The OECD has built on its extensive work
on growing income inequalities by establishing a Centre
for Opportunity and Equality, which is a platform for
policy-oriented research on trends in, and the causes
and consequences of, inequalities – and policies to
address them (OECD, 2015a). 
Structure of the report 
Chapter 1 is a literature review, documenting trends and
patterns of social mobility across EU Member States,
giving particular attention to a broad European
coverage (as the majority of the most cited and most
well-known research has focused mainly on the US, the
UK and a few other Western countries) and outlining the
main concepts and theories behind social mobility. This
chapter also includes the methodology for the
quantitative analysis. 
Chapter 2 presents the main findings from existing
comparative studies and maps patterns of absolute
social mobility across 24 EU countries, while Chapter 3
performs the equivalent task for relative social mobility
(social fluidity) in 20 EU countries. For both chapters,
data from the European Social Survey (ESS) were used
to perform the analysis. The ESS has been identified as
the best available source of data given the number of
countries covered and the high quality of its data. It
includes information on the occupation of respondents
and both of their parents. 
Chapter 4 examines the contextual factors and drivers
behind patterns of social mobility in four selected
country clusters: the Baltic states, the Netherlands,
Poland and the UK. The information derives from a
series of in-depth country workshops (involving mainly
academic experts), which sought to provide information
on the patterns and barriers to social mobility in
different countries and the policies or measures that
have contributed to promoting upward social mobility.
Chapter 5 turns to the current policy situation and
examines how social mobility has been an issue on the
policy agenda in different Member States and how the
policy debate has been framed (for example, in terms of
equal opportunities, life chances or growing social and
income inequalities). The chapter also looks at the main
drivers of inequality, the stakeholders involved in
Member States and differences between clusters of
countries (see Annex 3 for more information on the
country clustering).
Chapter 6 examines specific barriers to social mobility
(as highlighted in policy debates and/or assessed in
dedicated studies), focusing on systemic factors.
Chapter 7 looks at policies introduced at national level
that have been identified as key to promoting equality
of opportunity, particularly for disadvantaged
individuals. The chapter examines policies in childcare
and early education, school and the labour market. A
short section is dedicated to an overview of initiatives
and measures that Member States have put in place to
tackle barriers to social mobility stemming from
regional inequalities. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are based on information collected
by Eurofound’s network of European correspondents.
The network covers all 28 EU Member States plus
Norway. The questionnaire was completed and
analysed in the first quarter of 2016 (see Annex 2). It is
important to note that the information included in the
report refers to the situation in the Member States at
the time of data collection. 
The report concludes with a summary of the main
findings and policy pointers for stakeholders and
policymakers at the national and European level. 
Social mobility in the EU 
7Key terms used in study
Social mobility, which is understood as occupational
mobility in this report, is the movement of individuals
and groups from one position to another over time. For
the purposes of analysis, similar occupations are
grouped into socioeconomic classes. Measuring
mobility in terms of occupational achievement has
advantages over other methods: class membership is
relatively stable over time compared with, say, level of
income. It is also a more precise measurement, as it
reflects the life chances of individuals and a certain
degree of embeddedness in society. This is only
properly captured if socioeconomic status is measured
once a person has gained occupational maturity – the
stage where they have reached a stable position in life
that is unlikely to change (considered to be from age 35
on). The dominant socioeconomic class membership of
the parents when the respondent was aged 14 is
understood as the respondent’s ‘social origin’
(depending on the occupation of both parents  and
classified according to whichever is highest). ‘Social
destination’ is measured by the occupation that an
occupationally mature individual has achieved at the
time of measurement. There is an evident hierarchical
gradation between socioeconomic classes  in the
European Socioeconomic Classification from the
bottom to the top of the classification, but this is not
necessarily the case between adjacent classes (see
Table 2 on p. 11). Groupings of similar occupations are
used to simplify  the analysis, while socioeconomic
classes stand for different levels of access to resources
(education, social capital, wealth) and life chances. In
general, children from a lower blue-collar origin have
fewer resources at their disposal than the offspring of
parents who hold white-collar occupations. A more
detailed description of the class scheme is provided below
(see p.10). 
One of the fundamentals of mobility research is the
distinction between absolute and relative mobility.
Absolute mobility rates are changes in the structure of
occupations across time on the aggregate level. These
reflect structural change in an economy and society and
the general upgrading of status in a society (moving to
fewer low-level occupations and to more medium- or
high-level jobs). It is possible to compare countries over
time to see how the process of modernisation – or
industrialisation – is happening. Relative mobility rates
show social fluidity: they represent the chances that
individuals will occupy a different socioeconomic class
from that of their parents (this includes the opportunity
to move both upwards and downwards); the less
fluidity, the more individuals will remain where their
parents were. 
Social mobility: major themes in
research literature
There are two long-established hypotheses about how
patterns of social mobility might vary over time. The
first hypothesis is the ‘liberal theory of industrialism’ –
the modernisation hypothesis associated with the work
of Parsons (1960) and Kerr et al (1960). This hypothesis
claims that absolute mobility increases as a result of
economic progress. However, social fluidity will also be
affected, as ongoing economic progress means
increased economic competition, which in turn means
that employers are likely to recruit people based on
their acquired skills and qualifications rather than their
social backgrounds. 
One of the main consequences of greater social fluidity
will be the growing importance of education as an
important determinant of someone’s socioeconomic
position. Crucially, the theory also assumes that the
education system itself will also become more
meritocratic. The theory goes on to make the point that
the increasingly complex nature of the labour market
and the labour force will make it less likely that
advantageous positions will be automatically inherited.
The overall trend should be one of greater openness,
especially as far as the labour market is concerned,
where employers increasingly recruit on the basis of
merit and educational qualifications rather than
parents’ socioeconomic class and associated
characteristics.
In contrast, the Featherman, Jones and Hauser (FJH)
hypothesis (1975) argues that in advanced industrial
societies, the association between origins and
destinations will display a basic cross-national similarity.
This means that one should expect little variation over
time or indeed between countries. The hypothesis also
makes an important point from a policymaking
perspective insofar as patterns of social mobility are
quite resistant to any policy interventions. This theory is
broadly in line with the Lipset-Zetterberg (LZ) theory of
mobility, which claims that ‘the overall pattern of social
mobility appears to be much the same in the industrial
societies of various western countries’ (Lipset and
Bendix, 1959). The LZ thesis therefore also suggests that
countries with similar levels of industrialisation have
similar rates of (absolute) mobility. 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) have refined the FJH
thesis, saying that countries display similarities in their
patterns of relationship between origins and
destinations, but at the same time may also show some
deviation in the strength of this association, which can
be affected by policy intervention; this is of course
important from a policymaking perspective. They also
1 Literature review and methodology
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argue that inequalities in mobility chances have a self-
reinforcing quality. They see a lack of variation over
time in class-related inequalities, which can be largely
attributed to the fact that groups in a position of wealth
and advantage pursue actions that maintain their
power and position in society. 
More recently, Breen (2005) suggested that there could
be a third way. He pointed out that both of the previous
hypotheses are based on data from the ‘golden age’ of
capitalism (from the end of the Second World War until
the mid-1970s) – a period of growth, of full, stable and
predictable employment, and of the development and
extension of the welfare state. From the 1980s, however,
countries started to follow different paths, some
Member States moving towards greater deregulation
and privatisation of certain segments of the economy
and state. In addition, in recent years, countries have
experienced several economic recessions and battled
with the economic and social consequences of these.
The ways in which countries have responded to the
crises, especially that of 2008, have also varied. Job
losses and growth in different occupations have
impacted on the patterns and the levels of social
mobility, which are also likely to have been affected by
growth of income inequalities (Eurofound, 2016). 
Comparative studies on patterns
of occupational mobility 
Several international studies have examined
intergenerational occupational social mobility in
European countries. However, empirical research on
comparative social mobility has so far been limited due
to lack of suitable comparable data. 
Ganzeboom and Treiman (2006) analysed data from 35
countries drawn from the period 1947–1986 and
concluded that, despite substantial cross-national
differences, there was an overall reduction of about 1%
per annum in the strength of the association between
class origins and class destinations at the aggregate
level, meaning greater social fluidity. 
Breen and Luijkx (2004), using 117 mobility surveys,
compared 11 countries (9 European countries) and
found that France, Germany, Ireland and Italy tended to
show low levels of intergenerational social mobility. In
contrast, in the Scandinavian countries (in particular,
Norway and Sweden) and the post-socialist countries
Hungary and Poland it seemed to be more possible for
individuals to occupy positions that differ from their
social origin. Two countries show the most pronounced
changes: the Netherlands had become considerably
more socially fluid, while the UK had moved from being
one of the most fluid countries to being quite static. The
authors argue that the results demonstrate that there is
no convergence in terms of equality of opportunity. 
Beller and Hout (2006) focus on the levels of social
mobility and the welfare regimes of different countries.
Using an approach to mobility based on the ISCO-88
schema –  converted into an eight-occupational class
version of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) – they looked
at 18 countries grouped into four welfare types: 1
£ corporatist (Cyprus, France, Germany, Ireland,
Israel, Portugal); 
£ liberal (Canada, Chile, New Zealand, US); 
£ social-democratic (Norway, Sweden); 
£ post-socialist (Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia,
Poland, Russia, Slovakia). 
They found that post-socialist and social-democratic
welfare regimes foster a weaker origin–destination
association, meaning greater social fluidity. Origin–
destination association is weaker for individuals with
the highest level of education. This finding is supported
by Breen (2005) and Hout (1989). Occupational mobility
is strongly linked with family background and
education. High rates of educational mobility directly
produce higher rates of occupational mobility.
Increased access to higher education may lower the
overall origin–destination association (in other words,
increase social mobility), as the association is low for
individuals with college degrees. Social-democratic and
post-socialist Member States promote equality of
occupational opportunity across generations without
explicitly relying on access to higher education as a
catalyst for upward social mobility.
The authors also found that corporatist, post-socialist
and liberal welfare states have higher rates of social
fluidity if access to education is fostered, but lower rates
if access to education is hindered. 
Esping-Andersen and Wagner (2012) used the 2005 data
from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
survey (EU-SILC) for five countries (Denmark, France,
Italy, Norway and Spain) and investigated asymmetries
in the opportunities structure. They found that the
impact of class origin on educational attainment had
weakened in France and the Nordic countries,
decreased somewhat in Spain and remained persistent
in Italy. In Nordic countries, the equalisation of life
chances is asymmetrical: marginal effects of welfare
states policies are felt far more strongly at the bottom of
the social class pyramid. As a consequence, the
disadvantages associated with lower social class origins
1 More information on the ISCO-88 schema can be found on the website of the Warwick Institute for Employment Research:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ier/research/classification/isco88/english
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being in a privileged class do still persist. This is
especially the case in Denmark. 
The role of education in occupational social mobility
has been a focus of several comparative studies.
Triventi (2013), using 2005–2006 data from the
FLEXibility survey (Reflex) investigated mechanisms
whereby social inequalities are reproduced among
graduates of third-level education. He found that the
effect of parental education is greater on occupational
status than on income, with the most pronounced effect
found in Spain. In all countries, a parent’s graduation
from a leading educational institution is a greater
determinant of a respondent’s occupational status than
their income. (It may be that income, and not
occupational status, is more related to skills, which are
not fully certified by educational credentials.) Finally, in
all countries except Germany, people whose parents
were educated to tertiary level are more likely to have a
highly paid occupation.
The European Commission DG Regional Policy 2010
report Social mobility and intra-regional income also
dedicated a small section to the analysis of
occupational social mobility (European Commission,
2010). The report found that Portugal and Spain,
followed closely by Austria, Belgium and Poland, had
the highest proportions of respondents who shared the
same occupational group as their father. Finland and
France had the lowest share, indicating greater levels of
social mobility. Most immobility is registered for the
‘professional’ category (group 2 of the ISCO-88 scale).
When it comes to educational mobility, the greatest
mobility is recorded in Lithuania, Sweden and the UK,
while the least mobility is found in the Czech Republic,
Germany and Slovakia. The most ‘immobile’ category
was ISCED 5 (first stage of tertiary education).
To conclude, it is evident that the literature shows
somewhat different, if not contradictory, findings, even
though the main focus of all the studies referred to
above has been on occupational mobility. This should
not be of major concern, as many scholars have
highlighted a range of factors that may lie behind the
differences in results. These can include the period
covered, age brackets or the different occupational
classes and grouping of classes used for the analysis.
The inclusion of both men and women also plays a role.
Evidence is rather mixed as far as post-socialist
countries are concerned. What is evident, though, is that
a number of research organisations as well as other
stakeholders have called for comparative research
mapping patterns of social mobility in the EU countries
using coherent data sets that also pay attention to the
gender dimension. 
Overview of the empirical
analysis in this study
The following chapters present a mapping of absolute
mobility in 24 EU Member States and an analysis of
social fluidity (relative mobility) in 20 of these countries
(the reduction in the number of countries relates to the
adequacy of sample sizes for analysis). 
Assessing the mobility of societies in absolute terms
(compare Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Breen 2005)
means measuring the movement of individuals from
their class of origin to their class of destination.
Absolute mobility is also an indication of societal
change, a consequence of the modernisation
(industrialisation) of a society, or its post-modernisation
(the movement from an industrial to a services-based
economy). Traditionally, a society sees its agricultural
sector decline to make way for more jobs in industry –
commonly known as modernisation or industrialisation.
At some point, jobs in industry decline and the children
of those who worked in heavy industry move on to jobs
in the services sector (Bell, 1976; Fourastié, 1979;
Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). The more a society is
modernising, the more it creates jobs with higher skill
levels while destroying jobs in low-productivity areas.
This is a situation that Schumpeter (1942) called
‘creative destruction’. Social mobility is thus related to
modernisation and structural change.
In terms of its contribution to existing research, the
added-value of Eurofound’s work is twofold: it performs
a cross-country comparison and reports a change in
mobility patterns over three cohorts, using recent data
for a large number of EU countries. (This latter exercise
on change in mobility patterns has already been done
by Breen and Luijkx (2004) for an earlier period and of
course in the seminal work by Erikson and Goldthorpe
(1992), on whose work this chapter relies.)
In the following section, the data source used in this
study is introduced. This is followed by a presentation of
the class scheme that has been employed to estimate
mobility. Then some first results on absolute mobility in
Europe are presented, along with some of the models
that estimate relative mobility.
Data
The quantitative data source used in this study is the
European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a cross-
national survey that measures attitudes, beliefs and
behaviour patterns of random samples of population in
more than 30 countries. The ESS has all the data needed
for the creation of class variables – for respondents and
both of their parents. Not all countries are available
across the different waves of the ESS. Table 1 gives an
overview of the countries for which data are available
and the total numbers of observations for the first five
waves of the survey. Countries that are not members of
the EU28 have been omitted. Only those respondents
Social mobility in the EU
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who worked at some stage of their life are included.
All respondents who have never worked were excluded,
along with all those for whom information on the
occupational position of at least one parent is lacking.
The reported occupation of the father and mother when
the respondent was aged 14 is used to determine the
respondent’s social origin. 
Surveys implemented between 2002 and 2010 were
used, and respondents aged 35 to 75 were identified. In
other words, respondents selected for mobility analysis
were born between 1927 (being 75 years old in the ESS1
in 2002) and 1975 (being 35 in the ESS5 in 2010), and the
information on the status of their parents can refer to a
period between 1941 and 1989. This choice of age
category is motivated by the requirement to observe
occupational maturity among the youngest
respondents – in other words, that they have reached a
point in their professional lives that can be considered
determinant (35 years), in contrast to younger
respondents who may still gradually improve their class
positions. The upper boundary of 75 years was selected
because of differential mortality, as incumbents of
higher classes are more likely to survive beyond that
age than individuals from lower classes. 
Table 1 also shows the number of observations per
country where all the required information to proceed
with the mobility analysis is available. The country with
the highest number of observations is Finland, which
participated in all five waves of the ESS since it began in
2002. Most of the new Member States from the 2004 and
2010 enlargements are only present in up to four waves,
with the notable exceptions of Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia. The fewest observations exist for Lithuania,
which only participated in two waves – with a total of
1,014 observations. Italy and Romania were excluded
because of data issues. Further on, the analysis of
absolute mobility is carried out for 24 countries;
however, countries with fewer than three waves or
fewer than 2,500 observations are not used in the
analysis of relative mobility, because too many blank
cells affect the estimation, both for the country in
question and for other countries (these countries are
listed in italics in Table 1). 2
Class scheme
The two preeminent approaches to stratification are the
Weberian approach, which focuses on life chances, and
the Marxist one, which focuses on resources and power.
Sociology has been dealing with class analysis since
Marx’s unfinished discussion in his work, Capital. Marx’s
conceptualisation of classes takes its origin in the
organisation of production and his concern with the
egalitarian distribution of resources. Marxists look at
history and analyse how ownership of resources and
appropriation of labour power have shaped class
structure, affecting life chances and resulting in conflict
and social change. 
The Weberian class analysis looks at economic assets,
their market value and the exchange relations providing
a differential control over income and therefore life
chances, options and opportunities (Weber, 1922). In
this view, the class situation stands for market situation,
incorporating dimensions of ownership of property and
control over means of production (Breen, 2005).
Weberian class analysis does not claim to identify a
group as the ‘engine of social change’ with the aim of
2 All annexes are available on the Eurofound web page for this report. 
Table 1: Countries, waves and number of observations in the European Social Survey (ESS), 2002–2010      
Country (waves) Observations Country (waves) Observations Country (waves) Observations
Austria (4) 5,183 Finland (5) 11,976 Netherlands (5) 9,776
Belgium (5) 7,025 France (5) 7,302 Poland (5) 6,929
Bulgaria (3) 5,624 Germany (5) 10,714 Portugal (5) 5,167
Croatia (2) 1,845 Greece (4) 7,026 Slovakia (4) 6,421
Cyprus (3) 2,451 Hungary (5) 6,146 Slovenia (5) 5,228
Czech Republic (4) 6,259 Ireland (5) 5,718 Spain (5) 6,841
Denmark (5) 8,892 Lithuania (2) 1,014 Sweden (5) 6,986
Estonia (4) 7,174 Luxembourg (2) 2,195 Sweden (5) 9,740
Note: Number of respondents aged 35–75 years. Data weighted with frequency weights based on rounded design weights; for more information
on the weighting applied, see Annex 4.2 All 24 countries have been used for the analysis of absolute mobility, but those countries with fewer than
three waves or fewer than 2,500 observations are not used for the analysis of relative mobility (these are shown in italics). 
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations. 
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realising an egalitarian society. Classes are not the
major source of conflict, as any social division (gender,
region, ethnicity, race, age) can give rise to conflict over
scarce resources. Compared to other dimensions used
to analyse mobility (such as income or education), using
occupational classes provides a more robust measure
for status in society, as class membership is more
closely linked to other dimensions of status, such as
education, capital possessions or social connections,
and is more durable: income levels, education and even
wealth may fluctuate more often than the class
membership based on occupation. 
The most recent and detailed socioeconomic
classification based on Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero
(EGP) is that developed by Rose and Harrison (2007,
2010) as part of the EU’s Sixth Framework Programme
(FP6) between 2004 and 2006 and the European
Socioeconomic Classification (ESeC). The class scheme
is largely based on the EGP with a few minor alterations.
The EGP class scheme was developed by Erikson,
Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979) and is also known as
the Comparative study of social mobility in industrial
nations (CASMIN) scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe,
1992; Goldthorpe, 1980; Goldthorpe, 1984). The EGP
scheme combines the Marxist ownership perspective
with the Weberian market-based approach to form
classes in terms of their assets and resources:
education, income, wealth and social capital. The
fundamental distinction, apart from that between
employers or the self-employed (owners of means of
production) and dependent employers (offering their
labour and skills), is based on the labour contract –
service contracts and labour contracts.
The European Socioeconomic Classification (ESeC) also
has the advantage of being well documented, plus the
coding scheme and the syntax to implement it are
available to the research community (see Table 2 for
details of the classification; a more detailed outline of
the class scheme is presented in Annex 4).3
To gauge the first results of the class distribution of the
respondents and their parents in the ESS using the
methodology described in Annex 4, an aggregated class
structure of the parents compared with one of their
children in the data is shown. The distribution of
parents across the class scheme adopted for all
countries for which data are available is presented in
Table 3. The table shows the share of the respondents’
parents in each of the classes as defined above, by
country. 
A cautionary note about the parents’ class distribution
has to be made here: this distribution does not
represent the distribution of individuals across classes
at any given time, as the information on parents is
collected via the respondents to the survey. However, it
reflects the social origin of respondents in the survey
and also provides good information on historical
occupational class structures and the structural change
that took place in societies in the second half of the 20th
century. 
3 All annexes are available online together with the electronic version of this report. 
Table 2: European Socioeconomic Classification (ESeC), 2007     
Note: Categories take into account the highest level of occupation (based on ISCO-88), span of control (number of dependent employees) and
labour market status (employed or self-employed).
Source: Rose and Harrison (2007).
1 Large employers, higher-grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations
2 Lower-grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations and higher-grade technician and supervisory occupations
3 Intermediate occupations
4 Small employer and self-employed occupations (excluding agriculture, logging, fishing, etc.)
5 Self-employed occupations (agriculture, logging, fishing, etc.)
6 Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations
7 Lower services, sales and clerical occupations
8 Lower technical occupations
9 Routine occupations
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Table 3 shows that – with the exception of Cyprus,
Finland, Greece and Poland – the share of independent
farmers in the parents’ generation is well below 25%  in
most countries. The changes in the share of farmers
from generation to generation were most extensive in
Greece (a drop of 29 percentage points), Poland
(–28 percentage points), Cyprus (–25 percentage
points), Finland (–22 percentage points) and Ireland
(–17 percentage points).4 In many countries, the share of
parents in the service classes (classes 1 and 2) represents
about one-third of the class of origin: the UK (36%),
Sweden (34%), Belgium (30%), Denmark (30%), and in
the Baltic countries, with 32% in Lithuania and 29% in
Estonia (Latvia has been omitted). In most other
countries, the share of respondents’ social origin in
classes 1 or 2 is around one-fifth. The exceptions are
Greece, and Portugal, where the share is lower than 10%.
4 All figures given here are percentage point changes, not growth rates.
Table 3: Parents and respondents – distribution across socioeconomic classification by country (%)      
A. Class of origin
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Large
employers,
higher
managers/
professionals
Lower
managers/
professionals,
higher
supervisory/
technicians
Intermediate
occupations
Small
employers
and self-
employed
(non-
agriculture)
Small
employers
and self-
employed
(agriculture)
Lower
supervisors
and
technicians
Lower sales
and service
Lower
technical
Routine
AT 8.0 13.4 9.4 10.7 15.7 10.8 5.2 15.4 11.4
BE 11.6 17.9 6.0 18.1 7.4 7.2 3.0 14.5 14.1
BG 8.5 14.8 3.7 1.7 3.8 6.0 5.9 20.8 34.8
CY 2.7 6.8 3.4 22.6 27.0 4.0 3.2 10.5 19.7
CZ 6.4 20.4 6.9 0.4 3.1 7.9 9.1 31.0 14.7
DE 10.3 16.5 10.3 7.4 5.3 11.2 6.4 22.5 10.1
DK 13.4 16.0 6.0 5.5 15.5 7.4 7.8 13.2 15.3
EE 15.8 13.7 4.6 0.5 4.5 11.7 6.3 30.6 12.2
EL 3.1 4.9 2.7 21.4 42.8 2.2 2.8 7.0 13.1
ES 5.9 7.9 3.3 17.7 13.8 5.2 3.7 16.8 25.7
FI 6.7 14.7 3.1 14.6 25.6 4.5 5.7 13.0 12.1
FR 11.2 15.7 7.2 13.9 8.0 10.6 5.1 15.3 12.7
HR 6.4 14.0 6.7 5.4 7.5 6.7 3.7 18.9 30.7
HU 8.0 14.6 5.2 3.4 3.7 8.2 5.7 25.3 26.0
IE 6.6 14.0 4.1 12.2 22.0 9.0 3.4 9.2 19.6
LT 12.5 19.5 2.8 3.5 0.3 6.0 7.3 12.8 35.3
LU 7.8 12.8 4.4 4.8 13.9 10.2 3.8 20.4 21.8
NL 10.3 17.9 4.7 14.8 9.4 12.3 3.5 14.7 12.4
PL 4.2 10.7 3.0 4.4 40.5 4.8 3.4 14.3 14.7
PT 3.0 4.1 3.3 15.5 16.5 4.6 5.0 23.1 24.8
SE 13.0 20.7 8.9 11.8 9.9 7.3 10.7 9.5 8.2
SI 10.5 11.9 4.0 0.5 6.0 22.6 5.0 22.5 17.0
SK 12.2 12.2 2.9 1.4 3.8 9.4 6.1 25.8 26.2
UK 14.2 21.6 6.2 9.0 2.4 12.1 6.6 10.3 17.6
EU24 9.3 14.5 5.3 6.6 13.2 8.6 5.5 17.2 16.8
13
Social mobility in the EU
The so-called middle classes (higher grade white-collar
workers in administration and the self-employed in
trade and sales, classes 3 and 4) represent between one-
fourth and one-fifth of the parents’ generation in most
western European countries – Belgium (24%), France
(21%), Spain (21%), Sweden (21%), Austria (20%) and
the Netherlands (20%). This stands in clear contrast to
the former socialist countries, where this figure is
around 10% or below. The number of self-employed
workers in particular was extremely low in former
socialist countries in eastern Europe (LT – 3.5%,
CZ – 0.4%, SI – 0.5% and SK – 1.4%), being almost
non-existent in some countries (EE, CZ, SI). Many
parents in east European countries were employed in
blue-collar jobs (classes 6 and 8)  – Slovenia (45%),
Estonia (42%), the Czech Republic (39%), Slovakia (35%)
and Hungary (34%). This is in contrast to western
European countries, where the figures are well below
30%, with the exception of Germany (34%) and
Luxembourg (31%), where at one time 80% of gross
domestic product (GDP) was dependent on the steel
industry. 
Note: Class of origin and destination follow the European Socioeconomic Classification (ESeC) used by Rose and Harrison (2007). Class of origin
refers to the categories of the respondents’ parents when the respondent was 14 years old. Class of destination refers to categories that respondents
belong to themselves. For a fuller description of the classes, please see Table 2. This selection of countries comprises 24 EU Member States.
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
B. Class of destination
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Large
employers,
higher
managers/
professionals
Lower
managers/
professionals,
higher
supervisory/
technicians
Intermediate
occupations
Small
employers
and self-
employed
(non-
agriculture)
Small
employers
and self-
employed
(agriculture)
Lower
supervisors
and
technicians
Lower sales
and service
Lower
technical
Routine
AT 8.2 25.3 15.6 7.3 2.9 9.9 11.9 6.9 12.0
BE 13.5 26.1 8.8 9.1 1.1 10.4 7.9 6.5 16.7
BG 8.3 16.0 6.7 4.8 0.6 5.0 11.8 15.6 31.2
CY 7.3 12.4 10.3 12.4 1.9 10.6 12.7 11.0 21.5
CZ 6.5 20.5 9.7 7.4 0.6 6.4 9.4 15.7 23.8
DE 12.9 23.8 13.4 6.8 0.9 11.1 9.0 9.2 13.0
DK 15.5 24.0 11.4 7.0 0.8 10.1 9.9 6.6 14.8
EE 13.8 18.1 4.7 4.8 0.7 8.7 9.4 14.7 25.1
EL 6.5 11.5 6.5 19.5 14.0 5.8 8.6 9.5 18.1
ES 8.1 11.1 9.1 14.1 3.6 8.8 8.3 12.0 24.2
FI 13.9 21.1 7.1 8.2 4.0 5.9 10.8 12.5 16.4
FR 13.1 22.2 13.7 7.2 0.9 8.6 11.1 6.9 16.4
HR 10.5 18.4 11.7 5.4 0.9 10.4 9.7 14.6 18.4
HU 8.4 16.4 9.0 6.5 1.0 5.8 9.8 18.3 24.7
IE 10.8 22.5 8.8 8.9 4.9 9.7 11.9 5.5 17.0
LT 8.1 25.3 9.7 0.4 0.1 5.4 9.1 17.5 24.5
LU 12.5 22.3 9.2 6.2 2.7 12.5 7.5 8.5 18.7
NL 15.8 30.7 10.2 6.7 1.1 11.0 9.9 4.8 9.7
PL 7.2 16.1 6.2 6.7 12.7 7.0 7.9 13.2 23.1
PT 4.4 10.8 6.6 11.7 3.0 6.9 10.7 17.7 28.3
SE 16.3 26.3 10.9 6.8 1.3 8.3 13.0 6.0 11.1
SI 14.8 22.0 8.3 5.7 0.7 15.6 6.4 10.1 16.5
SK 7.7 21.7 7.8 6.2 0.4 8.5 7.9 14.7 25.1
UK 13.9 23.3 8.2 9.8 0.8 12.2 11.2 4.1 16.5
EU24 11.4 20.8 9.3 8.2 2.7 8.9 9.9 10.3 18.6
14
In four of the former socialist republics, the most
common social origin is either routine occupations
(class 9) or lower sales and service occupations (class 7)
– Lithuania (43%), Bulgaria (41%), Croatia (34%) and
Hungary (32%). Some of the countries in western
Europe also have a higher share in this class of origin,
but lower than in the countries above. This is the case
for Portugal (30%), Spain (29%) and Luxembourg (26%);
the share is even less in the UK (24%), Denmark (23%)
and Ireland (23%). 
As indicated above, the most dramatic changes in a
generation happened for people of agricultural and
blue-collar origin, which in broad terms can be related
to both the modernisation and post-modernisation of
societies. For those countries that have seen their rural
sector decline most, the following changes are visible
over the generations: Greece (–29% percentage points),
Poland (–28%), Cyprus (–25%) and Finland (–22%). A
decrease in employment in the manufacturing sector
and therefore a corresponding decrease in blue-collar
workers (both skilled and unskilled – classes 6 and 8)
was most noticeable in Estonia and Slovenia (–19%),
the Czech Republic (–17%), Germany (–13%) and
Slovakia (–12%). Some countries have also seen their
heavy industries increase their workforce: Cyprus (+7%),
Greece (+6%), Lithuania (+4%) and Finland and Poland
(+1%). There appears to be a pattern, especially in
European countries, whereby a decline in farming is
followed by growth in manufacturing and industry, then
followed by services development (sometimes also
called Petty’s law). A notable exception to this rule,
however, is Ireland, where the shift has occurred from
farming to services without a noticeable increase in
manufacturing (except in Northern Ireland). 
The Netherlands and Sweden have the largest share of
respondents themselves working in service classes 1
and 2 (large employers, higher- and lower-grade
professionals, administrative and managerial
occupations, higher-grade technician and supervisory
occupations): 47% and 43% respectively, while the
figure in Belgium and Denmark is close to 40%. In most
other western European countries, the share is around
one-third of the working population. The exceptions in
western Europe are Spain (19%), Greece (18%) and
Portugal (15%). In most eastern European Member
States, the share is around one-quarter of the working
population. 
The lower-skilled occupations – trade, personal
services, unskilled blue-collar and routine jobs – make
up less than 30% of the working population across
Europe, with substantial differences across countries.
The shares are highest in former socialist countries:
Bulgaria (43%), Estonia (35%), Hungary (35%), Lithuania
(34%) and the Czech Republic (33%). However, the
figures are also high for Portugal (39%) and Cyprus
(34%). Across Europe, for each person working in less-
skilled routine occupations (classes 7–9), two work in
higher professional or managerial jobs or in clerical
professions (classes 1–3). The figures in the Netherlands
are in the ratio of 1:3, while in all other western
European Member States the ratio is over 1:2. The ratio
is less than 1:1 only in Bulgaria and Portugal, meaning
that more respondents work in unskilled professions
than in skilled professions. In Estonia, Hungary and
Poland, the ratio is close to 1:1. 
In sum, Member States in the EU are at different levels
of modernisation/post-modernisation and have
witnessed substantial changes in their class
composition over the last two generations. Some
countries have seen their agricultural sector decrease
only in recent decades, with a corresponding increase in
the share of workers in manufacturing sectors (in
particular, Cyprus and Greece) or in the services sectors
(especially Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).
The countries that started the process of
industrialisation in the 19th and early 20th centuries
have the highest shares of respondents in the higher
occupational classes and the lowest shares in either
agriculture or industry, reflecting what the theories on
modernisation postulate. 
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Absolute social mobility refers to the number of people
who moved to a different social class from that of their
parents. There can be two reasons for movements
between distinct classes: 
£ genuine individual mobility to a different social
class from one’s parents; 
£ a change in the social structure of origins and
destinations – for example, fewer farmers, fewer
miners, more service jobs and more professionals
from generation to generation.
Table 4 shows the transition or mobility table for all
respondents in the survey where there is sufficient
information on origin and destination. The rows
represent the class of origin, based on the highest level
of occupation (ISCO 88), span of control (number of
dependent employees) and labour market status
(employed or self-employed at the time the respondent
was aged 14). The columns represent the class of
destination of the respondents, based on the same
variables. Bold text, forming a diagonal pattern,
represents immobility (where children reproduced the
status their parents had). For example, 7,110
respondents in class 2 had the same occupational class
origin: among the 4,110 independent farmers, 3,039 of
them came from a farming background. (This is the
occupation in which children are most likely to
reproduce their parents’ occupational class.) 
The green shaded cells show three main class clusters
(top, middle, bottom). Only a movement from one
cluster to another is considered as upward or
downward mobility; shifts within classes 1–2 or 3–8 are
considered horizontal mobility between similar
positions.
To carry out the analysis in this chapter, separate tables
were used – for country, for sex and for three cohorts
(born 1927–1945, born 1946–1964 and born 1965–1975)
– which results in a total of 144 mobility tables to be
analysed separately and compared to each other. For
the moment,  the focus is on the marginal distributions
– in other words, the class structures for the two
Table 4: Mobility of sample: class of origin and destination (24 EU Member States)      
Class of
origin
ESeC categories Class of destination
TotalDescription 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Large employers, higher
managers/
professionals
3,751 4,457 1,433 1,158 54 994 883 484 1,007 14,221
2 Lower managers/
professionals, higher
supervisory/technicians
4,093 7,110 2,354 1,619 124 1,706 1,894 1,132 2,250 22,282
3 Intermediate
occupations
1,328 2,277 1,162 652 45 588 829 472 817 8,170
4 Small employers and
self-employed (non-
agriculture)
1,790 3,002 1,503 2,351 334 1,245 1,505 1,103 1,978 14,811
5 Small employers and
self-employed
(agriculture)
1,195 2,834 1,302 1,891 3,039 1,555 1,750 2,434 4,282 20,282
6 Lower supervisors and
technicians
1,513 3,103 1,301 932 58 1,812 1,348 1,189 1,938 13,194
7 Lower sales and service 754 1,721 973 584 43 821 1,193 844 1,517 8,450
8 Lower technical 1,684 4,078 2,283 1,693 194 2,605 2,909 4,350 6,619 26,415
9 Routine 1,415 3,444 1,911 1,706 219 2,398 2,849 3,753 8,112 25,807
Total 17,523 32,026 14,222 12,586 4,110 13,724 15,160 15,761 28,520 153,632
Note: Pooled sample of respondents aged 35–75 from 24 EU countries. Data weighted with frequency weights based on rounded design weights.
No population weights were applied since the purpose of this table is to assess the composition of the sample as well as to demonstrate what a
mobility table is. 
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
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generations (respondents and their parents) presented
in Table 4. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of respondents’ origin (O)
for men (sons) and women (daughters) as well as their
destination (D) by gender. We can see that the relative
numbers for sons’ and daughters’ origins are very
similar, representing a quality assessment of the data,
as there is no reason to believe that social origin should
systematically differ for men and women; if sex at birth
is a random selection. 
Reading the second and fourth columns of the table
(from the left), the following observations can be made. 
£ Around 9% of men and women among ESS
respondents in this set of 24 Member States come
from a class 1 background (large employers and
higher managers/professionals).
£ Some 15% had parents who had been lower
professionals or who had supervisory roles (class 2). 
£ Around 5% of parents had been in intermediate
occupations (class 3), mostly skilled clerical and
administrative positions.
£ Slightly over 20% of the respondents had parents
who had been self-employed either in agriculture
(13%) or small businesses in crafts and trades (10%)
– in classes 4 and 5. 
£ Some 9% of the respondents had parents who had
worked as lower supervisors or technicians
(class 6).
£ Around 6% of the respondents had parents who
had worked in lower sales and services (class 7). 
£ Some 17% had a father or mother who had worked
as a semiskilled or unskilled blue-collar worker
(class 8). 
£ About 17% of respondents’ parents had worked in
routine occupations (class 9). 
The respondents’ own class membership differs
considerably from their parents’ – a reflection of the
change in the occupational class structure after
modernisation processes. However, globally the
difference between class membership of respondents
and parents also differs greatly between men and
women – because of occupational gender segregation.
It is interesting to see which classes have increased or
declined – and by how much (the two columns on the
right-hand side). The highest increase can be seen in
lower sales and services for female respondents, with an
Table 5: Distribution of respondents and their parents across socioeconomic classes by sex (24 EU Member
States)      
Origin (O) Destination (D)
O-D
(sons)
O-D
(daughters)
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Percentage
point
difference
Percentage
point
difference
1 Large employers, higher
managers/professionals
6,775 9.2 7,446 9.3 11,040 15.0 6,483 8.1 5.8 -1.2
2 Lower managers/
professionals, higher
supervisory/technicians
10,624 14.4 11,658 14.6 13,387 18.1 18,639 23.4 3.7 8.7
3 Intermediate occupations 3,815 5.2 4,355 5.5 2,849 3.9 11,373 14.3 -1.3 8.8
4 Small employers and
self-employed
(non-agriculture)
7,100 9.6 7,711 9.7 8,018 10.9 4,568 5.7 1.2 -3.9
5 Small employers and
self-employed
(agriculture)
10,223 13.8 10,059 12.6 2,524 3.4 1,586 2.0 -10.4 -10.6
6 Lower supervisors and
technicians
6,462 8.8 6,732 8.4 8,978 12.2 4,746 5.9 3.4 -2.5
7 Lower sales and service 4,041 5.5 4,409 5.5 3,231 4.4 11,929 15.0 -1.1 9.4
8 Lower technical 12,703 17.2 13,712 17.2 11,258 15.2 4,503 5.6 -2.0 -11.5
9 Routine 12,101 16.4 13,706 17.2 12,559 17.0 15,961 20.0 0.6 2.8
Note: Respondents aged 35–75 years. Class of origin refers to the class of male and female respondents’ parents when respondent was 14 years
old. Class of destination refers to categories that respondents belong to themselves. 
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
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increase of 9.4 percentage points, compared with the
parents’ generation. In addition, women have
increasingly being engaged as lower professionals and
in intermediate occupations, which are typically
gendered jobs: education, nursing and care specialists;
and clerical jobs in administration and the financial
services industry. 
The biggest increases for men were in higher-level
professions (such as solicitors, physicians or higher
managerial positions – around +6 percentage points)
and in lower-level professions (such as engineering,
product design and middle management in public
administration and industry – almost +4 percentage
points ). Not surprisingly, the class that has seen the
largest reduction in a generation is farmers
(–10 percentage points), but for women the reduction in
lower technical occupations is even bigger
(–12 percentage points), which is due to the downsizing
of the textile industry throughout Europe in the last 50
years (a sector with a predominantly female labour
force). Other statistics used for the analysis of the
transition tables will be the dissimilarity index and rates
of upward and downward mobility (see Figures 1 and 2).
This analysis will show how open (or closed) to social
mobility the societies of Europe are. 
The study understands absolute mobility as the share of
respondents who do not occupy the diagonal cells in a
mobility table that compares social origin and
destination as measured by the socioeconomic class of
parents and respondents (see, for illustration, Table 4;
cells are marked in bold). These are respondents who
belong to a different socioeconomic class from their
parents. Social mobility is further distinguished into
upward, downward and horizontal mobility (the first
two are also called vertical mobility). Horizontal
mobility means that respondents are mobile but in
neighbouring classes to their social origin. Immobility
means that the respondent is in exactly the same
occupational class as the parent
In order to measure upward, downward or horizontal
mobility for the purposes of this study, the nine
categories (classes) of the socioeconomic classification
are clustered into three classes (following Breen, 2005).
This is done in order to focus on major shifts and avoid
misinterpreting minor changes across similar positions
in the social hierarchy as real social mobility. In Table 4,
the three main clusters are the cells with a blue
background. Classes 1 and 2 represent a cluster of
similar socioeconomic positions and a move between
them represents horizontal mobility (in other words, no
mobility within the large top class). Another, middle
cluster is comprised of classes 3 to 8. The bottom cluster
consists of a single class – class 9. Upward mobility
occurs if a respondent moves to a cluster higher than
that of their parents – for example, if the son of a skilled
manual worker (class 6) becomes a physician (class 1).
Downward mobility is when the opposite happens and
the class cluster of the respondent is lower than their
social origin. If a respondent has exactly the same class
membership as his or her parents, this is considered
immobility or status inheritance. This occurs most
frequently where a respondent has an agricultural
origin and an agricultural destination. 
In general, because of ongoing economic
transformation, upward mobility should be more
prevalent than downward mobility and immobility
should decrease over time – this being a sign of status
inheritance, which should decline over time as societies
become more meritocratic. For example, if all
observations in a mobility table fall on the diagonal,
there is no mobility and farmers’ children become
farmers and the sons and daughters of solicitors
become solicitors, physicians or managers, etc.
However, as talents and abilities are not perfectly
correlated with class of origin and ideally there should
be no barriers preventing mobility, there should be
social mobility and the off-diagonal cells should be
populated. The social mobility as seen in the
off-diagonal cells can be affected by different levels of
resources or levels of aspirations.  (see also Boudon,
1974; Jackson, 2007). If a society is totally immobile – a
feudal society, for example – all the counts would be on
the diagonal. 
Changes in class structure in 24 EU
Member States
Figures 1 and 2 show the change in the class structure
from examining the relationship of sons and daughters
compared to the highest occupational class in the
household. In a sense, this can be seen as reflecting the
underlying economic transformation of countries. Each
figure represents a dissimilarity index (see Annex 4 for
more details), a measure that shows how many
respondents would have to move across cells to obtain
the same distribution in the origin and destination
tables. The more individuals have moved up or down
the class hierarchy compared with their class of origin,
the higher the dissimilarity index. A dissimilarity index
of .20 means that 20% of the class distribution has
changed between the respondents’ generation and
their parents’ generation. The higher the share, the
more the class structure has changed. The class
structure has changed the most in Cyprus, Greece,
Poland, Finland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
Countries in which the numbers of independent farmers
have been massively reduced have already been
discussed. At the opposite end of the plot are countries
where the class distribution has changed the least,
either because the countries have already modernised
substantially (France and the UK) or because they seem
to be stagnating in the modernisation process (Bulgaria
and Hungary). 
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However, it is important to note that this does not say
anything about mobility: all that is being compared is
the distribution of respondents and that of their parents
across classes, or the marginal distributions of the
mobility tables (not shown). Looking back at Table 3
(p.12), with the distribution of the respondents’ own
class and their origin, we can see that in France and the
UK, respectively, some 16% and 22% of the parents’
generation were in class 2 (managers and
professionals). For the respondents themselves, the
respective shares are 22% and 23%. Hence, there has
been a change only in France – none in the UK. In Cyprus
and Greece, however, the corresponding shares for
social origin are 7% and 5% for the parents’ generation
Figure 1: Dissimilarity index between origin and destination, for men      
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
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Figure 2: Dissimilarity index between origin and destination, for women      
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
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and 13% and 12% for the respondents’ class
membership. In fact, in Cyprus and Greece the current
share of professionals and middle managers (class 2)
among the active population, despite doubling in a
generation, has not yet attained the levels that France
and the UK had in the previous generation. 
The UK did not change that much between parent and
respondent because it was the first country to go
through all the cycles of modernisation and post-
modernisation: it was the first country to become
industrialised and the first country to develop a strong
services industry, especially finance and services. So
over the last few decades of the previous century, the
UK has barely changed in terms of major occupational
and class categories (see Table 3 on p. 12). Other
western European countries like Belgium, France and
Germany are similar, having already developed in the
post-war period. Ireland, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands are latecomers, but they are economically
much more advanced today than Cyprus, Greece and
Poland. The share of respondents in class 2 in the
Netherlands (31%) is twice as high as in Poland (16%),
Greece (12%) and Cyprus (13%) – see Table 3, p. 12 for
the appropriate cells. A similar situation applies for
class 1 (large employers, higher managers and
professionals). In the lagging countries – Bulgaria and
Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia and Spain –
the share of respondents in the service classes (classes 1
and 2) is low and has not changed much in a generation.
These countries reached a moderate level of
modernisation some decades ago. 
If we now consider the same dissimilarity index for
women, the first thing to highlight is that the levels are
overall much higher than for men (Figures 1 and 2). A
straightforward explanation is that when the number of
professional, administrative and sales jobs in a country
rises, women have tended to fill them; men more often
enter manual jobs, engineering, etc., often following in
the footsteps of their father. For women, their choice of
job selection is often very different from their parents’
occupation. The index of dissimilarity for women is
highest for Finland, Cyprus, the Netherlands and
Greece.  The rank correlation between the origin–
destination dissimilarity indices for men and women is
.55, which means that the differences in men’s and
women’s class when compared with that of their
parents is quite substantial. 
Figure 3: Dissimilarity between class of origin and destination for parents and children, by country      
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, covering 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
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However, data on women’s occupations should be
interpreted with a degree of caution: because the
occupational measurement of respondents looks at the
current or last occupation, a woman’s occupational
status may not be representative of the class changes
that occurred from origin to destination, especially if
she had stopped working a long time prior to the data
collection. This is not so much a problem in the case of
data for men, who are less likely to have had their
careers interrupted or discontinued. For this reason, the
dissimilarity index for men alone may be a more precise
measure of structural change in a country, since the
total index is impacted by the lack of precision in the
index of dissimilarity for women. 
Comparing the two series of dissimilarity indicators
together with one covering the total population in one
plot delivers a few interesting insights (Figure 3). It can
be seen that the more the class structure between men
and their parents has changed – an indicator of
modernisation or post-modernisation processes
underway – the smaller is the gap in dissimilarity
between men’s and women’s origin and destination. In
other words, the more the class structure in a society
was changing, the more similar the mobility processes
of men and women became. In Cyprus, there is almost
no class dissimilarity between men and women and
their parents. The differences are greatest in France and
Ireland, countries that have witnessed a lot of mobility
of women into new service sector jobs while men have
remained occupied in more traditional jobs. 
A further reason why the differences in class movement
distribution for women and men is small may be related
to the size of the economy: small countries have less
variety of occupations and the labour market has only a
limited number of jobs to offer, in only a few sectors. 
Nature of mobility: up, down or none?
Having the data on upward mobility, downward
mobility or no mobility, it is possible to compare
societies according to levels of social mobility. In these
terms, societies with more immobility and horizontal
mobility, and less vertical mobility (upward and
downward) have a more closed or rigid social structure.
In contrast, societies with less immobility and greater
vertical mobility (upward and downward) are more
open in terms of their members’ freedom to move
across social structures. 
Figure 4: Indicators of absolute mobility for men       
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, covering 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations. 
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Figures 4 and 5 show the main measures of absolute
mobility across countries for male and female
respondents separately. What is being investigated
here? First, it was explained above that if a country’s
economy is thriving, there should be more upward
mobility than downward mobility, as the usual process
of modernisation leads from unskilled, labour-intensive
occupations to highly skilled intellectual occupations
and from monotonous routine occupations to more
diversified ones with more contact between people (as
in service jobs). Furthermore, it is also normal in such
societies to have a fair amount of horizontal mobility
and only a limited degree of immobility 
Looking at absolute mobility indicators for men only, it
is striking that downward mobility is higher than
upward mobility in five countries: the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. At the same
time, in these countries, the levels of immobility are
fairly high and horizontal mobility  is at relatively lower
levels for most of those countries. . By contrast, in the
other countries, upward mobility clearly  outweighs
downward mobility.  Among men In Figure 4, horizontal
mobility – the mobility between similar social classes –
and downward mobility are strongly negatively
correlated: the higher the horizontal mobility, the lower
the downward mobility. A high level of horizontal and
upward mobility and low levels of immobility and
downward mobility indicate that societies are open to
the upward social mobility of their members. This is the
case for all the countries on the far left of the plot. There
is no correlation between immobility and horizontal
mobility, which appears strange, as they should be
measuring a similar condition, social closure. However,
there is a fair degree of correlation between upward and
downward mobility figures across countries, suggesting
a trade-off between the two. 
The picture for women (Figure 5) is quite different from
that for men, as mobility for women is affected by two
factors: occupational segregation and career
interruptions (especially early departure from the
labour market); this has to be kept in mind when
looking at the mobility patterns of women. Compared
with men, the difference between rates of upward
mobility and downward mobility for women is far less
pronounced.  More  countries show downward mobility
exceeding upward mobility: Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain (although
to a lesser extent than for men).
In addition, downward mobility does not show as much
variance across countries as for men. For women, there
is a moderate, negative correlation between immobility
and horizontal mobility (unlike for men) and a negative
correlation between horizontal mobility and upward
Figure 5: Indicators of absolute mobility for women        
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, covering 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations. 
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mobility across countries. This latter correlation is
completely absent in the chart for men (Figure 4). These
findings do not lead to any consistent conclusions, like
the ones that can be drawn about men’s absolute
mobility, except again that socially mobile  societies are
characterised by high levels of upward mobility, low
levels of immobility and downward mobility and a
moderate degree of horizontal mobility. This seems to
be true for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden
and, to a much lesser extent, the UK. 
The contrast between the situation of men in western
European Member States and those in eastern Europe is
pronounced; however, this is less the case for women.
Women seem to be more often upwardly mobile in
eastern Europe than men. And it appears that women in
southern Europe and France experience more
downward mobility. 
Cohort differences in absolute mobility
Three cohorts have been created by birth year, the
surveyed population in the ESS being divided into
respondents born 1927–1945 (the ‘silent generation’),
those born 1946–1964 (the ‘baby boomers’) and those
born 1965–1975 (‘Generation X’). The ‘silent generation’
is a relatively small cohort: birth rates were low during
the economic and financial crisis of the 1920s and 1930s
and the war years. Those born in this period could
pursue their careers amid the opportunities of the post-
war expansion. ‘Baby boomers’ were the large cohort
born and raised during the affluent decades
immediately following the Second World War, when
birth rates were high. These individuals were especially
well placed to avail of the long post-war economic
expansion. Finally, Generation X, the generation
following the baby boomers, is the first generation that
could not necessarily assume that their lives would be
more affluent than their parent’s generation. The
cohorts grew up in very different eras and in distinct
socioeconomic contexts. Within the cohorts, they share
common cultural identities: hence, they constitute a
group, rather than simply a collection of unconnected
individuals born around the same time (see also
Elwood, 2008; Strauss and Howe, 1991). 
If the absolute mobility of these three cohorts is
compared, it can be seen that mobility patterns have
changed from one cohort to the next – not, however, in
the same way for women as for men (Table 6). It can be
seen in a pooled sample from all 24 countries and all
selected ESS waves that downward mobility has slightly
increased from the silent generation to Generation X:
the cohort born before 1946 shows 35% downward
mobility as against 37% for the cohort born after 1965,
an increase of two percentage points.5 The share of
respondents who inherited the status of their parents
(‘immobile’ in Table 6) has not changed at all from
5 The breakdown by countries is available in Table A3 in Annex 4.
Table 6: Absolute mobility statistics by cohort and sex (24 EU Member States)       
Note: This table is an illustration of a breakdown by cohorts and sex using a pooled sample (that is, for all countries but unweighted by
population size; see explanation in Annex). Data representative of each individual country are provided in Annex 4. 
Based on the size of samples and the total population of cohorts, and a confidence level of 95%, the margin of error for the figures in the table
ranges from 0.68 to 1.6 percentage points. For example, for both sexes the downward mobility of the baby-boomer generation is around 35%; a
margin of error for the estimate of 35% at the 95% confidence level is +/-0.48 percentage points. In other words, the true value is between 34.52
and 35.48%. Most differences seen in the table are around or bigger than 2 percentage points and are therefore significant. Conversely,
differences below 1.6 percentage points may not be significant.
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
24 EU countries N Downwardly mobile (%) Immobile (%) Upwardly mobile (%)
Total
1927–1945 38,103 35.0 21.9 43.1
1946–1964 82,198 35.1 20.8 44.1
1965–1975 33,331 37.3 22.2 40.5
Men
1927–1945 19,024 32.0 22.3 45.7
1946–1964 39,260 34.4 22.6 43.0
1965–1975 15,560 37.3 24.2 38.5
Women
1927–1945 19,079 37.9 21.5 40.5
1946–1964 42,938 35.8 19.2 45.0
1965–1975 17,771 37.3 20.5 42.3
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cohort to cohort. If upward mobility across cohorts is
now considered, it can be seen that the share of
upwardly mobile respondents increased between the
two first cohorts but decreased somewhat for the last. 
Looking at the same data for men and women
separately, a slightly different picture emerges. While
the share of men who experience downward mobility
over the cohorts has increased significantly, the same
indicator has not changed at all for women. The share of
those who are stable in each cohort has not changed for
the total population, as shown above, but the directions
of motion are opposite for men and women: while the
share of men who are immobile has increased by
around 1% between the first and latest cohorts, the
share of immobile women has decreased by about the
same extent. Thus, the apparent lack of change in the
aggregate table actually masks a slightly opposite
movement for men and women. This becomes even
clearer when the patterns of upward mobility for men
and women are considered separately. From the oldest
to the youngest cohort, men show a significant decrease
in upward mobility: almost 46% were upwardly mobile
among the silent generation, as against 38% for
Generation X. In the aggregate statistic, this is partly
hidden by the fact that for women, there was an
increase of around two percentage points in the share
of upwardly mobile respondents between the cohorts. 
The data indicate how different mobility patterns have
evolved for women and for men. Women have become
more upwardly mobile while men are more likely to be
downwardly mobile. However, the findings are different
for each country (see Table A3 in Annex 4). 
The data for Austria (reproduced here in Table 7) show
an increase in both downward and upward mobility,
while immobility has diminished throughout the
cohorts. Looking at the Austrian data separately for men
and women, the same pattern is evident as for the
aggregate: women have a strong tendency to be more
upwardly mobile and less downwardly mobile from one
cohort to the next, while the opposite is true for men.
And for men, the proportions who are stable (immobile)
increase, while for women, the proportions decrease.
Table 7: Absolute mobility rates across cohorts – Austria and Bulgaria       
Austria N Downwardly mobile (%) Immobile (%) Upwardly mobile (%)
Total
1927–1946 983 33.9 22.3 43.8
1946–1964 3,220 33.3 20.0 46.6
1965–1977 980 37.8 17.1 45.1
Men
1927–1946 512 27.0 23.4 49.6
1946–1964 1,482 30.4 22.5 47.1
1965–1977 384 34.6 24.0 41.4
Women
1927–1946 471 41.4 21.0 37.6
1946–1964 1,738 35.8 17.9 46.3
1965–1977 596 39.8 12.8 47.5
Bulgaria N Downwardly mobile (%) Immobile (%) Upwardly mobile (%)
Total
1927–1946 1,375 26.5 26.0 47.5
1946–1964 3,031 33.2 26.5 40.3
1965–1977 1,218 43.3 25.4 31.4
Men
1927–1946 577 22.4 26.9 50.8
1946–1964 1,308 34.6 26.8 38.6
1965–1977 5.5 40.2 28.1 31.7
Women
1927–1946 798 29.6 25.3 45.1
1946–1964 1,723 32.2 26.3 41.6
1965–1977 713 45.4 23.4 31.1
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The data for Bulgaria, however, show that for both
sexes, both downward mobility is increasing and
upward mobility is decreasing. It appears that there is
less upward mobility for everybody in Bulgaria across
cohorts. Only immobility has slightly increased for men. 
Table 8 (based on the absolute mobility tables for all
countries), shows that in most countries –18 –
downward mobility for men increased over the three
cohorts. Over the same period, upward mobility for men
decreased in 15 countries. The direction of absolute
mobility for women is the opposite: downward mobility
increased for women in 6 countries, while it has
decreased in 8 and stayed the same in 10. Meanwhile,
upward mobility for women stayed the same in 10
countries, increased in 8 and decreased in 6. The picture
for immobility also shows opposing tendencies: women
are less likely to inherit the status of their parents from
cohort to cohort (to be immobile); however, men
become more likely to do so. The picture is particularly
clear in Greece, where downward mobility has stayed
the same for men while declining for women, whereas
women’s upward mobility has increased and men’s has
decreased. 
The countries at the top of the table are those in which
absolute mobility is most polarised, cases of
upward/downward mobility for men and women being
mostly different while immobility is declining or at most
stable. At the bottom of the table are those countries
where immobility is greatest. For example, in France,
most indicators are stable, with the exception of
downward mobility for men increasing and upward
mobility declining. Overall, women are experiencing
Table 8: Change in absolute mobility patterns, by sex and cohort      
Country
Downwardly mobile Immobile Upwardly mobile Extent of changes
Men Women Men Women Men Women – 0 +
Greece 0 – – – – + 4 1 1
Austria + – 0 – – + 3 1 2
Cyprus – – + – 0 + 3 1 2
Czech Republic + + – – – 0 3 1 2
Ireland + 0 – – – + 3 1 2
Bulgaria + + + – – – 3 0 3
Denmark + – + + – – 3 0 3
Spain + 0 – – 0 + 2 2 2
Finland – – + + 0 0 2 2 2
UK + + 0 0 – – 2 2 2
Croatia + – – + 0 0 2 2 2
Lithuania + + – 0 0 – 2 2 2
Belgium + + + – – 0 2 1 3
Netherlands + – + 0 – + 2 1 3
Poland – + + – 0 + 2 1 3
Sweden + 0 + + – – 2 1 3
Slovenia + – + + – 0 2 1 3
Estonia 0 0 0 + 0 – 1 4 1
France + 0 0 0 – 0 1 4 1
Luxembourg + 0 – 0 0 0 1 4 1
Portugal 0 0 0 – 0 + 1 4 1
Slovakia + 0 0 0 – 0 1 4 1
Germany + 0 0 – 0 1 3 2
Hungary + 0 0 – 0 1 3 2
– 3 8 7 10 15 6
0 3 10 6 8 9 10
+ 18 6 11 6 0 8
Note: 0 means no change occurred, – means a decrease, and + means an increase of the share of those who were downwardly mobile, immobile
or upwardly mobile. The extent of change is a simple count of those. 
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
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successive mobility gains across cohorts in most
countries while men are more likely to experience
downward mobility than previous generations. 
Absolute mobility – men and women
The extent of structural change alone does not indicate
whether that change has led to more upward or
downward mobility, nor how it has affected different
groups in society (including men and women). In other
words, a structural change measured by a dissimilarity
index (as an overall dissimilarity between occupations
of respondents and those of their parents) does not
include any additional information that would be
important for understanding long-term trends. The next
graphs (Figures 6a and 6b) are constructed in such a
way to allow an exploration of whether an overall
structural change that took place during the period
examined was related (a) to the extent of upward
mobility, and (b) to differences in absolute mobility of
men and women. To represent the extent of structural
change in societies over time, an index of dissimilarity
between origin and destination of men is chosen (on the
horizontal axes in both figures).6
Figure 6a shows that the less structural change there
has been in a country (in other words, the less absolute
mobility), the more downward mobility is observed – in
Hungary and Bulgaria, for instance. Conversely, in
countries where dissimilarity between origin and
destination for men is high, there is more upward
mobility than downward mobility (as can be seen for
Finland, the Netherlands, and most other countries).
The association is, however, rather weak, as there are
other factors affecting mobility. Countries in the lower
left part of Figure 6a , such as Slovakia, are those that
have not changed (modernised) much in the decades
covered in the study and where the rise in social
mobility has come to a stop or is decreasing (Czech
Republic, Portugal and Spain). Countries in the top-right
6 All annexes are available online together with the electronic version of this report. 
Figure 6a: Structural change has positively impacted on upward mobility     
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Note: The horizontal axis represents the extent of absolute mobility for men, shown as origin–destination dissimilarity index. This indicator is
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(both sexes together) and suggests to what extent the upward mobility has prevailed over downward mobility in each country. 
Source: ESS, waves 1–5, 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
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corner (Finland and the Netherlands) have changed a
lot – at least for men – and upward mobility is (or has
been) much higher than downward mobility. The
countries towards the right-hand side of the graph are
those that have undergone the biggest change in the
class structure: if the ratio of upward to downward
mobility is higher than 1, they have succeeded in
creating enough upward mobility. 
The effect of structural change over the examined
period was relatively strong for ‘gender equality’
between the careers of men and women as seen in
Figure 6b (the correlation is notably stronger than in
Figure 6a): in countries where structural change was
substantial, the differences in the extent of mobility
between men and women have substantially decreased
over time. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from examining
these associations.
£ The more a society experienced shifts in its class
structure between generations, the more upward
mobility increased and prevailed over downward
mobility.
£ The more the class structure changed (or
modernised due to the disappearance of low-skilled
menial jobs and growth in service-class and highly
qualified jobs), the more the extent of absolute
social mobility among men and women became
similar. 
This is also what the liberal theory of industrialisation
(the modernisation hypothesis) predicts: there should
be more upward mobility than downward mobility.
Although Figure 6a shows that – in general – this is the
case, there are huge differences between countries. 
Figure 6b: Structural change led to the intergenerational occupational mobility of men and women becoming
more similar     
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Note: The horizontal axis represents the extent of absolute mobility for men, shown as the origin–destination dissimilarity index. This indicator is
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£ To understand social mobility in European societies, it is important to acknowledge differences in economic
development and the shifts in occupational structure that occurred over time within each country.
£ Structural change – which involves change of occupational structure and size of population in various
occupations – have enabled upward mobility: at least, this was the case across three generations in the 20th
century.
Structural shifts that changed the occupational structure for current generations in comparison to their parents,
have also led to the extent of absolute social mobility among men and women to become more similar. 
However, the trends in upward or downward mobility for men and women in the 24 countries studied differ:
£ For men, the extent of upward mobility has decreased (in 15 out of 24 countries), and downward mobility has
increased over the three cohorts in the majority of countries (18 out of 24);
£ For women, the extent of downward mobility over three cohorts decreased in a third of countries (8 out of 24);
stayed the same in the majority of others, and upward mobility has increased in a third of countries. 
£ Women, from generation to generation, were also increasingly less likely to inherit the status of their parents,
while this was becoming more likely for men.  
A change in the structure of the economy (a rebalancing of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors) opens up new
positions in managerial occupations, in high- and low-level professional occupations and in administration and
services. At the same time, the share of jobs in more labour-intensive low-skilled sectors such as logging,
quarrying and agriculture decreased, partly because these activities largely disappeared or because they
underwent substantial technological change so that less human labour is required. This structural change fosters
social mobility – in particular, upward mobility. Some countries (the UK and Belgium, for instance) modernised
and experienced large changes in their occupational structure early; hence, the workforce in western European
countries is engaged to a great extent in service class and administrative/clerical jobs. In contrast, some
countries have barely changed at all and still have a large part of their population working in agriculture or
routine manual jobs, as in Romania and Bulgaria. (In the case of Ireland and Luxembourg, the phase of
industrialisation experienced in other countries was largely skipped over.) 
In most countries, the intergenerational mobility processes described in this chapter reflects these major
economic shifts, but to differing extents. Both the silent generation and the baby boomers – women in particular
– have enjoyed considerable upward mobility. Men in Generation X, however, have more frequently  experienced
downward mobility or remained immobile; women in this cohort, in contrast, are more upwardly mobile. Most
jobs in the ‘new economy’ need a substantially higher level of education; women are often better educated and
hence are better equipped to work in higher-level occupations. Moreover, many jobs in manufacturing that were
previously occupied by men have disappeared.
Summary 
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Measures of relative social mobility (‘social fluidity’)
estimate the probability that individuals from different
social groups or classes end up in other social positions
or classes regardless of changes in the class structure
that happened over time. This is taken as an indicator of
the openness or fairness of a society. Goldthorpe points
out that ‘absolute rates refer to the actual proportions
of individuals of given class origins who are mobile to
different class destinations, while relative rates
compare the chances of individuals of differing class
origins arriving at different class destinations and thus
indicate the extent of social fluidity’(Goldthorpe, 2012,
p. 5). 
The following question is probably the most important
one for research on social mobility to deal with: have
opportunities for social mobility increased for more
recent generations? Is there equality of opportunity and
openness? One could also formulate the question
differently with regard to achievements and in
meritocratic terms. The process of modernisation
means that birth becomes less important than a
person’s own achievements, such as education and
career, in gaining the most coveted positions in a
society. 
To answer this question, mobility research has
developed the uniform difference model, a log-
multiplicative model, abbreviated as the Unidiff model
(see Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992 and an explanation
in Annex 4). This model estimates that the odds ratios
for the separate mobility tables change by some
common multiplicative factor, labelled β. The
association is fixed to 1 for one cohort in one country as
a reference category and all βs are measured in
reference to this standard, as with an index where a year
and country is equal to 100. Here, the silent generation
(born before 1946) in Austria is the reference category
(equal to 1). Figure 7 shows the successive βs for the
countries and cohorts included in the analysis of
relative mobility (‘social fluidity’) for the total
population.7 A decreasing β parameter indicates a
7 Countries with samples that are too small have been excluded: Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania and Luxembourg.
Figure 7: Changes in social fluidity over time      
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3 Relative social mobility 
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decrease in the association between origin and
destination and thus an increase in social fluidity. Social
fluidity increases if the social origin becomes a less
important factor in avoiding downward mobility or
experiencing upward mobility. 
Figure 7 shows a convergence in the levels of social
fluidity),8 in particular from the silent generation to the
baby boomers, where for most European countries
social fluidity increased and social origin started to play
a less important role for the next generation. (As the
research shows (see Annex 4), social fluidity increases if
social origin becomes a less important factor in avoiding
downward mobility or experiencing upward mobility.)
The variance of the indicators decreases from 3.64 to
3.16 over the three cohorts, showing a decrease in
variability and thus convergence. It is, however, also
noteworthy that between the baby boomer generation
and Generation X the lines on the graph (the Unidiff β
parameters, as explained in Annex 4) are fanning out
again, meaning that convergence has reversed: in some
countries social fluidity has continued to increase, while
in many countries social fluidity has come to a halt or
has started to decrease. The results presented are for
20 countries and men and women combined. In Figures
8–12, the details will be presented by sex separately.
From one cohort to the next, fluidity may increase,
remain stable or decrease. Patterns can be more or less
complex: fluidity may increase steadily from one cohort
to the next (or, alternatively, decrease steadily). An
increase may be followed by stability or decrease, or
stability may be followed by a decrease or an increase –
and so on. The four charts in Figure 8 show the patterns
of the evolution of social fluidity for all countries in the
analysis. (It should be kept in mind that the level of
8 Or a convergence of the unidiff β parameters.
Figure 8: Social fluidity by cohorts for men and women, by country and dominant fluidity patterns     
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fluidity is inversely related to the beta coefficient – in
other words, if the β coefficient for successive cohorts
goes down, this means that the association between
origin (O) and destination (D) is weakening and thus
fluidity is increasing.)
Social fluidity in Hungary, Ireland and the UK does not
seem to have changed much over the cohorts (the
strength of association between origin and destination
has not changed over the cohorts observed) and is at a
relatively low level in these three countries when
compared with others. Put another way, social fluidity
in the UK did not change across cohorts and is among
the highest in comparison to other countries, as other
research has found (Breen, 2005; Goldthorpe, 2016). 
In the second graph in Figure 8 (stabilising fluidity),
it can be seen that in the Czech Republic, Germany,
Poland and Spain, fluidity increased between the first
two cohorts,  but then stabilised. 
Continuously increasing fluidity is observed in two
Nordic countries (with the notable exception of
Sweden), as well as in Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands
and Slovakia. These are the only countries where
chances for equal opportunities have continued to
increase for the three cohorts and social origin has
become less important over time. 
Finally, in a number of countries, fluidity decreased for
the last two cohorts. This is the case for Austria,
Bulgaria, Estonia, France and Sweden. In particular,
Sweden shows a U-shaped profile of the curve after it
became socially mobile country in  the 1970s and 1980s,
but it social fluidity has decreased after that. 
Figure 9: Changes in social fluidity for men and women by cohort: Invariable fluidity     
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Source: ESS, waves 1–5, covering 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
Regardless of what the dominant trend in the level of
fluidity appears to be when the data for all countries are
analysed, the breakdown of data by sex reveals
substantial differences between men and women
regarding changes in fluidity, as shown in the following
series of figures.
In the UK, it becomes apparent that a seemingly stable
level of social fluidity was, in fact, a movement towards
decreasing social fluidity for men in the Generation X
cohort (Figure 9). In contrast, social fluidity continued to
increase – albeit at a slower rate – for women. The data
show the opposite pattern in Ireland (little change for
women across cohorts and increased fluidity for men of
Generation X). 
In the cluster of countries showing stablising level of
fluidity over time (Figure 10), the Czech Republic
probably displays the most stable levels of social
mobility: fluidity remains largely the same over time.
Moreover, trends for men and women do not differ
much – particularly for the Generation X cohort. In
Poland, by contrast, the situation of men and women in
Generation X does differ: social fluidity increased for
men, while the level of fluidity remains almost constant
for women. 
Other ‘stabilising’ countries reveal different trends for
men and for women (Figure 10). In Germany and Spain,
social fluidity for men increased across all three cohorts,
but women in Generation X experienced a reduction in
social fluidity. Although trends in fluidity are the
opposite for men and women, as they have been for the
last two cohorts in Germany, if data are not broken
down by sex these trends appear to cancel each other
out and create an illusion of consistent or stable levels
of fluidity in society. 
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Decreasing fluidity over the three cohorts can be
observed for both men and women in Austria, Bulgaria,
Estonia, France and Sweden (Figure 11). However,
fluidity decreased more substantially for men than for
women in all countries apart from Austria and Sweden,
where a marked decline can be observed for both sexes
(although more markedly for men). Regarding Sweden,
all Nordic countries have traditionally been known for
being, egalitarian societies. The relatively high rate of
social mobility in the Nordic countries is attributed to
the institutional features of the societies, the way in
which the society can compensate for differences in
conditions in childhood, the structuring of the
education system, the rate of return on education, low
wage dispersion, low income inequality, the low
incidence of low-wage jobs and the high rate of
redistribution (Lind, 2009). Despite the apparently
overall positive picture, Lind argues that from the mid-
1990s and throughout the 2000s many of the factors
that fostered upward social mobility were put under
pressure, particularly in Sweden. An increase in the
freedom of choice in public services (for example,
school choice) has widened the gap between families,
income inequalities have increased and income
redistribution has decreased. It remains an open
question whether a reduction in mobility in Sweden is
temporary or not; furthermore, it is unknown whether
such recent developments are unique to this country or
whether they signal a trend in other Nordic countries. 
Figure 10: Changes in social fluidity for men and women by cohort: Stabilisation of fluidity      
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Source: ESS, waves 1–5, covering 2002–2010; authors’ own calculations.
Figure 11: Changes in social fluidity for men and women by cohort: Decrease in fluidity       
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Finally, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the
Netherlands and Slovakia show a continuous trend of
increasing fluidity over the successive cohorts
(Figure 12). Both men and women are part of this trend
and in similar amplitudes. However, it should also be
assessed whether all social groups are evenly
benefitting from the general trend, and whether there
are still barriers to be tackled.  
Figure 12: Changes in social fluidity for men and women by cohort: Increase in fluidity        
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Notwithstanding the scale and type of changes in occupational structure, societies differ in terms of social fluidity
(relative mobility) – that is, to what extent social origin affects one’s chances of being in a  different occupational
class  from one’s parents.
In the 20 Member States examined, the extent of social fluidity converged over the 20th century, becoming more
similar between Member States for the cohort born 1946–1964 (the baby boomers) than they were for the cohort
born 1927–1945 (the silent generation). However, it is noteworthy that between the baby boomer generation and
Generation X (born 1965–1975) the extent of social fluidity started to diverge: in some countries, it continued to
increase, while in many countries it came to a halt or started to decrease. 
The extent of social fluidity changed in different directions for the countries analysed. In most countries, social
fluidity increased for baby boomers when compared with the silent generation. However, in one group of
countries, fluidity has been continuously increasing: Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia and
Greece. In contrast, in another group of countries, the Generation X cohort – in particular – has experienced a
decrease in social fluidity: most notably Sweden, but also Austria, France and Bulgaria. In a third group,
comprising Germany, Poland, the UK and Ireland, levels of social fluidity have been stable. 
These overall patterns mask different trends between men and women, which merit policy attention. As already
indicated, apparently stable social fluidity may hide opposing trends for men and women, which cancel each
other out in statistics unless broken down. The extent of social fluidity in the second half of the 20th century
changed in opposite directions for men and women in Germany, Spain, and the UK. In Germany and Spain, social
fluidity for men increased across the three cohorts. However, in both these countries, more women were limited
by their social origin – experiencing less social fluidity – in Generation X than their equivalents in the baby boom
cohort. In the UK, the converse is apparent: social fluidity increased for women across the three cohorts, but more
men in Generation X were limited by their social origin than was the case for baby-boomers. 
In several countries, men, especially those in Generation X, have started to experience decreasing levels of social
fluidity. As just stated, this is the case in the UK; it is also the case in France, Sweden, Austria, Estonia and
Bulgaria. In contrast, social fluidity has increased for men (as just discussed) in Germany and Spain, as well as in
Summary 
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those countries where overall levels of social mobility have been high for both sexes (the Netherlands, Denmark,
Finland, Slovakia, Belgium and Greece). 
Social fluidity has in general changed less for women than for men. Social fluidity among women has increased in
the UK, Czech Republic, Finland and most notably in Belgium and the Netherlands. In contrast, it has decreased in
Austria, Sweden, Germany and Spain. 
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In order to gather information on the contextual factors
and drivers behind patterns of social mobility,
Eurofound hosted a series of national workshops in
2016 in selected Member States: 9
£ the Netherlands
£ Poland 
£ the three Baltic states
£ United Kingdom
The findings and data presented at these workshops are
detailed below in four spotlights. As the Netherlands
has continuously experienced high levels of social
mobility, the Dutch case study examines the factors that
contribute to the high levels of equal opportunity in the
country. Poland has a relatively rich tradition of
research into social mobility, which has provided
considerable input for Eurofound’s work. The Polish
case study reflects the impact of social and economic
transformation on patterns of social mobility. The Baltic
case study highlights the impact of such transformation
and provides information on countries that have so far
conducted less research into social mobility (with the
exception of Estonia). 
There has been long-standing interest in social mobility
in the UK, specifically in the scientific community  but
also in public and political debate. A widespread policy
commitment to promote social mobility has been
reflected in the establishment of a Social Mobility
Commission in 2010, which has argued that the mobility
of an entire generation of young people is being
compromised.
4 Country spotlights 
9 For the dates and participants of the workshops, please see Annex 1 (available online).
10 ‘Diploma inflation’ is a term coined by Wolbers (1998) used to indicate that diplomas have less value nowadays on the labour market: with the same
educational level one now obtains a lower labour position than was previously the case.
11 In 2015, the RMO merged with two other Councils into the Council for Health and Society (Raad voor Volksgezondheid en Samenleving). 
The’golden age’ of upward social mobility – during which education expanded and the number of professional
middle-class jobs increased – lasted until the 1990s in the Netherlands, at least for men (Goldthorpe, 2016). 
Since then, the country has witnessed only a minor upgrading of occupations; education, however, continued to
expand. This has led to ‘diploma inflation’ on the labour market.10 Consequently, the influence of education on
the labour market position of individuals diminished. In essence, it means that meritocracy on the labour market
has stagnated (Tolsma and Wolbers, 2010). 
In 2011, the Dutch Council for Social Development (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling – RMO) similarly
concluded that the trend of upward intergenerational relative social mobility is no longer evident in the
Netherlands and pointed to the first signs of downward social mobility.11 According to the RMO, education is the
main reason for this. Greater access to education has enabled the Netherlands to become more open; however,
the level of educational achievement has become the main divider in Dutch society: those with a high level of
education benefit more than those with a lower level. A more recent study by the Netherlands Institute for Social
Research added weight to this concern, finding increasing polarisation in education and on the labour market
(Vrooman et al, 2014).
The importance of social mobility for society is one of the important messages of the RMO. In another study, it
presents three conclusions about the way in which the Dutch government promoted social mobility in the period
1982–2009 (RMO, 2010). 
First, the government’s priority shifted from the ideal of equality to that of a society in which citizens are called
upon to contribute and participate, both economically and in civic terms. It is important to note that equality had
been more or less achieved during the post-war period up to 1982 and commitment to the ideal of equal access to
education remained strong over that time.
Second, since 1982 there has been a growing shift towards policy that supports absolute social mobility over
social fluidity. Participation was encouraged on the basis that it created employment and social cohesion; the
focus was no longer on providing equal opportunities for the individual. 
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Third, three pathways to social mobility reappeared in the focus of the successive governments in the period
1982–2009:
£ employment 
£ equal access to education
£ social inclusion.
However, the trend towards less fluidity in Dutch society leads to questions about the effectiveness of these
policy pathways. 
Poland has a long and rich tradition of social mobility research. Researchers have been particularly interested in
the impact of historical developments and transformation of the social and political system on the patterns of
social mobility. The research has been aided by the high quality of the ESS in Poland; the country has participated
in each wave of the survey. The response rate in Poland has been very high – higher than in most countries
participating in the project and higher than in other scientific  face-to-face surveys in Poland. (However, even
though the field of social mobility has been prominent in research, this has not carried over into the wider policy
agenda, as has happened in the UK.)
Overall, findings from a number of researchers suggest that absolute upward social mobility was on the rise for
both men and women in the period immediately following the Second World War.12 Later, social mobility
increased for women until the mid-1990s but remained largely unchanged for men. 
The most detailed analysis of social fluidity in Poland is a study by Domański et al (2016), which analysed data
from 1982–2006. The study looks at several dimensions and associations: 
£ the effects of social origin on destination
£ the relationship between social origin and education
£ the net effect of education on destination;
£ the effect of education reflected in the rising share of more educated categories in the overall
social/occupational structure. 
The results are complex and difficult to interpret. The authors found a consistent trend of a declining association
between education and occupational position but a less clear association between social origin and destination.
For men, beginning in the late 1990s, the association between origin and destination generally increased
(meaning that social fluidity decreased). This was most pronounced in the higher educational levels. This
differentiates Poland from a number of western societies, in which greater openness among more educated
categories makes social stratification more fluid. In a study devoted largely to gender differences, Mach (2004)
using data from 1972, 1988 and 1994 found no change in men’s social fluidity but a clear tendency of increasing
social fluidity among women in both 1972–1988 and 1988–1994. 
Słomczynski et al (2016) used data from the Polish Panel Survey, POLPAN 1988–2013, to compare the
socioeconomic status of different cohorts. They found no evidence to support the idea that the impact of social
origin on occupational careers diminishes over the course of one’s career or over time generally. On the contrary,
the mean differences between origin and destination in socioeconomic status at the beginning of the career are
smaller than later in the career. Furthermore, the effect of the origin increases from one cohort to the next: it is
smallest for the 1945–1955 cohort and largest for the 1981–1989 cohort. The authors suggest that differences in
socioeconomic status between categories of social origin are not due to the socioeconomic status that is
expected based on education but reflect rather structural opportunities and differences in social and cultural
capital.
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The experts agreed that the national context matters in understanding and explaining both the trends and the
influencing factors behind patterns of social mobility. The uniqueness of some of the social processes in Poland –
and their importance to the phenomenon of social mobility – has been underlined in a number of studies:
£ the significant eradication of intelligentsia during and after the Second World War
£ the lack of collectivisation in agriculture
£ people’s perceptions of present-day opportunities for social mobility chances compared with those under
state socialism
£ female/male preferences regarding social mobility and work–life balance
£ the diminishing role of higher education as an enabler for upward social mobility 
£ the growing number of a type of zero-hour contracts offered to young people 
£ place of residence as a factor in boosting life chances – increasing east–west and rural–urban dimensions.
The topic of social mobility has not been a focus of academic research in the Baltic states (apart from Estonia) nor
has it been mentioned in public debates in recent decades. However, social mobility has been referred to – albeit
indirectly – in policy debates regarding the persistent, high rates of poverty and income inequality; traditionally,
these social issues have been cited as one of the main factors influencing patterns of social mobility. For example,
high levels of inequality and poverty (especially among children) signal potentially low levels of social mobility
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011). Both income inequality and the risk of poverty among children in the Baltic
countries are among the highest in the EU. Wealth inequality has also been mentioned as a barrier to social
mobility. Navicke and Lazutka (2016) established that income inequality is substantially higher for all three Baltic
states – particularly if income from property is fully accounted for, while Helemäe (2011) reported on the negative
effects of wealth inequality on social mobility in Estonia. 
In a similar way to countries in central and eastern Europe, the transformation of the socioeconomic system in
the Baltic states has had an impact on patterns of social mobility. Roots (2013) distinguished between two
periods in Estonia: 1991–1997 (‘a window of opportunity’) and the post-1997 period (marked by a tightening of
the links between generations – a decline in social fluidity).  Helemäe (2011) has confirmed similar tendencies of
decreasing upward social mobility in the 2000s compared with the 1990s. 
The Baltic states have been characterised by different patterns for men and women; substantial research has
been done to specifically investigate gender differences. Research by Saar (2010) on four cohorts in Estonia
(1930–1939, 1940–1949, 1950–1959 and 1960–1974) showed that for men in the 1940–1949 cohort social fluidity
increased; in later cohorts, it decreased. For women, social fluidity was on the rise in the first three cohorts and
then decreased in the latest cohort. Titma, Roots and Soidla (2010) found that women in Estonia were more
successful than men in gaining positions in the upper occupational classes and in white-collar positions between
1998 and 2004. Looking at the mechanisms behind gendered patterns in social fluidity, the change in social
fluidity was driven at least partially by changes in educational inequality and segregation between men and
women (Saar, 2010).
Many studies have found a strong relationship between patterns and rates of social mobility and education.
Education also plays a role: experts point to recent educational reforms as potential barriers to social mobility.
The education system has some strengths: the basic school system is fairly uniform and children’s abilities are
generally tracked from an early age. However, there are visible differences in the quality of schooling. In
Lithuania, figures from the Ministry of Education indicate that the number of dropouts from education is almost
three times higher in rural than in urban areas. In contrast, the number of urban children in non-formal education
is twice the number of rural children. In Estonia, Saar and Kristel-Amelie (2014) found that social inequality in the
probability of progressing to secondary education increased significantly during the 1990s, with social origin
having a strong impact, those from more affluent backgrounds being favoured. And, in Estonia, inequalities
between ethnic groups are important: the chances of ethnic Russians progressing to secondary and tertiary
education are lower than those for native Estonians (Lindemann and Saar, 2012). In all three Baltic states, reforms
were implemented in higher education; these have liberalised funding mechanisms, increased tuition fees and
reduced access. In Latvia, the share of programmes not subsidised by the government is high – between 63% and
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77%. Vocational education and the extent to which educational programmes match the needs of the labour
market demand are important issues. 
While levels of educational attainment are on the increase in the Baltic states, there are not many well-paid jobs.
As a result, there is little scope for upward social mobility and people with a high level of education must work in
lower occupational categories than their educational attainment would prepare them for. Decreasing
intergenerational mobility during the transition period in Estonia (since the 1990s) has been visible (Saar, 2011);
similar trends have been found in Russia (Gerber and Hout, 2004) and Hungary (Róbert and Bukodi 2004; Bukodi
and Goldthorpe, 2010). 
As mentioned, the geographical dimension is important for social mobility: increasing urbanisation means a
concentration of the population and economic activity in urban areas, and a corresponding decrease in rural
areas. Werner (2013) found that, in Lithuania, moving up or down the social ladder is related to patterns of
geographical movement: roughly 25% of respondents who moved from the middle class to the upper social class
(in terms of occupation) during the period under examination were residents of Lithuania’s two biggest cities.
Regional development policies in all three countries are currently strengthened through EU structural funding,
aimed at improving regional cohesion.
The debate on patterns of social mobility in the Baltic countries cannot be separated from the discussion
regarding the impact of emigration on social mobility (still an under-researched topic). The Centre for Diaspora
and Migration Research (University of Latvia) has published a large-scale empirical study of various Latvian
emigrant communities abroad (Mierina, 2015). The findings indicate that emigration often provides opportunities
for upward social mobility in terms of career advancement, moving to a better neighbourhood or region, learning
new skills and acquiring new social contacts. Sipavičienė (2011) distinguishes between at least two phases of
emigration from Lithuania. At an initial stage (1990–1993), Lithuania’s regaining of independence triggered the
repatriation of ethnic minorities from the country to other former Soviet republics. The second phase is described
as the ‘economisation’ of migration serving as a ‘survival strategy’ for citizens. While there was no direct
assessment of the impact of emigration on social mobility, the use of emigration as a survival strategy suggests
that downward mobility would have been potentially greater if there had been no opportunity to leave.
There has been long-standing interest in social mobility in the UK, specifically in the scientific community
(Goldthorpe, 2016), but also in public and political debate. A widespread policy commitment to promote social
mobility has been reflected in the establishment of a Social Mobility Commission in 2010, charged with assessing
progress in improving social mobility in the UK and with promoting social mobility in England.
During the course of this research, articles on aspects of social mobility have appeared regularly in daily
newspapers, particularly The Guardian and Financial Times; and best-selling books have been published on
diverse themes such as: the psychological dilemmas of upward mobility; the constant preoccupation with social
class in the UK; and the growing problems of intergenerational unfairness – with evidence of increasing barriers
to mobility (and even towards better living standards) among the current generation of young people.
Many commentators on the Brexit vote have ascribed the decision to underlying resentment of an ‘us and them’
society, with fundamental societal barriers to equal opportunities (mostly unrelated to the EU). There are some
distinctive concerns referenced in the UK debate: the legacies of an unfair education system with privileged
access to ‘public’ (i.e. fee-paying) schools; nepotism and protection of entry to certain professions (e.g. barristers,
doctors) and the ‘top jobs’; pay gaps in professions associated with social origins; and unequal chances to study
at ‘top’ universities. In addition, the recent policy debates have highlighted stark regional economic imbalances,
a growing lack of affordable housing, and large differences in parenting in different social groups. There have also
been critical observations regarding cutbacks in public services, such as nursery schools, which are most relevant
to improving the life chances of people (particularly children) from disadvantaged groups.
Research in the UK has generally highlighted a ‘golden age’ for upward social mobility in the decades after the
Second World War, when employment in professional and managerial occupations expanded. The opening of
many higher-class occupations promoted both absolute and relative social mobility. More recently, with large
numbers at higher levels in the occupational structure there is an increased risk of downward mobility – which
appear to be happening (Goldthorpe, 2016).  Differences between absolute and relative mobility have been
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emphasised by sociologists since the 1960s, but have only been taken up by economists and politicians in the UK
in more recent years. The extensive social research in the UK has adopted a range of different methods to
examine social mobility. The results underline the significance of research decisions, for example, about: how
occupational classes are defined; how upward or downward mobility is categorised; which age range is included;
and whether men and women are analysed separately or together. Recent studies, such as those based on the UK
birth cohort studies, highlight the importance of female employment, although with different stories for women
in part-time compared with full-time employment.
Most analyses point to the significance of education for upward mobility. However, other resources related to
parents’ social capital, family networks, and cultural assets are identified as important in protecting as well as
promoting occupational class. In the UK expert workshop organised by Eurofound, the top three barriers to social
mobility identified were: 
£ early childhood education (parental involvement, childcare costs)
£ social inequalities (importance of connections for life chances, access to top jobs)
£ income inequalities (labour market polarisation, rising importance of wealth and mixed progress on child
poverty).
The most recent State of the Nation 2016: Social Mobility in Great Britain report (SMCPC, 2016) argues that Britain’s
social mobility problem is getting worse for an entire generation of young people – not only for the poorest in
society but for a large swathe of middle-income families. This is not just a social division: it also reflects a
widening divide in life chances between people living in the big cities and those living in many towns across the
UK. The expectation that each generation would be better off than the one preceding it is no longer being
fulfilled. The commission calls for new thinking and new approaches, which involve not only government, but
employers and professions, schools and universities, parents and charities.
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This report began by noting how citizens across the EU
have become increasingly concerned that young people
will have fewer opportunities for upward social mobility
than their parents or even their grandparents. This
perception has been reinforced by research in some
Member States, particularly the UK, which indicates that
‘what is happening, and what has been largely
overlooked, is that younger generations of men and
women … are less likely to experience upward mobility
and more likely to experience downward mobility’
(Goldthorpe, 2016, pp. 95–96). In the UK, policy interest
in social mobility has led to the establishment of a
Social Mobility Commission and to the ‘great social
mobility debate’ over the last decade (The Guardian,
2016a). Such explicit debate on social mobility is a
feature of policy discourse in a few Member States
albeit as diverse as Sweden and Malta; although the
perception that income and social inequality is rising
and upward social mobility is stalling is widespread
across OECD countries (Garnero et al, 2016).
The previous chapters examined the patterns of
intergenerational social mobility in EU countries looking
back over several decades – how societies have
changed in terms of structural/occupational change and
societal progress (absolute social mobility). It also
investigated to what extent societies have become more
open and fluid over time (their relative social mobility).
This chapter, and Chapters 6 and 7, review the current
situation in the Member States.13
The public and policy discourse on social mobility often
relates to debates around growing social and economic
inequalities as well as discussions of measures to
address poverty and social exclusion. The alleviation or
reduction of poverty as such may not directly increase
upward social mobility, but it will increase the resources
that are available to people to improve their life
chances. In most Member States, attention to social
mobility is linked to equality of opportunity and how to
overcome economic and social disadvantage. Attention
to deficits in opportunities is related to awareness of
disadvantage and discrimination associated particularly
with gender, disability and ethnicity – though to
different extents in different Member States. As the
more detailed examples that follow will show, the main
elements of the policy and public discourse cover a
wide range of social and economic problems and
developments; this relates to history and societal values
as well as policy processes (Corak, 2016) and reflects the
complex interactions between families, the labour
market and government policies in determining the life
chances of people growing up in different Member
States.
In most countries, the absence of a specific policy
debate on social mobility is not necessarily because of a
lack of social inequalities or economic disadvantage. In
Latvia, for example, social mobility is hardly discussed,
for a variety of historical and societal reasons. 
Key actors in the debate
In a majority of Member States, the debate on social
mobility has been informed by national research on
social mobility in addition to information from cross-
national studies (such as Breen, 2005). Such research
distinguishes between absolute and relative
intergenerational mobility; it has been produced by
academic and government sources.
Often there has been an effort to document changing
patterns of social mobility over time, highlighting the
1970s as ‘a time when the industrialised world was
actively breaking down barriers to improve social
mobility’ (Frankopan, 2015, p. 447), or the ‘golden age’
of upward social mobility in the 1950s and 1960s in the
UK (Goldthorpe, 2016). In central and eastern Europe,
the period since the fall of communism in 1989 and
subsequent changes in the labour market have been of
particular interest. Katrňák and Fónadová (2014)
examined patterns of social mobility in the Czech
Republic from 1990 to 2011, arguing that between 1990
and 2000, the relationship between parents’ occupation
and the occupation of their children strengthened
(meaning that social mobility declined). Following the
expansion of the tertiary education system since 2000, it
appears that the link between the education of parents
and attainment of children weakened, occupation
becoming less determined by the occupational class of
the parents, hence meaning greater social mobility.
The nuances of academic research on absolute and
relative mobility may be reflected in the policy
discourse (as in Finland); or they may not (as in Latvia).
It seems that the results of academic research have not
5 Policy discourse on
social mobility  
13 This information was gathered by the network of European correspondents in 28 Member States who reviewed and analysed relevant national academic
and policy documents. In some cases, interviews with relevant stakeholders took place. 
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made much impact on the policy debate in the Czech
Republic, again in part because socioeconomic
inequalities are not conceptualised in terms of
occupational class inequalities. Instead, the dominant
political and social policy discourses have been in terms
of poverty, social exclusion, the problems of the Roma
and socioeconomic disadvantage. This appears to be
quite characteristic of the debates in many Member
States that address the issue in terms of equal
opportunities.
With encouragement from EU legislation and initiatives
on discrimination and equal opportunities, all Member
States have strengthened policies to improve the life
chances of disadvantaged groups, often through
developing national strategies for social inclusion (for
example, Bulgaria and Ireland). In some countries, this
has involved establishing central government
departments or agencies, or advisory bodies – the
Combat Poverty, Insecurity and Social Exclusion Service
in Belgium and the Social Mobility Commission in the
UK. In France, the riots of 2005 underlined the
disadvantages experienced by people living in the
suburbs of many big cities, notably in terms of access to
work, healthcare and education. In 2006, the French
government declared that equality of opportunity was
‘the great national cause’ and a national Agency for
Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities was
established. This agency addresses inequalities and
discrimination experienced by disadvantaged groups –
specifically, young people. Concern about social
inequalities in educational achievement, particularly
regarding schools in disadvantaged areas, continues to
be a key theme in the policy debate on social mobility.
Framed in terms of combating barriers to mobility and
promoting equal opportunities, it is clear that individual
government departments – in education, health,
employment and welfare services – see themselves as
contributing to better life chances, even if they do not
often promote social mobility explicitly. In many
government initiatives, other actors – particularly from
municipal public authorities, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and the social partners – are
directly involved. For example, the Social Exclusion
Service in Belgium brings together public centres for
social welfare, trade unions and professionals from
different sectors to produce analyses and
recommendations for policymakers.
NGOs appear to have a key role in driving the policy
debate in a number of Member States. In Austria, the
‘Poverty Conference’ brings together a network of
national NGOs and institutions dealing with poverty and
social exclusion. The current debate highlights concerns
about child poverty and its consequences for health and
well-being. Studies in Austria have underlined the
significant correlation between the economic resources
of parents and the income of their children a generation
later (Altzinger et al, 2013). In Finland, the Central Union
for Child Welfare and the Ombudsman for Children have
been particularly visible in a debate on child poverty
that is central to discussions of social mobility; the
Evangelical Lutheran Church has also been active in
driving this agenda. And in the UK, much of the specific
debate on declining social mobility has been informed
by research and advocacy conducted by third-sector
organisations such as educational charity the Sutton
Trust and think tank the Resolution Foundation.
Employers and trade union organisations have been
highly visible in debates in many Member States about
deficits in education (for example, in Estonia) and
labour market opportunities (in France), both
separately and collectively in social partner initiatives.
In Slovakia, negotiations between the social partners in
the national-level Economic and Social Council have
contributed extensively to the development of concrete
measures to improve living and working conditions and
to promote equal opportunities. Social partners in
Poland have contributed to measures that address
poverty and social exclusion through proposals for the
indexation of minimum income benefits and childcare
benefits in the framework of the Tripartite Commission
(now the Social Dialogue Council).
In many of these examples, the issue of social mobility
has been approached through a broader discussion of
equal opportunities and social inclusion or through
more specific debate on issues, such as education and
health, that directly impact on life chances and
prospects for economic and social advancement –
opportunities for upward mobility have primarily been
at the centre of the policy discourse. However, most of
the current debate is framed in terms of concerns about
deepening barriers to mobility, growing inequalities and
the threats of increasing downward mobility.
Drivers of the current debate
Although relatively few people in Europe are talking in
abstract terms about ‘social mobility’, many are
expressing practical and political concerns about a ‘fair
society’ – one in which people have equal chances to
enjoy good living conditions and have access to
resources. Specifically, attention is directed to
developments that make it more difficult for young
people to achieve their potential in education and the
labour market. Eurofound’s network of correspondents
was asked to identify the main drivers behind the policy
debate on social mobility in their country, drawing upon
academic, policy and political documents as well as
coverage in the media and academic research. The
observations covered a wide range of social problems,
including youth unemployment (for example, in Greece,
Latvia and Spain), child poverty (Lithuania, Poland) and
early school-leavers (Malta, the Netherlands, Romania).
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The most common developments are captured in eight
main drivers of the debate:
£ widening income inequalities
£ diminished access to public services
£ persistent inequalities in education
£ Intergenerational transmission of poverty 
£ widespread gender inequalities
£ integration of immigrants
£ nepotism and corruption
£ growing regional disparities.
Widening income inequalities
Widening income inequalities were reported as a
phenomenon undermining social mobility in a majority
of Member States. In the recent annual report of the
Social Protection Committee (Social Protection
Committee, 2016), increased income inequalities are
identified as an issue in 12 Member States, as is a rise in
the depth of poverty since 2008 (in 16 countries), so it is
not surprising that this deterioration features in the
debate across Europe.
In Spain, since 2010, problems directly or indirectly
related to social mobility and income inequality – such
as a rise in child poverty, wage inequality or a worsening
of employment opportunities for young people – have
appeared in the policy discourse. This issue was taken
up extensively in the media as well as by social
movements – both traditional (trade unions, teachers’
and doctors’ groups) and new (Indignados, Platform for
Mortgage Affected People). These developments are
similarly reported in Greece, with growing social and
economic inequalities associated both with the
economic crisis and with the implementation of
austerity programmes.
Reference to widening income inequalities is also evident
in Hungary and Slovakia. In Hungary, the economic crisis
was linked to loss of income, particularly among people
already living in poor material conditions associated with
hardship and unemployment. It appears that the middle
class has narrowed (since more people experience a
lower standard of living) and that a growing gap has
developed between higher and lower strata in society.
The report on the social situation in Slovenia 2013–2014
(Social Protection Institute of the Republic of Slovenia,
2015) indicates that the situation of the middle classes
has deteriorated, particularly the lower middle class, with
the risk of poverty increasing since 2009. Social policy has
become increasingly targeted at the most vulnerable
groups in the population and there is growing pressure
on humanitarian organisations to help those who have
exhausted their personal and financial assets.
Actual and perceived increases in income inequality
have fuelled the policy debate in Estonia, with a
particular focus on child poverty and unequal life
chances. In Cyprus, the banking crisis triggered
economic setbacks in all areas of society over the
succeeding five years. Social benefits for vulnerable
groups were reduced, unemployment increased and
income inequalities widened. The main public debate
since 2011 has focused on unemployment and income
inequality, as well as labour rights and the entitlement
of poor families to education and healthcare.
Diminished access to public services
Diminished access to public services is identified as a
driver of the debate on social mobility in a range of
countries. In Denmark and Finland, universal access to
education and welfare services is a cornerstone of social
policy and fundamental rights ensuring equal
opportunities for all. These are regarded as important
factors in these countries’ comparatively low inequality
and high social mobility. However, maintaining equal
access to equal services is difficult when, for example,
middle-class families choose to move their home away
from schools with troubled reputations to schools that
are regarded as better (as has been documented in
Finland). This reinforces neighbourhood segregation
and exacerbates differences in learning outcomes
between schools. A similar phenomenon is reported in
Denmark, where the proportion of children attending
non-public schools has increased in the last five years
(Landersø and Heckman, 2016). In Finland, some recent
austerity measures are feared to have implications for
unequal access. A daycare reform has been proposed
that reduces entitlement to public daycare if at least
one parent is unemployed or on parental leave. This
inequality is likely to most severely affect children from
poorer families.
Austerity measures have reduced access to public
services in Greece and Spain. In Greece, cutbacks are
reported in education, health and state subsidies to
programmes supporting vulnerable groups; in Spain,
campaigns have stressed how cuts in public health and
education could hinder social mobility. Similar concerns
are high in the policy debate in Portugal, where – since
2011 – austerity measures have been implemented in
the education and health sectors, resulting in
reductions of some social protection benefits.
Inequalities in access to healthcare and the declining
quality of health services are identified in the public
debate in Hungary, while access to healthcare,
especially for children, appears to be a particular issue
in Latvia.
Access to a range of public services has been prominent
in the political discourse in Poland over the last 10
years. In particular, limited access to early childhood
education is highlighted as an important factor in the
reproduction of inequalities; the lack of daycare
facilities for children below school age is particularly
acute in rural areas. Access to housing is also a major
issue, since affordable rental housing is limited and
mortgages are difficult to finance, especially for young
people.
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Persistent inequalities in education
Persistent inequalities in education are reported in
many Member States, especially in western Europe. In
most countries with relevant data, educational
attainment is closely related to socioeconomic
background; in some – for example, France – it appears
that these inequalities have increased over the last
decade. In Austria and the Netherlands, concern has
been expressed about the negative effects of ‘early
tracking’ or separation into different classes by early
scholastic performance; in the UK, the merits of
selective education following tests at the age of 11 are
hotly debated (The Guardian, 2016b). In Croatia, too,
upper secondary education is selective, with an
academic track for high-achieving students and a
system of underfunded vocational schools for the rest.
In many countries, children are less likely to reach
tertiary education if their parents do not have a higher
level of educational attainment. In Austria, only 4% of
students in tertiary education have parents who
completed only compulsory schooling (Statistik Austria,
2015); in Belgium, only 6% of students in tertiary
education have parents with educational attainment
below upper secondary education (OECD, 2014). The
OECD report Education at a glance (OECD, 2014) shows
that even in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the majority
of students (both male and female) in tertiary education
have parents who themselves had attained tertiary-
level qualifications.
An analysis of intergenerational transmission of level of
educational attainment for people aged 25–59 has been
undertaken using data from the EU Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2011 ad hoc module
(Grundiza and Lopez Vilaplana, 2013). Data from all 28
Member States show a high level of persistence of
educational achievement from parents to children: this
was 34% for parents with a low level of education
(based on the highest level of education of either
parent), 59% for a medium level and 63% for a high
level. Among parents with a high level of education,
only 3% of their children had a low level. The
persistence of a low level of education is least common,
reflecting the general increase in levels of education
between generations; however, the chances of
achieving only a low level of education are still clearly
related to the parents’ educational level. The
persistence of a low level of education across
generations was above 50% in Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Portugal and Spain. The persistence of a high level of
education is over 75% in Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland,
Luxembourg and Romania. In contrast, 25% or more of
people achieved a high level of education (although
their parents had a low level) in Finland, Ireland, Spain
and the UK. As the authors note, the level of education
is one of the most important individual factors for
adults in reducing the level of poverty and being able to
secure acceptable living conditions. The persistence of
educational inequalities is a major, widely
acknowledged, barrier to upward social mobility.
Intergenerational transmission of poverty
The intergenerational transmission of poverty crops up
in the debate in many Member States. This is not only
an issue for the current experience of poverty, but also
for the fact that in many families, poverty is a feature of
life from generation to generation. Again, data from EU-
SILC illustrate the scale and distribution of this problem.
Using the indicator of ‘ability to make ends meet’,
Grundiza and Lopez Vilaplana (2013) show that
transmission from parents to children of a limited ability
to make ends meet is more common than transmission
of a high ability – although at 69% and 56%, there is a
strong persistence at both levels. The association
between parents’ and children’s limited ability to make
ends meet is highest in Belgium, Italy, Malta, Romania,
Portugal and Spain.
In the reports from correspondents, persistence of
poverty appears to be particularly apparent in the
public debate in Austria, Luxembourg and the UK. This
is partly related to scientific studies (for example,
Altzinger et al, 2013; SMCPC, 2015) showing the strength
of persistence of income between parents and children
(when they are adults). In these three countries, there is
specific concern regarding population subgroups at risk
of poverty, particularly child poverty. Although it does
not have the highest rates of child poverty in the EU,
Luxembourg is among the Member States where child
poverty has increased most since 2008 (Social
Protection Committee, 2016).
Widespread gender inequalities
Gender inequalities are identified in many Member
States as factors constraining women’s upward social
mobility. Although there are big differences between
Member States, women in the EU are more likely to be
at risk of poverty than men – particularly if they are
single parents or are elderly (European Parliament,
2016). This is the case in Bulgaria and Romania, which
have the highest poverty rates in the EU: in Bulgaria,
every third woman over the age of 65 is at risk of poverty
or social exclusion. In Estonia, there has been increasing
public awareness of the inequalities in opportunity for
different social groups, particularly women. Although
women are almost as active in the labour market as
men, there is considerable segregation both in
education and the labour market and a correspondingly
high gender wage gap. In Italy, the relatively low labour
force participation of women is an important feature of
the policy debate.
Gender inequality is also a major theme of the policy
discourse in Croatia and the Czech Republic. In Croatia,
the disadvantages experienced by women, particularly
long-term unemployment, are being addressed in the
annual employment plans; in the Czech Republic,
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unemployment among women is also at the centre of
debate, particularly the situation of single mothers. As
in many other countries, social mobility in Slovenia is
defined in the context of equal opportunities, with a
national programme being developed to promote equal
opportunities. The programme seeks to address issues
such as employment rates, occupational segregation,
reconciliation of work and family life, creating a
‘knowledge society’ without gender stereotypes, the
balanced representation of women and men, violence
against women and gender equality in foreign policy.
Integration of immigrants
The integration of immigrants is a complex issue of
growing concern, specifically regarding the new influx of
asylum seekers and refugees; there is much discussion
about how to ensure immigrants can enjoy improved
life chances and living conditions. Over the last year, the
refugee crisis has dominated the social policy debate in
several Member States, including Austria and Germany.
Alongside discussion of numbers, there have been
discussions about how refugees’ residence can be
integrated and provided with adequate support. In
Austria, different perspectives are evident in the
political debate: on the one hand calling for investment
in the education and vocational training of refugees and
asylum seekers; on the other, seeking to minimise costs
and reduce benefits. Debate around the access of
asylum seekers to social benefits is also evident in
Denmark.
Longer-standing concerns exist regarding the
integration of Roma people in countries in central and
eastern Europe. In the Czech Republic, the emphasis has
been on improving access to education and the labour
market. In Slovakia, both short-term and long-term
measures to combat the social exclusion of people in
Roma settlements have been discussed, with the
emphasis on employment opportunities. For Roma
children in Slovakia, there has been support to extend
pre-primary education to promote better health and
social behaviour for at least one year before entering
primary school and differences in the educational
attainment of Roma children have been reduced. In
Slovenia, there has been an emphasis on addressing the
health needs of children and protecting them against
neglect, discrimination and exploitation. While rates of
early school-leaving have generally been in decline in
most Member States, they remain a problem for Roma
children in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.
Finally, reports from Estonia, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands highlight language barriers for immigrants.
In Estonia, it is difficult to participate in the labour
market without Estonian language skills, so a lot of
attention is being directed towards improving the
language capabilities of non-Estonians, especially in the
school system. In Luxembourg, a key aim of early
childhood education programmes is to enhance the
abilities of children aged one to three by providing a
‘linguistic bath’ in French and Luxembourgish. The
multilingual educational system has been identified as a
significant barrier for the integration of children from an
immigrant background. Similarly, in the Netherlands,
language deficiency is one of the most difficult
challenges for early childhood education. While children
of immigrants used to be a target group for intense
language training, this policy was gradually abolished
after 2005 as a result of the government’s wish to be
‘colour blind’. As in a number of Member States,
education is at the centre of discussions on social
mobility in the Netherlands. 
Nepotism and corruption
Nepotism and corruption are essentially unfair ways to
advance the interests of some people at the expense or
exclusion of others. In relation to social mobility, the
common issues are access to preferential education and
the labour market. Of course, advantages come in both
softer and harder forms – for example, in Italy, it is
reported that 35% of workers who entered the labour
market between 2003 and 2010 were facilitated by
family and personal networks (ISFOL, 2012). In
particular, family networks appear to provide support in
the case of risk of downward social mobility (De Paola,
2015). In various guises, some advantage is conferred by
family and ‘old boy’ networks for career advancement.
Supportive social networks can no doubt be found in
nearly every Member State and at every level of society.
The Finnish correspondent’s report refers to concerns
regarding members of the establishment (bankers and
high-ranking executives in different sectors) protecting
their interests – also an issue in Spain and the UK. The
2015 elections in Spain strongly highlighted concerns
about political corruption as a cause of poverty and
inequality.
Discrimination against specific groups, such as Roma
people, is an issue voiced in several countries and has
led to the development of extensive initiatives, such as
the National Strategy for Integration of Roma in
Bulgaria 2012–2020. These broader concerns about
favouritism in the labour market, with nepotistic hiring
and promotion regarded as a serious problem
(Chavdarova, 2015), are also highlighted  as a problem
in Cyprus, Malta and Romania.
Growing regional disparities
Growing regional disparities are visible between regions
of a country, and between rural and urban areas; they
can also be seen between parts of cities (suburbs and
centre, poorer and richer neighbourhoods). In many
Member States, where people live is an important factor
in terms of availability and quality of public services,
especially schools, and access to employment.
The differences in economic and educational
opportunities between regions are a feature in many of
the Member States that have joined since 2004. In
Croatia, the problem of regional disadvantage is
46
Social mobility in the EU 
particularly acute in the war-affected areas along the
border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have not
fully recovered economically from the conflict of the
1990s. These regional differences in poverty have
apparently not been addressed adequately in regional
development policy and disparities have deepened. In
Hungary, regional differences in poverty and
employment are also evident and the disparities have
increased following the economic crisis. The disparity
between the more advantaged western regions and the
eastern parts of Hungary is long-standing; it is reflected
both in economic development and in differences in life
expectancy. The relative disadvantage of eastern
regions is also apparent in other central European
countries such as Poland and Slovakia, where
inadequate transport infrastructure is highlighted as
an issue.
Unequal life chances for people living in rural areas can
be illustrated by experiences in countries as different as
Denmark and Romania. In both cases, it appears that
wealth and a high-skilled workforce are concentrated in
the capital. Denmark has seen an increase in regional
differences over the last decade or more in terms of
income, jobs, education and health. Many regions are
under pressure because businesses and public
institutions close or move to bigger cities and because
of low economic growth and difficulties in attracting
talent (Finans, 2015); this leaves some regions with a
concentration of low-income groups (AE, 2015). In
Romania, only 3% of the population in the Bucharest–
Ilfov area is at risk of poverty compared with 33% in the
north-east region, 30% in the south-west and 29% in the
south-east; there appears to be a specific problem with
rural depopulation and availability of childcare services
in Romania. Problems with access to public services in
rural areas are also reported in Lithuania and Poland. In
Portugal, the closure of public services in areas of the
country experiencing depopulation is likewise
contributing to increasing regional differences in
economic development.
Finally, it is clear that differences between
neighbourhoods (in terms of living conditions, quality
and availability of public services) can determine life
chances. Patterns of residential segregation – by
income or ethnicity – are an important element of the
policy debate in several countries. In France, the crisis in
the suburbs, highlighted by the riots in 2005, has
underlined the inequalities that people in these areas
face, notably in terms of access to work, healthcare and
education. In all of the Scandinavian Member States,
there is a growing debate about middle-class families
moving to areas with better schools (as in Finland) to
give their children additional advantages. In Sweden,
reforms in the education system – specifically, the
introduction of school choice in 1992 – have been
criticised because children increasingly go to schools
that are segregated according to socioeconomic and
cultural backgrounds. Ethnic segregation is on the
increase: a study conducted by Dagens Nyheter,
together with Statistics Sweden in 2015, showed that
out of the 30 municipalities in Sweden, ethnic
segregation has increased in all but two (Dagens
Nyheter, 2015).
Differences between Member
States in policy discourse
The previous section has shown how wide-ranging the
drivers of debate on social mobility are. This analysis
has tried to focus on those that have been identified as
significant in the Member States and that feature in
public and political debate. The correspondents were
asked to provide information on the main elements of
debate, so a reference to a particular theme in a
Member State does not mean that it was the only theme
discussed. Therefore, systematic comparison of the
policy discourse in different Member States is not
possible; however, some distinctive themes emerge
when Member States are clustered, as the table below
indicates.14
In the Nordic cluster, access to education is at the
centre of debate – particularly regarding early
education and access to tertiary education for those
from low-income backgrounds. However, increasing
attention is being paid to the ways in which parents
with resources are gaining greater advantages by
paying for homework tuition and opting for better
schools – in some cases, moving to live nearer to them.
14 For more information on the clustering scheme, see Annex 3.  It is an adaptation of Eurofound’s country typology that was developed to analyse different
dimensions of quality of life in Europe (Eurofound, 2014).
EU28 country groups
Cluster Label Countries
1 Nordic Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
2 Continental countries and
western islands
Austria, Belgium,
Germany, France, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands,
UK 
3 Western Mediterranean Italy, Malta, Portugal,
Spain 
4 Central and eastern
Europe and Baltic states 
Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia 
5 Eastern Mediterranean
and Balkan countries
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece,
Romania 
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Although inequalities are perceived to be relatively low
and social mobility relatively high, there is concern that
both issues are deteriorating.
Social mobility as such is not routinely high on the
policy agenda in any Member States except the UK. In
the Continental countries and western islands cluster,
the policy focus is on equal opportunities, especially
regarding education and early childcare. Increasingly,
there is concern about opportunities for migrants in
education and the labour market. Young migrants have
received specific attention in several Member States
and there is increasing discussion about life chances for
refugees.
The countries in the Central and eastern Europe and
Baltic states cluster have emphasised regional
disparities – particularly regarding opportunities for
people in rural areas. There are still many problems
related to gender equality and specific issues about
living and working conditions for Roma. Social mobility
as such is not at all prominent in the policy debate, but
it is discussed in terms of improving opportunities for a
range of disadvantaged groups. Access to housing,
health and other public services is a factor for many
disadvantaged groups.
In the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan countries
there is also concern about the situation of Roma
people (along with other marginalised groups). In some
of these countries, access to education and especially
employment is compromised by nepotism, favouritism
and corruption.
Finally, in the Western Mediterranean cluster, there is
particular emphasis on increasing income inequalities,
poverty and unemployment. The themes of persistent
gender inequality and corruption are also present.
Social mobility in the EU
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This chapter describes how various barriers in Member
States can hamper intergenerational social mobility.
It focuses on barriers identified by the country
correspondents where the system itself hinders social
mobility and is shown to have an impact on three
different stages of life: the early years, the school years
and working age. The focus for the early years is on
access to and cost of childcare; for the school years, the
emphasis is on tracking or early selection and financial
barriers;15 and for people of working age, the focus is
on barriers related to the transition from school to work
and access to occupations. 
Table 9 presents an overview of the role of these
systemic barriers in the Member States. The countries
are grouped according to the five country clusters
described in Chapter 5 (and Annex 3).
6 Barriers to social mobility 
15 Tracking or ability grouping is the separation of pupils into different classes or educational trajectories according to their scholastic ability; early selection
refers to the age at which this takes place and this can vary depending on the education system.  
Table 9: Overview of system barriers in EU Member States, by country clusters      
Country
cluster
Early years School years Working age
Access to ECEC Cost of ECEC
Tracking or
early selection
Financial
barriers Transition Occupation
Nordic countries
Denmark No No No No No No
Finland No No No No Yes Yes
Sweden No No No No Yes Yes
Continental countries and western islands
Austria Yes No Yes No Yes No
Belgium Yes No Yes No No Yes
Germany No No Yes No Yes Yes
France No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Luxembourg No No Yes No No No
Netherlands No Yes Yes No Yes No
Ireland No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
UK No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Western Mediterranean countries
Spain Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Malta Yes No No No No Yes
Portugal Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Central and Eastern Europe and Baltic states
Czech Republic Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Croatia Yes No No No Yes No
Hungary Yes No No No Yes No
Poland Yes No No No Yes No
Slovenia No No No No Yes Yes
Slovakia Yes No No No Yes No
Estonia No No Yes No Yes Yes
Lithuania No No No No Yes No
Latvia No No No No Yes No
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Early childhood education
and care
There is a widespread consensus that early childhood
education and care (ECEC) gives children a better start
in life and lays the foundation for success in terms of
education, social integration, personal development
and, later, capacity for employment (European
Commission, 2011a). One benefit of ECEC, for instance,
is that it reduces the risk of early school leaving
(European Commission, 2011b).
Many children, particularly those from a disadvantaged
background, do not have access to high-quality ECEC
because of its cost or lack of available places. This puts
them at a disadvantage later in life because of the
positive effect that ECEC has on cognitive abilities; in
turn, this negatively impacts on their educational
progress (Eurofound, 2015b). 
The lack of sufficient childcare places or the cost of
childcare is a barrier to social mobility in many Member
States. In the countries in the Nordic cluster, with their
long tradition of affordable early childhood education,
the system of ECEC is conducive to social mobility. This
is less so in the other clusters. In many of the countries
in the Continental and western islands cluster, access to
childcare is widespread but the costs can be high,
particularly in Ireland and the UK (also in France and the
Netherlands) where it is reported to be a barrier.
Furthermore, high levels of access do not necessarily
mean that access is equal: children from disadvantaged
backgrounds are often less likely to attend childcare
services. Research indicates that unequal access forms
a barrier to social mobility in many of the countries in
this cluster (see, for example, Altzinger et al (2013) for
Austria). 
Availability of childcare places is also a significant
barrier in many of the countries in the central and
eastern European and Baltic states, many of these
countries failing to achieve the Barcelona objective of
having at least 33% of children under the age of three in
formal ECEC structures (European Commission, 2013a).
Availability is particularly poor in the Czech Republic,
Poland and Slovakia. This creates a twofold barrier to
social mobility: firstly, it reduces the chances for early
intervention and mitigation of inequalities experienced
by children from disadvantaged social backgrounds
(Federowicz and Sitek, 2011); and secondly, it hinders
the return of mothers to the labour market (Kozek,
2013). Moreover, in some of these countries there are
significant differences between rural and urban regions
in terms of access to early childhood education. 
A lack of ECEC places is also a problem in the western
Mediterranean cluster. In Italy and Malta, in particular,
further efforts are required to improve the availability of
childcare facilities, especially for children aged three
years or under.16 In Portugal, cuts in the education
sector have led to a reversal of positive trends in
preschool enrolment rates and subsequently to more
difficult and unequal access to preschool facilities.
The ECEC system is still underdeveloped in the eastern
Mediterranean and Balkan cluster. In Bulgaria and
Romania, in particular, the state of ECEC is poor and
consequently large numbers of children do not attend
formal childcare, especially in rural areas. In urban
areas – where availability is less of an issue – cost is a
barrier, only children of those who can afford it
benefiting from the opportunities provided by ECEC. In
these parts of Europe, the discourse should not (yet) be
about the impact of ECEC on social mobility, but rather,
the focus should be on the more pressing need to
further develop the childcare sector. In Cyprus and
Greece, limited investment in pre-primary education
structures maintains and even exacerbates social
inequalities from preschool age. 
Country
cluster
Early years School years Working age
Access to ECEC Cost of ECEC
Tracking or
early selection
Financial
barriers Transition Occupation
Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan countries
Cyprus Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Greece Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Bulgaria Yes No No Yes Yes
Romania Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Note: ECEC = early childhood education and care.
16 The share of children under three years who attend formal childcare arrangements is 11% in Malta and 22% in Italy, which is well below the Barcelona
objectives (European Commission, 2013a). 
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Secondary and tertiary education
In an increasingly difficult labour market, the
competition for jobs puts those with the highest
qualifications ahead of the rest. This demands a fair and
equal educational system. However, certain features of
the secondary and tertiary education system limit
upward social mobility in many EU Member States. This
section examines countries in which early tracking and
ability grouping – and financial costs – run the risk of
putting some pupils in second place. 
Early selection and inequality
The connection between early selection and
inequalities is described in detail in an OECD study on
equity and quality in education (OECD, 2012). The study
shows that in countries where school selection – or
tracking – is done relatively early, differences in
educational outcome by social background are larger
than when it takes place later. One explanation for this
is that children whose parents have a low level of
education more often go to low-quality schools than
children of similar ability with more highly educated
parents (Van de Werfhorst, 2015). 
The Nordic cluster is well known for its late selection
(Finland) and absence of ability grouping (Sweden).
However, that is not to say that the educational system
in the Nordic countries is completely egalitarian. A 2009
evaluation of the Swedish educational system by the
Swedish National Agency for Education shows that the
school choice system has led to a growing
differentiation between schools of the characteristics of
pupils, because students no longer have to enrol in the
school closest to their home (NAE, 2009). Furthermore,
the NAE’s 2013 report points to a strong correlation
between the extent to which the opportunity to choose
schools is used and the socioeconomic status of the
parents (NAE, 2013). In Denmark as well, evidence
shows that the probability of completing secondary or
higher education is strongly related to the parents’
educational level (see, for example, Nielsen et al, 2015;
Munk, 2013). In Finland, the evidence is perhaps
somewhat more encouraging in this regard:
grandchildren’s social class is only weakly related to
their grandparents’ social class (Erola and Moisio, 2007).
Early tracking is a feature of the school systems in much
of the Continental cluster (in Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands). In these five
countries, selection occurs before children make the
transition to secondary education. In Austria and
Germany, the first selection takes place at the age of 10
(Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers, 2012). A recent study
highlights the impact of early selection and inequality in
Austria (Schneebaum et al, 2015). In the Netherlands,
parents’ occupational class is strongly related to the
level of enrolment into streams at early ages (Van de
Werfhorst and Luijkx, 2010). Research on the Belgian
school system also points to limited educational
mobility between generations, with early tracking
offered as one possible explanation for this. There is an
ongoing debate on secondary education reform ,
focused on reducing the negative effects of early
tracking and the differences in educational trajectories
between general and vocational pathways. 
On the other hand, tracking occurs later in Ireland and
the UK, and in France, where it takes place around the
age of 15. In these countries, financial barriers are the
factors that most restrict choice in education and social
mobility (see the next section).
In the western Mediterranean cluster, tracking also
tends to occur at a later age and is not viewed as a
barrier to social mobility. Previously, Malta used
tracking to select higher-achieving students; those who
failed the exams were assigned to secondary schools
instead of the more prestigious Junior Lyceums, with
the result that they may have been indirectly neglected
(Fabri, 2011). Malta abolished early tracking in 2011.
Benchmarking assessments do still take place, although
the idea is to use this system as a diagnostic tool to give
more attention to those who need it. This means that
children in the same class can still be grouped
according to their abilities for particular subjects.
A review of early tracking in other countries shows that
tracking occurs early (at age 12) in the Czech Republic.
The existence of six-eight year grammar schools in the
Czech Republic gives rise to socially homogenised
cohorts, who, bolstered by an affirmation of their
academic ability, are in a sense destined to succeed
within the educational system and in the labour market
(Fónadová and Katrňák, 2015). Romania also has early
tracking (see, for example, Malamud and Pop-Eleches,
2011). 
Financial barriers
The hypothesis that social mobility is maximised under
the least elitist models of public education has been
widely researched (see, for example, Cremer et al, 2010).
In this context, the Nordic cluster has the least elitist
model, education in these countries being free of
charge. Ireland and the UK (countries in the Continental
cluster) are at the other extreme: in these two liberal
free-market countries, fee-paying schools make the
system an elitist one. In Ireland, elitism in the education
system has long been recognised and debated as a
barrier to social mobility, with particular reference to
elite fee-paying schools. The free-market approach to
education is seen as serving those who can afford
desirable educational choices and excluding lower-
income groups (Power et al, 2013). In the UK, the Social
Mobility and Child Poverty Commission (SMCPC)
highlighted the inequality of access to the best
education (SMCPC, 2016); one factor that accounts for
this is the existence of prestige schools. With social
mobility stalling in the UK, the SMCPC calls the system
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deeply elitist and closed at the top and also highlights
that the privately educated are becoming more
advantaged over time. France is another country in this
cluster where some elitism exists in the educational
system. Furthermore, research shows that the impact of
family background on education in France has
increased over time (Ben-Halima et al, 2014).
Educational fees are far less of a barrier in the other
countries in the Continental/western islands cluster,
where, as noted above, inequalities in social mobility
associated with education seem linked more to early
tracking and selection. 
With the exception of Malta, where education is free of
charge, financial barriers to tertiary education are also
evident in the western Mediterranean cluster. In Spain,
for instance, differences among social groups in terms
of tertiary educational attainment reflect social
inequalities. Financial barriers and lack of grants for
tertiary education may be behind those inequalities
(Martínez-Celorrio and Marin, 2012). 
The former socialist system of the countries in the
central and eastern European and Baltic states cluster
has left its mark on their educational systems and their
societal and economic structures. Schlicht et al (2015)
note that during the socialist period, these countries
were characterised by artificial top-down equalisation.
During the initial years of transformation, it was
primarily the well-educated families that easily and
quickly adapted to the free-market economy, thereby
improving their situation. The authors claim that in
these countries, educational performance depends
more strongly on social background than in western
Europe, yet private schools do not significantly
influence inequality of education. This may explain why
financial barriers are seen as less of a barrier in this
cluster.
In the eastern Mediterranean and Balkan cluster, in
Cyprus and Greece the ability to purchase private
tuition is seen as a crucial factor. Personal relationships
and family ties influence the educational and
professional choices of children, resulting in the
children of wealthy families having more education and
training opportunities than those of lower-income
families. A study from Cyprus shows that the impact of
parental educational background on the child’s
probability of studying in higher education has
decreased over time, resulting in increased educational
mobility (Andreou and Koutsampelas, 2015).
Meanwhile, in Bulgaria and Romania, the existence of
private tuition is reported as a barrier to social mobility.
Research findings from Bulgaria suggest that equality of
educational opportunities in access to higher education
(in the context of the currently applied private co-
financing of education) is negatively affected by the
ineffective legal possibility to use bank loans
guaranteed by the state. 
Labour market
Transition from school to employment
The large number of young people not in employment,
education or training (NEET) across the EU highlights
how difficult it is for young people to make the
transition from school to employment. Even in the
Nordic countries, where most other inequalities have
been minimised, school-to-work transitions and youth
unemployment are key issues . 
With the exception of Malta, youth unemployment is a
major problem in the western Mediterranean cluster. 
In the central and eastern European and Baltic states
cluster, transition from school to the labour market
poses a range of difficulties. In the Czech Republic,
those leaving secondary education without a school
leaving examination are disadvantaged: lack of this
compulsory precondition for applying to tertiary
education limits a student’s chances of obtaining a
tertiary degree and so hinders upward social mobility. A
study by Matković (2009) on the educational and work
careers of young people in Croatia shows that a
disadvantaged position for labour market entry and for
good-quality employment is correlated with coming
from a disadvantaged family background (for example,
having parents of lower educational level, coming from
the Roma national minority, being of lower
socioeconomic status or having a disability). In Estonia,
policy documents emphasise the problems associated
with dropping out of school, which obviously impedes
transition from school to work. In Romania, Jecan and
Pop (2012) describe a phenomenon they call the
bumping-down effect, which exists because there are
not enough high-status occupations to accommodate
the significant increase of individuals with a higher level
of education. This forces graduates to accept
occupations that are below what their qualifications
would permit them to take. The authors argue that this
surplus of overqualified graduates leads to a tightening
of education-related hiring criteria, which in turn
hampers access to occupations for those with lower
educational qualifications. 
Access to occupations
Access to occupations is closely linked to relative social
mobility and is a good measure of how socially mobile
societies are, as has been described in detail in Chapter 1.
Using findings from the academic literature and
information from the network of European
correspondents, this final section provides a brief
overview of how restrictions in access to occupations
act as a barrier to social mobility. 
In the Nordic countries, research has identified
discrimination against minority groups and women that
hampers their access to certain occupations. Research
from Finland, for instance, shows that the labour
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market is quite gender segregated: research studies
indicate that women generally face higher requirements
than men for attaining high-level positions (Koivunen et
al, 2015). In addition, ethnic minorities and immigrants
experience discrimination at work and elsewhere that
may hinder their social mobility. Furthermore, research
from Sweden shows that informal contacts are crucial
for succeeding in the Swedish labour market. However,
the importance of social networks for social mobility is
not an issue that has been highlighted in the debate.
In the Continental and western islands cluster, access to
occupations is hampered by discrimination, labour
market difficulties and – in some countries – elitism and
nepotism. In Belgium, being born outside the EU
appears to significantly restrict labour market
participation. Moreover, native-born offspring of
migrants have less favourable labour market positions
(Marx and Van Rie, 2013). Belgium is among the EU
countries where the intergenerational link between a
parent’s occupation class and the child’s is strongest.
Compared with the average worker, respondents whose
father had an elementary occupation are 1.5 times more
likely to have an elementary occupation as well. This
reproduction also applies at the other extreme: workers
whose father was a legislator, senior or official are 1.5
more likely to hold a function at this level (Zaidi and
Zolyomi, 2007). 
In France, a study by Vallet et al (2016) shows that
whatever the indicator of labour market success –
occupational prestige score, access to the service class,
wage earned – the ‘direct’ effect of parental background
does exist in France. The influence of parental origin
seems to increase over the life course, being less
pronounced for the first job than for the current job.
However, this ‘direct’ origin effect generally varies in
strength over educational categories, being weaker or
non-existent among higher-educated people.
Conversely, a higher social background is able to
compensate to a certain extent for a lower level of
educational attainment – even more so in the course of
the career than at its outset. Finally, the socioeconomic
background has indeed strengthened in the most recent
cohorts (or the last decade observed). This can be
related to the declining occupational returns on
education in the context of sustained educational
expansion that has characterised France in the post-war
period. 
In Germany, for many years, male and female pupils
followed gender-stereotyped preferences in their choice
of occupation. Now, science, technology, engineering
and mathematics (STEM) university courses (and
occupations) are receiving higher proportions of female
students. However, this change in occupational choice
is taking place only slowly, despite the fact that – in
Germany – STEM occupations offer better prospects for
career advancement, pay and upward mobility. In the
UK, the elite professions have traditionally been the
preserves of the upper reaches of society and access to
elite occupations remains unequal (Ashley et al, 2015). 
The literature from the western Mediterranean
countries shows that social networks, the economic
crisis and discrimination all affect access to
occupations. In Italy, family and local networks play a
pivotal role in determining labour market participation.
Recent studies indicate that people with a more
advantaged family background benefit from a social
‘parachute’ that reduces their probability of social
downgrading (Franzini et al, 2013; Raitano and Vona,
2015). A study in Spain shows that the impact of the
crisis has been higher for migrant workers and that
immigrants have experienced more downward mobility
than native workers. As a consequence, wage
polarisation between natives and immigrants has
increased (Miguélez et al, 2014).
The analysis of the central and eastern European and
Baltic states cluster highlights how the transition to
post-socialist life has affected access to occupations.
Research from the Czech Republic (Katrňák and Fučík
(2010) shows that during the period 1989–2009, Czech
society re-stratified. During this period, socioeconomic
hierarchies were established and began to influence the
life outcomes of their members. This is the paradox
characterising Czech post-socialist society. The
opportunity to do business and enhance the effects of
education and qualifications on one’s employment
position has led to improved life chances but the
connection between social origins and class
destinations has grown stronger. However, other factors
also hamper access to occupations. For instance,
institutional barriers in Estonia also affect occupational
mobility over the life course; in addition, a mismatch of
skills and skills requirements can limit a person’s labour
market opportunities. In Slovenia, gender bias in the
workplace (especially in the private sector) affects
women’s opportunities. Social networks also play an
important role in hampering equal access (Robnik,
2015).
Finally, with the exception, it seems, of Romania, access
to occupations is a widespread problem in the eastern
Mediterranean and Balkan cluster – one linked
predominantly to nepotism and discrimination. In
Bulgaria, nepotism and corruption are barriers to
accessing the labour market (Chavdarova, 2015).
Furthermore, ethnic discrimination is an obstacle to
social mobility in low-skilled occupations, even if
affirmative action measures exist to help people of
Roma descent. In Cyprus, gender discrimination inhibits
access to occupations for women. Likewise, in Greece,
men are still twice as likely as women to hold
managerial positions and three times as likely to be
general managers.
Social mobility in the EU
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It is challenging to map and discuss policies that aim to
foster upward social mobility, as their impacts will be
most evident in future decades. However, most
policymakers agree that achieving the type of the
society we want to live in – including the ideal that
everyone, regardless of background, can reach their full
potential – depends on the decisions made and the
policies implemented today.  It is also necessary to have
an understanding of past and current problems and
challenges, and an appreciation of the effects of past
policies and their impact on our current environment
and society. Understanding the effects of policies will
help greatly in designing better policies. 
Policy measures to facilitate upward social mobility
have focused mainly on promoting increased equality of
opportunity for groups who are disadvantaged due to
their socioeconomic status. (Race, gender, religion,
family composition and migrant status may also play a
part in disadvantage). Given the central importance of
the prospects of the next generation in determining
social mobility, the opportunities for children and
young people receive a great deal of attention. This
chapter provides an overview of policies and measures
in the EU28 (focusing on country clusters) aimed at
promoting social mobility and directed at overcoming
barriers in three areas: childcare and early education,
formal education and the labour market. 
Measures related to childcare and early education:
Policies may focus on improving access to early
childhood education and good-quality care. Measures
may also include mechanisms that offer parenting
support, as well as out-of-school activity programmes. 
Measures related to formal education: These may
include measures to modify the structures of tuition
fees and grants, change admission procedures and
amend the tracking system (for example, by raising the
age of selection or by changing the criteria applied).
Policies may include initiatives on school choice that
avoid segregating pupils. There may be measures that
provide extra support to disadvantaged pupils,
including specialised curricula and additional teaching
assistance. Policies may also be aimed at improving
teacher quality, particularly in disadvantaged areas, or
boosting access to second-chance schooling.
Measures related to the labour market: Measures may
be taken to broaden access to certain occupations or to
amend recruitment practices and so open up access to
certain sectors. Policies may also include second-
chance schooling, apprenticeships and vocational
training, as well as measures for lifelong learning. 
Early childhood education and
care 
There is a widespread consensus that early childhood
education and care (ECEC) can have a positive impact
on a person’s achievements and on their capacity to
become a successful member of society.17 In this way,
ECEC can be seen as an area where policies could help
to counterbalance early on the disadvantages and
limitations that some children experience due to their
social origin and milieu (Eurofound, 2015b).
Institutional set-up and systemic features determine the
availability and accessibility (in terms of cost) of ECEC.
There is considerable variation in the availability and
quality of ECEC across the Member States; the
experiences of developing it also vary widely across
countries (Eurofound, 2015b). Within the services, there
can be a range of measures to either directly facilitate
early development or to interact with the broader
community and address larger societal inequalities. In
some cases, the motivation for supporting ECEC is to
help integrate women into the labour market and create
new jobs.
As for the larger-scale policy context at European level,
policy interest over the last few decades has broadened
from a focus on the availability of ECEC places and its
role in improving work–life balance to the role of ECEC
in achieving social inclusion. The European Commission
has also highlighted social investment in both helping
those coming from disadvantaged backgrounds and
having a qualified and motivated workforce in ECEC
(Eurofound, 2015c; European Commission, 2011a).
7 Policies to facilitate upward
social mobility  
17 In this chapter, the ECEC measures reviewed include those targeting children at a very early age (0–3 years) and later preschool age, as well as parents or
carers of children of this age group.  
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Nordic countries 
None of the Nordic countries was reported to have
major systemic barriers related to access and costs of
childcare. There seem to have been continuous
attempts to improve policy over the last two decades,
focusing both on curriculum quality and on ensuring as
much participation in preschool as possible. 
In Sweden, the first National Curriculum for Preschools
was introduced in 1998, aiming to improve the quality of
early childhood education. In 2002, a maximum fee was
introduced in recognition of the economic situation of
families with young children, aiming to facilitate
employment for parents. The current policy debate has
mainly centred on the proposal made in a Swedish
government report (Statens Offentliga Utredningar,
2013) to make preschool attendance mandatory.18
By extending the total number of years in compulsory
education, inequality in schooling is expected to
decrease. Meanwhile, in Finland in 2015, preschool was
made mandatory (even though 98% of children
attended before this) and a new regulation was
introduced that set the maximum number of children
per teacher and number of children per daycare group. 
Policies in Denmark that aim to strengthen early and
targeted measures for children and young people from
disadvantaged families have been part of a larger policy
programme for 2014–2017, called Early Effort – Lifelong
Effect. Looking at children aged up to 18 years, it
includes measures such as parenting skills development
(Socialstyrelsen, 2015; the programme is currently
under evaluation). In addition, the National Board of
Social Services cooperates with a number of
municipalities to strengthen their use of preventive
measures and to focus on vulnerable or disadvantaged
children’s well-being, development and learning. With
regard to curriculum quality, since 2004 there has been
more emphasis on learning in ECEC for children aged
0–5 years; this has brought positive outcomes for both
children’s development and for ECEC staff, who have
been equipped with new methods of working. 
Continental countries and
western islands
In Germany and Luxembourg, problems of availability
and the cost of ECEC were not seen to be a barrier for
access (as they were in the Nordic countries). In Austria
and Belgium, barriers related to access to ECEC were
mentioned (without pointing to costs). Cost (with
availability not being an issue) was highlighted as an
issue in Ireland and the UK (as will be seen also in
relation to the entire education system), and in France
and the Netherlands.
A focus on involving the 0–3 years age group in ECEC is
prominent in the policies of some countries in this
cluster. Since 2013, Germany has provided a legal right
to a place in a kindergarten or nursery school to
children aged one year or older. The share of children
below the age of three years in a kindergarten or
nursery school increased from 18% in 2008 to 32% in
2014.19 Also since 2013, France has implemented a
number of measures focusing on childcare options for
children under 3 years, including a five-year planned
reform of the governance of early childhood and
parenthood by expanding ‘childcare solutions’ (various
services for the 0–3 years age group) and ‘early
education’ arrangements (for the 2–3 years age group).
The complementary ECEC measures (brought into law
on 8 July 2013) were introduced to improve education,
notably in disadvantaged (‘priority’) areas, remote rural
areas and in overseas territories; these involved teacher
training and partnership with the local authorities. 
Various measures to improve ECEC are often informed
by concerns over the integration and prospects of
migrant children. Similar to what has been noted in
Nordic countries, mandatory preschool is in place in
Austria; it is believed to particularly benefit migrant
children. In Austria, there are debates on extending
mandatory preschool to two years. Meanwhile, in
Belgium, where a lack of places makes access to
childcare for migrants challenging, support is being
targeted at those affected by poverty (National Child
Poverty Plan 2014–2019). Examples of targeted
Countries Prevailing themes
Denmark,
Finland,
Sweden
Improving curriculum quality – greater focus
on learning 
Improving access/involvement: mandatory
preschool
Cooperation between municipal and national
level; promotion of measures to prevent social
exclusion and future problems for young
people (Denmark)
18 The Swedish government carried out a consultation with stakeholders over the proposal while this report was being drafted.
19 While the numbers have increased significantly since the introduction of the legal right, some 185,000 places are still lacking (BMFSFJ, 2015).
Countries Prevailing themes
Austria, France,
Germany
Focus on involving 0–3 years age group in
formal ECEC
Belgium,
Luxembourg,
Netherlands
Migrant children and those with a
disadvantaged background
Ireland, UK Parenting skills (UK)
Targeted support to address disadvantaged
3–4 year-olds (Ireland)
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measures include Germany’s federal programme 2011–
2018, called Start Reading (Lesestart), which was
designed for children of preschool age or in their first
year of schooling, with a special focus on disadvantaged
children (from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds) or
households where parents do not read aloud to their
children. The first evaluation results show that since
2011, around 400,000 parents annually have received a
starter set; this corresponds to some 60% of the birth
cohort. The programme is also supported by
paediatricians and over 5,000 libraries that help to
disseminate the starter sets.20
High childcare costs in Ireland and the UK are one of the
reasons why many women stay out of the labour market
and provide childcare to their children themselves.
Hence, measures have been put in place to improve
access to ECEC. Ireland runs the Early Childhood Care
and Education (ECCE) scheme and provides a free year
of early childhood care and education for children of
preschool age. Ireland also provides targeted support to
address disadvantages through the Early Start
Programme, targeted at children aged 3–4 years. The
UK has expanded free part-time early education places
for 3-year-olds. 
In the UK, there seems to be a lot of policy interest in
promoting parenting skills.21 Research has been
commissioned to assess trends in parenting skills. Clark
and Heath (2015) have found, for example, that there
are trends of convergence over time between groups
with the highest and lowest socioeconomic status with
regard to reading to children by the mothers, interest in
education and frequency of disciplinary problems.
However, there are widening inequalities in terms of
investment of parental time, behavioural problems and
social capital between parents of high and low
socioeconomic status. The Parenting Early Intervention
Programme (PEIP) (2008–2011) focused on parents from
socially disadvantaged backgrounds who had concerns
about their children’s behaviour. Lindsay et al (2011), in
their evaluation, found that PEIP had a positive effect on
parents’ well-being and children’s behaviour, for both
older and younger children. In addition, the percentage
of children with significant behaviour problems fell –
from 56% to 38%. Subsequent policy initiatives have
also addressed parenting, such as the CANParent
(2012–2014) and the Troubled Families programmes
(2011–present). 
Western Mediterranean countries
All the western Mediterranean countries were reported
to be facing similar issues: while the cost of childcare is
not viewed as a barrier, the availability of such services
is limited in all four countries.
In Law 65/2015 of 3 July, Portugal decided to establish a
right to preschool education for all children of four
years of age in an attempt to avert school failure in the
future.
To support the participation of women in the labour
market, Malta introduced free childcare for children
aged 0–3 years in 2014; however, this is conditional on
both parents or a single parent being in employment or
a study programme (thereby contributing to the social
security system). While early results seem positive both
in terms of childcare enrolment and women’s return to
the labour market,22 there is a concern that lack of
access to childcare for non-working parents may hinder
their search for employment and their children’s
development.
From 2012 to 2016, Italy implemented a vouchers
scheme for mothers after maternity leave,23 giving them
a choice in the type of childcare facility (for example,
either kindergarten or a babysitter service). In 2015, the
Jobs Act, on a temporary experimental basis, extended
the duration of parental leave and the period that it was
paid for.24 To promote flexible working time
arrangements, it introduced the entitlement to parental
leave on an hourly basis, an option that had previously
been possible only if agreed by collective bargaining.
Measures in Italy focus on leaving the choice of
childcare arrangements (type, timing) to families; the
new measures, however, target women, resulting in a
lack of gender balance in terms of incentives for men to
take parental leave. This might accentuate the
occupational segregation of women as well as
negatively affecting their career progress and pay rise
potential.
20 Source: Lesestart webpage, as on 3 February 2016.
21 Also note the emphasis on the need for more comprehensive policy connected with social mobility aims, such as the Parliamentary Inquiry into Parenting
and Social Mobility (2015) and David Cameron’s speech on life chances (2016).
22 Between April and December 2014, the number of children enrolled in childcare centres increased from 1,800 to 2,917. During the same period, an
additional 200 mothers are estimated to have entered the workforce in low- to medium-skill jobs. Furthermore, mothers who benefitted from the free
childcare scheme entered the workforce 130 days before mothers who did not make use of it.
23 The measure was introduced by Law 28 June 2012, no. 92 (hereinafter ‘Act no. 92/2012’) and has been extended to 2016 by Law 28 December 2015, no.
208 (hereinafter ‘2016 Stability Law’).
24 Jobs Act – work–life balance, Legislative Decree 15 June 2015, no. 80.
Countries Prevailing themes
Italy, Malta,
Spain, Portugal
Extending enrolment to youngest age groups
(0–3 years)
Providing in-kind support and parental leave
policies
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From 2008 to 2012, Spain undertook a large-scale
investment in ECEC for the 0–3 years’ age group, aiming
to boost enrolment and improve the quality of childcare
education centres.25 In recent years, the proportion of
children aged 0–3 in education has increased. In 2013–
2014, almost 100% of children aged 3 years were in
education, as were 52% of 2-year-olds and 33% of 1-
year-olds (according to data from Statistics Spain).
Spain has also addressed the situation of parents: if
children are younger than 8 years (it had previously
been 6 years), parents may reduce their working time by
a minimum of one-eighth (previously it had been one-
third) and a maximum of one-half. Working time
reduction may be applied by taking a day, a week or a
month off (Law 3/2007 for effective equality between
men and women).
Central and eastern Europe and
Baltic states
None of the countries in this cluster reported that cost
was a major barrier, although availability is recognised
as a challenge in the Visegrád countries (the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) and Croatia. 
Promotion of access to ECEC is more often targeted at
Roma or low-income families than reformed overall.
However, it is important to note that due to the sizeable
Roma population in many of these countries and to the
extent of the exclusion that a great proportion of Roma
experience, the (re)arrangement of ECEC services in
such a way that they reach out, are open and effective is
a major challenge. Sometimes preparatory classes or
supportive courses to even out the educational gaps are
introduced to help Roma – as in the Czech Republic,
where these seek to to substitute for full enrolment into
ECEC or schooling. They may also be introduced to help
the  children of migrants or returning migrants (as in
Lithuania). A particular type of Roma-oriented measure
in relation to ECEC and schooling that has been tried by
many countries in this cluster is to employ teaching
assistants who are from the Roma community or have a
close connection to it. 
Most countries in the region have been developing
Roma inclusion policies for about two decades and have
benefited from EU funding for the related projects.
However, it has not yet been established whether
measures implemented (such as ECEC or schooling)
have been on a sufficient scale to ensure systemic
change.
Regional unevenness in availability of childcare facilities
is also an issue in Croatia and Hungary (which provides
measures to aid the return of mothers to the labour
market, including covering commuting costs).
Other than measures targeting specific social groups,
mandatory preschool has been part of policy proposals
(starting at least a year before school in the Czech
Republic). Slovakia has been extending the availability
of kindergartens (the main target group is children aged
3–6). Since 2011, Poland has run a programme called
‘Toddler’ to promote the development of services for
the 0–3 age group; it covers up to 80% of the costs of
organising a daycare facility. Various types of providers
are eligible (local authorities, natural or legal people,
higher education institutions); the subsidy is meant to
make childcare more affordable for parents.
With regard to those countries where systemic barriers
were not reported (the Baltic states and Slovenia), it
may be worth considering to what extent ECEC as such
is seen as a policy priority at national level. While in
Slovenia enrolment levels are high and growing, in the
Baltic countries there are indications of problems
related to availability and costs – at least in some
instances. 
All three Baltic countries have tried to tackle the
availability of childcare in recent years. Although the
proportion of young people in Latvia and Lithuania is
falling due to ageing and emigration, the availability of
affordable (mainly public) kindergartens is an issue.
This is  especially the case in the capitals or large cities,
which attract young, geographically mobile people.
Latvia has introduced financial support for families who
cannot access public childcare due to a lack of places. A
similar measure has been introduced at local level in
Vilnius in Lithuania, where the demand for childcare
greatly exceeds supply: the municipal authorities have
introduced a subsidy payment to contribute to the cost
of private childcare for families who cannot access
public childcare because of lack of places. All Baltic
states have allocated some of the European Social
Funds to childcare projects, but in Estonia this seems to
have been mainly related to addressing systemic
shortages and introducing up to 1,200 new kindergarten
places as of May 2015. The funding can also be used for
25 The plan foresaw an investment of €1,807 million between 2008 and 2012, evenly shared between the state (50%) and the autonomous communities
(50%). 
Countries Prevailing themes
Czech Republic,
Hungary,
Poland,
Slovakia
Regional differences in availability of services
Croatia,
Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania,
Slovenia
Roma inclusion
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childcare in the evening, at night, at weekends and for
children with special needs. 
To address the shortages in service provision, Estonia
has amended legislation to allow municipalities to
provide daycare services to children under 3 years of
age, rather than providing a place in kindergarten. This
lowers the demand for kindergarten places because –
unlike kindergartens – daycare centres provide only
childcare and not preschool education. However, the
shortage of childcare places is greatest among children
aged under 3 years and the municipalities are still
obliged to ensure kindergarten places for older children. 
Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan countries
With regard to ECEC, Bulgaria and Romania have
experiences and difficulties similar to central and
eastern European countries. In both countries, ECEC
provision is affected by two central issues: availability
(one dimension of which is regional disparity); and the
inclusion of Roma children  (World Bank, 2014). To
address the challenges facing children from a non-
Bulgarian linguistic background ( Roma children and
migrants), Bulgaria runs a preparatory module for
groups most affected by exclusion.26
Lithuania and Romania, countries that have had the
highest emigration rates in the EU, are also experiencing
the phenomenon of ‘distance’ families: parents who
leave children behind for considerable periods of time
in the care of relatives. The developmental assistance
for such children may be uneven and not necessarily
compensated for by formal childcare.
Correspondents in Cyprus and Greece have reported
barriers in relation to both access to and costs of ECEC.
Citing data from the Ministry of Education and Religious
Affairs, correspondents in Greece report that a
mandatory one year of preschool was introduced in the
early 2000s and applied to all children resident in the
country who were 5 years old. The impact assessment
suggests that enrolment in public and private nursery
schools increased, from 141,654 in 2004 to 157,637
children in 2008–2009. The measure is seen as
successful thanks to an increase in the number of
children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds
attending nursery schools. However, this process has
faced problems such as lack of funding, issues with
planning and inadequate quality of services. Actions
that could have supported the enrolment extension –
preparing lists of infants, opening new nursery schools,
and providing suitable facilities and sufficient nursery
staff – have not been adequately implemented.
Challenges have emerged in relation to changing
patterns of accessing public and private facilities: public
nursery schools were cautious and sometimes avoided
enrolling first-year preschoolers to secure enough
places for second-year preschoolers, thus jeopardising
universal enrolment in many regions. This situation has
led to many parents opting for private nurseries so that
they get a certificate of attendance. Meanwhile, many
first-year preschoolers have been enrolled either in
private nursery schools or private childcare centres due
to the lack of places in public facilities.
In Cyprus, public childcare facilities previously provided
services only for the first half of the day, finishing at
13:00 (while afternoon care and tutorial activities were
available on the private market, they were not
affordable for less affluent families). In 2005, public
childcare hours were extended to 16:00, to make the
services accessible to more people.
Secondary and tertiary education
Many policymakers view education as the major
instrument to promote upward social mobility. The
education field encompasses a wide range of factors
that have an impact on equal opportunities and
ultimately on the patterns of upward social mobility.
These include: family- related factors such as wealth,
family structure, education and occupation of parents;
social networks, including friends and partner/spouse
but also networks that are useful later in working life;
institutional- and policy- related factors, such as welfare
and education policies, transitions from school to work,
and the broader institutional set-up of the education
system (such as financing, tracking and ability grouping
of pupils). 
Evidence and framework 
There is a large volume of studies highlighting the role
of education and the link between educational
achievement and occupational attainment and social
mobility. (D’Addio, 2007; Blanden et al, 2005). The
European Commission found that if a respondent’s
father had entered third-level education, respondents
were more than twice as likely to do the same than if the
father had had only a basic level of schooling. (In the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the odds were
nine times higher). Indeed, the educational level of
parents is cited by many as one of the most important
factors influencing social mobility (Blanden, 2009).
Countries Prevailing themes
Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Greece,
Romania
Availability of places, especially for Roma
26 The module is called ‘Providing additional training for children at preparatory groups’, part of the national programme called ‘Care for every student’
2015. Total enrolment in 2014 was 3,603; of these, 2,458 completed the programme. 
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Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) looked at the link
between the educational attainments of people in
different occupations or income classes and the
difference in the ‘return’ on education – the benefits of
their education vis à vis their labour market
opportunities. The key question was whether highly
educated professionals produce better-educated
children because they pay for better-quality schooling
or because of other factors, such as good parenting
practices, career motivation or biases in the education
system itself. 
The overall subjective value of education also counts.
According to Boudon (1974), people from lower social
classes tend to overestimate the costs and
underestimate the benefits of education; consequently,
they may not pay enough attention to the actual quality
of children’s education. In the UK, Blanden et al (2005)
show that the expansion of higher education since the
late 1980s has disproportionately benefited those from
well-off families.
The setup of the education system plays an important
role. Solon (1992) concludes that intergenerational
social mobility is strengthened in systems of public
education, whereas an education system with a large
private schooling element significantly reduces the
chances of intergenerational social mobility. 
Main themes 
Chapter 6 examined the barriers identified in three main
challenges in the educational field: the transition from
school to work, barriers related to the school system
(including tracking), and financial costs (including fees
and elitism). A first glance at the policies and measures
identified by correspondents in the EU28 reveals that
these interventions do indeed address these barriers.
The majority of interventions focus strongly on
equalising opportunities and helping disadvantaged
groups to flourish in the educational system. Mapping
the policies and measures confirms that most
governments see education as the primary way in which
upward social mobility can be fostered. Most
governments have also invested considerably in efforts
to introduce reforms to tackle particular barriers or to
respond to ongoing problems (such as widening
inequalities). Many Member States have also intensified
their efforts to nurture a closer link between education
and the labour market, and to keep abreast of shifts in
the job structure that require a new or modified set of
skills. 
The section below describes and discusses recent
measures and policies in selected Member States,
grouped by country cluster. 
Nordic cluster 
The reason for the relatively high rate of social mobility
in the Nordic countries is attributed, in part, to the
institutional structure of the societies, the way in which
the society can compensate for differences in
conditions in childhood, how the education system is
structured, the rate of return on education and the rate
of redistribution (Lind, 2009). However, in recent years,
several scholars (as well as the OECD) have pointed to
growing income inequalities and the stalling of upward
social mobility. 
Recent policy measures to address these challenges
have focused on two main dimensions. The first centres
on equalising chances at very early ages in education.
The second broadens vocational paths, in order to align
them to the needs of the labour market and to reduce
the number of school drop-outs.
Equalising chances in early education
Looking first at equalising chances in early education, in
Denmark, the public school reform introduced in 2013
aims to reduce the importance of social background in
relation to academic results and more broadly to
strengthen trust and well-being in the public school
system.  Longer school days were introduced, leading to
longer teaching and activity hours per day. The central
aspect of the reform was supporting pupils by giving
them more help with homework. The idea behind this is
that this assistance will benefit less-privileged pupils,
from backgrounds where this kind of help may not be
available. 
In Finland, changes in the law on comprehensive
education that came into force in 2011 aim at making
sure each pupil in early and compulsory education
receives sufficient support in their learning. Although no
formal evaluation had been carried out, in 2013 the
Trade Union for Education (OAJ) claimed that pupils still
do not have the intended support because of a lack of
coordination between different departments,
insufficient resources allocated to the reform and
unqualified staff in teaching positions. 
The quality of teachers is also high on the agenda in
Sweden. According to several stakeholders, including
the OECD (2015b), Sweden faces a serious deterioration
in the status and quality of the teaching profession; this
is thought to be a contributing factor to the overall
Countries Prevailing themes
Denmark,
Finland,
Sweden
Early education: 
£ focus on parenting skills
£ support beyond school building
Quality of teaching
Vocational path as an option
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decline in the performance of Swedish schools. To
counter this challenge, in July 2011, certification of
teachers and preschool teachers was introduced. The
purpose of the reform was to raise the level of skills in
order to improve the quality of teaching. The
implementation of the new regulations was examined in
a report from the Swedish government (Statens
Offentliga Utredningar, 2013), which stated that the
stricter eligibility criteria for teachers is likely to lead to
both improved results and in the long run to a better
transition of pupils into the labour market.
Vocational education and training
Vocational aspects of education have traditionally not
been a strong feature in the Nordic countries.
Policymakers have started paying more attention to this
only recently. In 2015, Denmark introduced a
so-called EUD/EUX reform with the main objective of
increasing by 25% the number of young people
obtaining a vocational education by 2020. The challenge
for vocational education has always been its image as a
less prestigious form of education. With the reform, the
legislators are trying to change that perception by
increasing the quality of the education and creating a
better match with labour market demands. To that end,
the initiative aims to increase the number of relevant,
demand-driven classes on offer. However, the new,
higher admission criteria have been criticised for
excluding less academic young people and limiting their
educational mobility. 
Boosting vocational education was seen as one of the
remedies for the high number of students dropping out
in Sweden, which in 2011 initiated reform of the upper
secondary school system. Many students (around one in
four in 2014) drop out of upper secondary school or
finish education without a complete diploma. With the
reform, 12 out of 18 programmes are going to be
vocational programmes providing a foundation for
working life and further vocational education; the
remaining 6 will focus on higher education preparatory
programmes, providing a path for further education in
the tertiary sector. The reform sought to ensure that
students who did not want to go into higher education
after finishing upper secondary school would not be
forced to go through all the steps required for college
admission. According to a report published by the
Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions
(2015), the share of young people who have established
themselves on the labour market after finishing upper
secondary school has increased since the reform.
However, there is still a big difference in terms of
opportunities in the labour market between those
young people who graduated from upper secondary
school and those who dropped out. 
Continental cluster and western islands
The Continental and western islands cluster comprises
a large number of countries with distinctively different
educational systems. These countries have invested in
several different areas to improve education outcomes.
The reforms focus on adjustments to the tracking
system, improving the overall quality of education
(including a strong component of personalisation) as
well as addressing the most pressing issues, such as
preventing school drop-out. 
For a long time, tracking of pupils – determining
whether pupils take a vocational or more academic
education path – has been a strong feature in many
Continental countries, such as Austria and Germany.
Recently, however, commentators have been
increasingly critical of the long-term effects of the
tracking system, linking it with the more limited
opportunities available to those from more
disadvantaged backgrounds. Some governments have
started to introduce reforms, with the overall goal of
making the system fairer. In Austria in 2008–2009, the
government rolled out a new type of school in lower
secondary education, the New Secondary School, for
pupils aged 10 to 14 years. The aim of the move is to
postpone the separation of pupils and hence boost
opportunities for all, regardless of socioeconomic
background, gender or race. The new school puts a
special emphasis on a different culture of learning, with
greater attention paid to the quality of teaching and
without separation in class based on achievement. The
most recent reform, started in 2015, introduced the
so-called ‘Joint Schools’ in some regions. Part of the
reform focuses on improving upward educational
mobility. However, it is neither easy nor straightforward
to introduce reforms to a system in place for so long. 
The example of the Flemish regional government in
Belgium and its efforts to amend the tracking system
are a good illustration of the challenges of introducing
such reforms. In June 2013, the Flemish regional
government of 2009–2014 ratified a plan for secondary
education reform. The goal was to move away from the
strong focus on early tracking and the strict separation
between general and vocational tracks, because of the
fact that it was largely pupils from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds who took vocational tracks. Implementing
the plan, however, resulted in conflicts within both the
governing coalition and the research community.
Opposing the reforms, arguments were put forward
saying the reform would sacrifice educational
Social mobility in the EU
Countries
discussed Prevailing themes
Austria,
Belgium,
Germany,
France, Ireland,
the UK 
Reform of tracking system
Improving overall quality of education
Preventing dropping out from education 
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performance for equality and that the degree of
inequality of educational outcomes is exaggerated
(Van den Broeck, 2014). In favour of the reform, it was
argued that early tracking produces unequal outcomes
that need urgent action (Lavrijsen et al, 2013; Nicaise et
al, 2014). The current Flemish government (elected in
2014) agreed to implement the proposed measures, but
the first attempts (in February 2016) resulted in
renewed and still unresolved political debate. 
The tracking system has undergone reform in the
Netherlands, where in 2014 the advice of primary
schools was given greater weight in determining a
pupil’s secondary school track. However, there are
mixed reactions to the reform. Van de Werfhorst (2015)
note that the use of track selection – in the form of a
national test, for instance – may decrease social
inequality. On the other hand, the increased role played
by the school raised concerns that parents’ would seek
to influence the teachers assessing the child’s potential.
A mixed reception has also greeted the forthcoming
reform (likely to be introduced in 2017) whereby
additional admission requirements will be demanded of
graduates of vocational education to progress on to
higher education. To date, all students who complete
the highest level of vocational education may be
admitted to all higher education programmes offered in
‘universities of applied sciences’ (not in regular
universities). In the near future, it is likely that
admittance will be dependent on the vocational
education programme being in the same field as the
intended programme of higher education. This measure
will make it more difficult to switch tracks later in the
educational career. However, it is hoped that, by linking
vocational students’ move into higher education to
their past experience, it will increase these students’
success rate.
The vocational path has also been the focus of recent
discussions in the UK, where traditionally expectations
for education after secondary school have been geared
towards tertiary rather than vocational education. This
is clearly visible in the share of university graduates,
which has grown substantially over the last few
decades. However, given the changes in the labour
market, with employers calling for graduates with more
technical skills, the government’s Post-16 Skills Plan
aims to change this by improving the quality of
technical education (Minister of State for Skills, 2016).
The introduction of tuition fees has led to a debate
regarding the value for money of a university degree, in
terms of a graduate’s chances of securing a good, well-
paid job. The plan aims to streamline the current
complex system (with about 20,000 technical courses on
offer) into a framework of 15 routes implemented by
dedicated providers. All courses will include mandatory
skills such as English, maths and IT – skills that have
frequently been mentioned as lacking among current
graduates of technical education. 
In Ireland, the School Completion Programme run by
the Department of Education and Skills aims to increase
the number of young people staying in primary and
second-level schools. The programme is part of the
department’s inclusion strategy ‘Delivering Equality of
Opportunity in Schools’ (DEIS), aimed at helping
children and young people who are at risk of, or who are
experiencing, educational disadvantage. The
programme provides flexibility for schools to develop
more effective strategies, such as out-of-school support
and outreach, family support, mentoring, staff
development and parental involvement. The
programme is a good example of a long-term, holistic
intervention that addresses all aspects of an individual’s
life, including education, life skills and extracurricular
activities. However, as pointed out by the Society of
St Vincent de Paul, well over half of all children from
disadvantaged backgrounds do not attend a DEIS
school and are thus immediately disadvantaged as they
move on within the education system (Irish Times,
2016). 
Reducing the high incidence of dropping out continues
to be high on the agenda in many continental countries.
In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF), the Federal Ministry for Labour and
Social Affairs (BMAS) and the Federal Employment
Agency (BA) work toward reducing the number of
school-leavers without qualifications and vocational
training. Through the ‘Educational Chains’ programme
that has been running since 2011, they support schools
with different funding instruments that support – for
instance – career guidance services and coaching
measures. Some 900 mentors work for the initiative at
more than 1,000 schools, supporting around 18,400
pupils. The 2014 evaluation of the programme shows
that 400,000 young people have benefited from the
programme. 
Highly talented high school and university graduates
have been a focus of policy in a number of countries.
A French initiative, ‘Excellent Boarding Schools’ aims at
helping motivated high school and university students
who do not enjoy a favourable home environment to
succeed in school (for example, their home conditions
are inappropriate for studying, or they come from a
disadvantaged or rural background). At the boarding
school, participants benefit from personalised private
tutoring. 
In Germany, the quality of teaching at university level
has been placed under scrutiny with the programme
‘Pact on Quality in Teaching’, introduced in 2010–2011.
It seeks to improve support for university students and
the quality of teaching at universities. The BMBF is
supporting universities by enabling them to employ,
train staff and improve their teaching methods. From
2011 to 2016, the pact supported 186 universities and
academic institutions. Between 2016 and 2020, another
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156 schools will receive the same support. The
evaluation of the pact showed that 43% of surveyed
project managers indicated a greater recognition of the
importance of quality of teaching in their university.
Western Mediterranean cluster 
For some time, countries in the western Mediterranean
cluster have been battling with alarmingly high levels of
youth unemployment, so the main efforts of the
governments have been on policies to address this. In
Italy and Spain this has translated into renewed efforts
to boost vocational education and training (VET). In
Spain, so-called Basic VET courses are being rolled out.
They are designed for young people aged 15–17 who
have ended the third or, exceptionally, the second
course of the mandatory secondary education. The
Basic VET courses will combine maths, literacy and
other academic subjects with vocational training,
including workplace training. In Spain, this vocational
track has been introduced quite smoothly; in Italy,
however, there is still some work to be done to convince
employers of the benefits of vocational training. Despite
concerted efforts made in recent years to promote
apprenticeships as a pathway to the labour market, this
type of employment contract does not appeal to many
employers. The latest effort (Jobs Act – Labour
Contracts Code, Legislative Decree 15 June 2015, no. 81
2015) reorganised and simplified the existing types of
employment contracts, including apprenticeships. It
remains to be seen whether the changes will make a
positive impact. 
In Malta, efforts have focused on preventing students
dropping out. Firstly, when a student is identified as
being at risk of leaving school early, before the O-level
graduation exams, the ‘Alternative Learning
Programme’ kicks in. This phase replaces the last year
of compulsory education with a programme that is
meant to help students learn basic life skills and
introduce them to vocational education in a bid to
smooth the transition from school to work. The second
phase consists of an intensive course in which students
learn basic competencies in specific ICT fields. In
addition, students who fail their maths, physics, English
or Maltese O-level exams can avail of the free Secondary
Education Certificate (SEC). Revision classes available
since 2014 provide help to secondary school students
who need to re-sit their exams. The measure has been
organised twice, in the summers of 2014 and 2015; help
was given to over 2,400 students in total. When
compared with the previous year, higher pass rates
were noted in 2014 in the subjects with free revision
classes. Of those who attended the free classes in 2014,
some 71% remained in education while another 8%
found a job. The Maltese government also offers
financial grants to parents of primary and secondary
school children to ensure that their children attend
school regularly. The measure also serves to emphasise
the importance of attendance and so prevent later
drop-out.
Central and eastern European and
Baltic cluster 
In this cluster, most of the measures in education focus
on addressing the needs of vulnerable groups, and
moving away from segregated education to a more
inclusive approach. Another noticeable feature has
been the attention given to a more individual-based
approach. One notable example is Latvia, where in 2014
guidelines were developed for education reform. The
cornerstone of the reforms is human-oriented
education – education that is aimed at self-
development and creating the preconditions for
entrepreneurship, inclusion, employment and civil
participation. 
The more inclusive approach allows policymakers to
pay more attention to vulnerable groups in society,
including children and young people with disabilities,
and mental health or behavioural problems. In several
countries, this approach has translated into provisions
for increased numbers of additional assistants in
mainstream education. This is the case in Croatia,
where, since 2014, the Ministry of Education covers the
cost of class assistants for children with developmental
difficulties. The measure has been deemed relatively
successful: since the 2014–2015 school year, all children
and young people with difficulties or disabilities are
provided with class assistants and are able to enrol in
mainstream schools. Similarly positive results were
noted in Estonia, where the programme that ran
between 2009 and 2012 focused on preventing school
drop-outs amongst children with learning difficulties.
The project placed 150 school students in a two-year
intervention phase in order to boost their social skills
and their capacity to successfully finish their education.
Early evaluations show reduced rates of drop-outs
(MTÜ Mahena fotokogu, 2011). 
Countries
discussed Prevailing themes
Italy, Malta,
Spain
Tackling youth unemployment
Renewed focus on VET training and education
Preventing drop-out
Countries
discussed Prevailing themes
Croatia,
Czech Republic,
Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania,
Poland,
Slovenia
Approach of inclusive education – move away
from segregated schools
Focus on vulnerable groups
Addressing the cost of education 
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However, a more drastic overhaul of the division
between special and mainstream education has proved
to be a challenge in the Czech Republic, where between
2005 and 2015 an attempt was made to convert special
education schools into inclusive schools. In effect,
special schools were renamed ‘practical schools’ in this
period. By renaming the schools, some social stigma
has been removed, but these schools still exist; many of
their pupils come from the Roma population.
As education in many countries becomes increasingly
expensive, governments have decided to alleviate its
costs. This has taken different forms. In Estonia, since
2013 all full-time students in public universities are
guaranteed tuition-free education. In other countries,
programmes have targeted students from low-income
families, who can apply for some form of scholarship.
The social scholarship has existed in Lithuania since
2010: its aim is to enable disadvantaged and disabled
young people to study at higher education institutions.
In 2015, a total of 3,732 students benefited from the
scheme at a cost of more than €2 million in total. A
similar system operates in Poland, with the so-called
bridging scholarships; these are provided by NGOs and
private companies and supported by the Agricultural
Market Agency. Students from low-income families and
from rural areas and small towns studying at public
universities are eligible. Since 2002, PLN 92 million
(around €21 million as at 24 February 2017) has been
spent on 19,510 scholarships; 92% of those awarded
with the scholarship confirmed that it has improved
their material situation during the studies and 90%
finished studies with very good or good marks. In
Slovenia, a system of scholarships exists for children
from low-income families as well as a separate
scholarship programme for gifted pupils. In 2015, the
government introduced a type of scholarship that it
hopes will channel students into professions where
demand for skills is needed. 
Reforms or innovative vocational training programmes
are absent in this cluster. The notable exception is
Slovakia, where at the beginning of the 2015–2016
school year, the government allocated resources to
enable a significant expansion of the practical part of
education to take place directly at the workplace. In the
school year 2015–2016, some 422 secondary students
were involved. Each of them spent half of their time
undertaking practical training in companies in the form
of an internship. It is expected that in the 2016–2017
school year, the number of employers engaged in the
dual education system will have increased, since 261
enterprises from all sectors of the economy submitted
their applications.
Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan cluster
Two countries from the eastern Mediterranean and
Balkan cluster – Cyprus and Greece – have explicitly
focused on putting policies in place to promote equal
educational opportunities. In Cyprus, several primary
school programmes decided to open late in the
afternoon to enhance children’s socialisation. Summer
schools for primary school pupils are being piloted
throughout the country, seeking to provide an inclusive
and creative environment and so mitigate inequality of
opportunities between children of affluent families and
those of poor families. The summer schools also help
working parents who cannot afford to pay for extra
school activities during summer months. 
In Greece, the entire education system has undergone a
major reform to boost equality of opportunity, aimed at
benefiting children of low and medium earners,
immigrants and Roma families. The most significant
changes comprise: 14 years of compulsory education
(2 years of pre-primary school, 6 years of primary
school, 3 years of junior high school and 3 years of
senior high school); the reform of special education by
broadening inclusion; the introduction of all-day
primary school nationwide; and a new strategic plan for
vocational education and training. 
Labour market
Both the academic and policy debate regarding upward
social mobility has focused mainly on the role of
education and ensuring equal access to it. Recently,
though, the debate has widened to include a discussion
on equal access to the labour market and the fair
progression of a career. This discussion has been
framed around access to top professions and the idea
that socioeconomic background and social networks
are often more important in securing a job than the
person’s ability. In addition, the challenges of record
levels of youth unemployment continue to be high on
the agenda, along with concerns over a bleak future for
young people in comparison with their parents and
grandparents.
Labour market policies to facilitate upward social
mobility may include mechanisms to broaden access to
certain occupations, or measures in recruitment
practices to open up sectors that have traditionally
been known to be closed and elitist. Policies may also
include second-chance schooling, apprenticeships and
vocational training, and measures for lifelong learning –
all with the overall objective of making access to the
labour market more inclusive. 
Social mobility in the EU 
Countries
discussed Prevailing themes
Cyprus, Greece Promoting equal opportunities and tackling
growing inequalities
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The labour market-related policies and measures
identified in the EU28 generally focus on addressing the
barriers in education and access to the labour market.
The first set of policies centres around the transition
from school to employment. The main instrument
identified in most countries is the recently adopted
Youth Guarantee, which focuses on providing
employment or work experience for recent graduates.
The second set of policies addresses access to the
labour market and specific occupations, an area that
has traditionally been linked to upward social mobility.
Here, policies look at breaking the cycle of disadvantage
in accessing jobs; they have predominantly been aimed
at women and migrants. More recently, the issue of
lower socioeconomic status as a barrier to social
mobility has been brought into the policy debate.
Transition from school to employment
Most of the EU Member States have implemented
employment measures related to the transition from
school to employment, either in the form of the Youth
Guarantee or via more general programmes, but with
the same objective of providing opportunities for
employment or further training for young people. The
Youth Guarantee that is being implemented in many
countries aims to ensure that all young people under 25
– whether registered with employment services or not –
get a good-quality, concrete offer of training, further
education or employment within four months of their
leaving formal education or becoming unemployed
(Council of the European Union, 2013). There have been
many studies that aim to examine the programmes and
their effectiveness in detail, not least Eurofound’s work
(Eurofound, 2015c); this section will focus on those
aspects that are most relevant to equal opportunities
and the social mobility debate.
Some of the strongest elements of the Youth Guarantee
and the area that many countries have been working on
are those related to apprenticeships and vocational
training. This is driven by the idea that better matching
the skills of young people with the demands of the
labour market can contribute to higher employment
rates. In some countries, this has been a focus for some
time; hence, evaluations have been carried out to
determine how successful these programmes have
been. In Austria, where some of the programmes under
the Youth Guarantee have been in place since 2009, the
emphasis has been on modifying apprenticeships,
including the ‘Training Guarantee’, an apprenticeship
programme that takes place within a company. The
programme is aimed at young people who cannot find
an apprenticeship position. The evaluation of the
programme shows overall positive effects, including
increased participation in education, fewer young
people becoming NEET and – to some extent – more
equal opportunities on the labour market (Bergmann
et al, 2011). 
In Germany, a new National Alliance for Vocational and
Further Training was set up at the end of 2014. The
alliance is to run from 2015 to 2018 and unlike its
predecessor, the Pact on Apprenticeships (2004–2014),
the latest initiative unites unions, employers and
government representatives. The overall goals are to
improve the quality and attractiveness of the vocational
training system; to provide every young person who is
interested in an apprenticeship position with a pathway
to a vocational qualification; to reduce the number of
school leavers without a school-leaving certificate or
without sufficient qualifications to begin an
apprenticeship; and to increase the number of
apprenticeship positions and of companies training
young people. Following the first year of the
implementation, the partners agreed that the newly
formed alliance had started well. Nonetheless, they also
highlighted areas for improvement. The German
Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB), for example,
criticised employers for not having provided enough
additional vocational training positions. Companies had
only created 7,300 additional places – not the 20,000
promised. The DGB therefore suggests introducing a
training levy, or similar measures, if employers are not
able to meet the targets. The employers reject such a
levy. Mismatches between applicants’ skills and
companies’ trainee profiles or regional needs have been
put forward as another area that needs further
attention. 
Access to the labour market 
Policymakers are paying more attention to ensuring
that the labour market is open to all and that access to
professions, especially top positions, is based on the
candidate’s ability rather than their socioeconomic
background or social networks. Several factors have
been identified as important in improving outcomes for
job seekers and ultimately helping them in securing
jobs: these include extracurricular activities,
geographical mobility and social capital.
The lower levels of extracurricular activities among
students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are a
differentiating factor in terms of their securing a job.
Research shows that students with a lower
socioeconomic status spent more time combining
school with paid jobs and less time engaging in
extracurricular activities. It was concluded that these
types of activities were important both in developing
students’ self-identify and in widening their social
networks and career prospects. Research has also
shown that employers value and recognise skills
acquired through extracurricular activities: this helps
them select the most suitable candidates for the
position (Stuart et al, 2011). The regional dimension has
also been highlighted as a possible factor in affecting
career progression. More research needs to be done to
explore this in greater detail (Bridge Group, 2016).
Evidence, however, shows that students from lower
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socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to move
away to study and more likely to return to their home
after graduation, hence limiting their opportunities to
access jobs. Social capital and its value in relation to
employability is a sensitive area. Employers may
assume that students from lower socioeconomic
background lack the networking skills employers value:
they therefore need to acquire those skills in order to
succeed. Research findings suggest that the
development of social capital at university is vital in
strengthening equality of opportunity (University
Alliance, 2014).
Research on access to the professions suggests that
some leading companies may engage in selective
recruitment behaviour, seeking to maintain their
competitive advantage and blocking a move to
widening access to the professions (Ashley and Empson,
2016; Ashley et al, 2015). In general, there may be a
mismatch between the set of skills and values that the
new recruits can bring with them and the needs and
demands of the employers. 
In this area, the UK seems to be one of the few countries
that explicitly seeks to improve access to the top
professional occupations for those from disadvantaged
backgrounds. The UK Social Mobility Commission has
established the Social Mobility Business Compact,
within which it aims to work with a range of employers
to broaden access to top positions. A number of firms
are working together with the government and are
outlining alternative (non-higher education) routes into
employment – such as apprenticeships. However, it is
too early to tell if this policy has been effective. It is also
a difficult environment to intervene in, as some UK
policymakers argue that it is not the role of the
government to interfere with companies’ recruitment
policies. Furthermore, the challenges of access to
professions are not restricted only to the point of entry:
they can continue throughout a person’s career and
may pose an obstacle to reaching the top levels within a
chosen profession.
As illustrated in Chapter 6, discrimination in access to
the labour market has been mentioned as one of the
challenges to upward social mobility in many countries.
This can apply to both gender and racially based
discrimination; it is seen in the ongoing debate about
the lack of diversity and the pay gap in certain sectors or
professions. Several countries have tried to tackle this
and have introduced programmes to improve
recruitment. In France, in 2015, the government
established ‘blind recruitment’ – the candidate’s
selection being based primarily on skills assessment
rather than a diploma-driven process. The initative aims
to fight discrimination in the recruitment process. The
selection is conducted via the so-called ‘platforms of
vocation’, which were created within French job
centres. Candidates who are selected after the testing
process are introduced to the companies that have
vacancies. An interview then follows, during which the
company decides whether to hire the candidate. This
recruitment process has been awarded a prize by the
national anti-discrimination body.
In Italy, the government implemented an act that aims
to increase female participation on boards of directors
and audit committees in an attempt to break the glass
ceiling that still prevails. Female representation on the
boards of public companies rose from 6% to about 23%
in January 2015 (Conde-Ruiz and Profeta, 2015). The law
had other spin-off effects, including improved
governance, as the new law also led to an increase in
the number of board members with a level of education
higher than that of their predecessors. All of this
indicates a widening of the pool of candidates selected
for the boards. In addition, the share of women related
by kinship to other board members has fallen from 16%
to 8%. The quota system, in other words, seems to be
able to trigger a change in the selection of directors,
with a strong incentive for companies to exclude lower-
skilled men in favour of higher-skilled women, thus
increasing the average quality of their representatives. 
In Slovenia, the focus has also been on women. In 2010,
the Association of Employers of Slovenia (ZDS) started a
three-and-a-half-year project, called ‘Girls’ Day’, that
promotes gender equality in the labour market by
raising awareness, encouraging and informing young
women about career possibilities in typically male-
dominated professions and showing participating
enterprises that women represent a source of untapped
potential. The project carried out seminars, workshops
and open-door days where participating companies
invited girls in to introduce them to ‘typically male’ jobs.
In 2014, more than 140 girls from 29 elementary schools
visited 11 companies. Another ZDS project, aimed at
promoting gender balance in economic decision-
making, GEMA, started in 2014 and finished in 2016.
Migrants and their attachment to the labour market has
been the focus of initiatives in Sweden, where
traditionally migrants have had much higher
unemployment rates than native-born Swedes. The
‘Special Recruitment Incentive’ is a subsidised form of
employment introduced in 2007, available to
immigrants with a residence permit. While working, the
employee also studies the Swedish language. ‘New Start
Jobs’ is another subsidised form of employment: it
targets people who have been out of work for a long
period. Both measures were introduced to incentivise
employers to hire people who had a limited chance of
getting a non-subsidised job because of their lack of
experience and/or their insufficient proficiency in
Swedish. In 2013, a report was published on the effects
of the two employment schemes (Swedish National
Audit Office, 2013). Participants in both schemes were
found to have gained an increased labour market status
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– entering and remaining in the labour market – after
the programmes ended. However, these results might
be exaggerated as it is generally the people who already
have the most resources who participate. The success of
participants in the ‘Special Recruitment Incentive’ in
finding a non-subsidised job after finishing the
programme did not increase. This was most likely due
to the fact that many of them went on to participate in a
‘New Start’ job. Both schemes are concentrated in only
a few sectors and occupations.
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Policymakers aim to foster an environment that allows
everyone to fulfil their potential regardless of their
socioeconomic background. In times of economic
slowdown, the promotion of equal opportunities is
more important than ever. There is increasing concern
about the prospects for young people and for future
generations, the expectation of progress for each new
generation no longer prevalent in many countries.
These concerns have reduced the sense of trust in the
fabric of European societies; in response, policymakers
are giving higher priority to measures aimed at
combating social exclusion and injustice by paying
more attention to social cohesion and fairness
(especially in times where deep rooted structural
changes have contributed to the widening inequalities
in European countries). 
This report comes at a time of intense public and policy
debate on the need for policies at European, national
and regional level that can help to improve life chances
and foster equal opportunities. It set out to map
patterns of intergenerational social mobility in the EU
countries. This involved considering both absolute and
relative social mobility:
£ absolute social mobility: how societies have
changed in terms of structural/occupational change
and societal progress
£ relative social mobility (or social fluidity): how
socially fluid societies have been in terms of
intergenerational movement between occupational
classes.
The story of recent social mobility was explored using
data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The report
also analysed the current policy discourse: it examines
whether social mobility has been visible on the policy
agenda in different Member States and, if so, how it has
been framed. It then provided information on the
prevailing barriers to and implementation of equal
opportunities. Finally, it focused on developments in
the last decade that could foster social mobility in
childhood and early education, school and tertiary
education, and the labour market.
The added value and the uniqueness of this report lie in
its coverage of social mobility across all 28 EU Member
States and in its use of both quantitative and qualitative
information to enable comparisons between countries.
Unlike many previous works in this field, it examined
patterns of social mobility for men and women
separately, recognising the increasingly important
gender dimension and providing a compelling overview
of gendered patterns of social mobility in Europe. The
study of patterns of intergenerational social mobility is
based on occupational classes, which classifies people
who have reached occupational maturity, deemed to be
at least 35 years of age. Thus, the empirical analysis of
trends in intergenerational mobility has a somewhat
historical element. The qualitative information relates
more specifically to the last decade and captures
current issues in terms of policy debate and policies put
in place to mitigate the challenges and promote upward
social mobility.
A key strength of the report is that it is built on four
sources of information: 
£ data from a high-quality survey (the ESS)
£ an extensive review of literature and research from
many Member States
£ policy assessments from Eurofound’s network of
European correspondents
£ validation/analysis in review meetings with key
experts from the Baltic countries, the Netherlands,
Poland and the UK. 
The analyses focus not only on research, but also on
policies and the links between them. The main
limitation of the report is that it presents results for
many countries in a brief format, meaning that analyses
and interpretation are necessarily constrained.
However, Eurofound hopes that the results presented in
the report can serve as a basis for more in-depth follow-
up work by other organisations. Such work is
particularly needed to further assist policymakers in
implementing appropriate policies to facilitate upward
social mobility. 
Patterns of social mobility
The report focuses on specific concepts related to social
mobility. It recognises that the definition of these
concepts has not been the same in all scientific
research; nevertheless, the report aims to be clear
about how concepts were defined and measured – and
why these choices were made. This is particularly
relevant to the empirical analyses, as comparison with
results from other research depends on the definitions
of the relevant population, the indicators selected to
measure social mobility, the specification of
occupational classes and the criteria for classifying the
categories of horizontal, upward and downward
mobility.
In measuring social mobility, Eurofound uses
occupational status as the key indicator. Occupational
class position is a reflection of an individual’s
involvement in economic life (which is essentially their
participation in the labour market) and of their
employment relations. Occupation has been identified
as the most suitable indicator for reflecting social
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inequalities and as one of the most important – in terms
of impacts on a wide range of an individual’s life
chances and life choices. The strength of classifying by
occupation is that it is associated with three important
aspects of economic life: income security, short-term
income prospects, and longer-term income prospects.
It is also an appropriate indicator for capturing the
patterns of social mobility within the timeframe that the
ESS data covered. There may be an issue regarding the
rapid changes in the modern world and discussion
might need to take place about the difficulties of
measuring these changes. This certainly applies to the
changes happening in the labour market, with the
growing prevalence of self-employment, freelance and
other non-standard forms of employment and the
consequences of these changes on the current ordering
of occupations into classes. However, it is important to
note that Eurofound’s empirical results provide
information on the patterns of those born between 1927
and 1975 and should be viewed and interpreted within
that context only. 
It was decided to focus explicitly on intergenerational
mobility in this study, analysing social mobility
processes for women and men separately as well as
analysing them for three distinct cohorts/generations.
The first part of the empirical section deals with
absolute mobility, while the latter part examines
relative mobility (‘social fluidity’). In terms of
methodology, absolute mobility relates to structural
change in societies; it is measured in terms of
individuals’ upward and downward mobility. Social
fluidity relates to equal opportunities and is measured
in terms of chances of movement between occupational
classes. 
To understand the scale and pace of social mobility in
European societies, it is important to acknowledge
differences in their developmental trajectories and
occupational structures. Generally, in western European
countries, jobs in service classes and the
administrative/clerical class are more numerous, while
in the southern European countries, many individuals
still work in agriculture and routine, unskilled labour.
Eastern European countries lie in between.
The changes observed from one generation to the next
are expected: in later-developing countries in the south,
mobility is greatest from farm work or other self-
employment towards skilled manual and sales and
service occupations. In eastern Europe, the movement
from blue-collar occupations towards higher service
classes, sales and services is more predominant. In
central and north-west Europe, structural change after
1970 was modest because western European societies
had already undergone extensive changes in
occupational structure. 
In general, rates of absolute mobility depend on
whether a country’s occupational structure has
changed substantially. If a country’s labour market does
not change structurally, there are fewer chances for
upward mobility – unless for some reason a large
number of people experience downward mobility at the
same time. The precondition for upward social mobility
is therefore economic growth. Changes in absolute
social mobility show marked country variations, with
the UK, for example, showing little change in
occupational structure. Similarly, Bulgaria and Hungary
have not seen their social stratification change much in
the last generations, albeit for different reasons. The
countries that have changed the most are Cyprus,
Finland, Greece and Poland, which have seen massive
mobility out of agriculture towards manufacturing and
services over the last generation or so. 
Structural change that involves change of occupational
structure and size of population in various occupations
can enable upward mobility: at least, this was the case
across three cohorts in 20th century. The analysis shows
how different mobility patterns evolved for men and
women. In a majority of countries, women have become
more upwardly mobile while men are more likely to
experience downward mobility. In this sense, women
are without a doubt advantaged by structural change
and deindustrialisation. Having said that, structural
shifts that changed the occupational structure for the
Generation X cohort (born 1965–1975) have also led to
the level of social mobility among men and women
becoming more similar: the more dissimilar the
occupations of respondents and their parents were in a
given country, the more similar was the extent to which
men and women had moved away from their parents’
occupation.
More recently, given the slowdown in economic growth
and the widening of social and economic inequalities,
policy attention has focused on equal opportunities (or
inequality of opportunity) and the transmission of
(dis)advantage. To varying degrees, equality of
opportunity has been on the policy agenda since the
Second World War both in Europe and the US; however,
the current debate both at EU level and in many
Member States reveals growing concern with the lack of
equal opportunities in access to schools, jobs,
healthcare and quality childcare. 
A socially fluid society is one in which all citizens can
achieve economic success commensurate with their
talents and efforts, independent of their social origin; in
one way or another, this is related to equality of
opportunity. Results from the ESS show that the levels
of social fluidity (relative mobility) in 24 EU Member
States converged over the 20th century: Member States
have become more similar in terms of social fluidity
among Generation X than they were among the cohort
born before 1946 (the ‘silent’ generation). However,
after that, the picture is more mixed and an overall
slowing down of convergence – if not more divergence
among countries – can be observed. The results show
different patterns, with social fluidity increasing in some
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countries while decreasing in others. To sum up, levels
of social fluidity changed in different directions for the
countries analysed and sometimes in different ways for
men and women. By and large, social fluidity increased
more for baby-boomers than for the silent generation in
most countries.
The overall patterns of social fluidity indicate a group of
countries where fluidity has continuously been
increasing: Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland,
Slovakia and Greece. These are the only countries, where
the chances for equal opportunity have increased over all
three cohorts. In another group of countries, Generation X
– in particular – has experienced a decrease in social
fluidity: this is most marked in Sweden, but is also
evident in Austria, France and Bulgaria. A third group of
countries show stable levels of social fluidity over time –
Germany, Poland, the UK and Ireland.
Eurofound decided to examine social fluidity by gender,
as the overall country patterns may hide differences
between levels of social fluidity for men and women.
Indeed, the results clearly show that apparently stable
levels of social fluidity may hide opposing trends for
men and women, which – in the statistics – cancel each
other out unless the figures are broken down. Social
fluidity levels in the second half of the 20th century
moved in opposite directions for men and women in
Germany, Spain, and the UK. In Germany and Spain,
social fluidity for men kept increasing across the three
cohorts examined; however, more women of
Generation X were limited by their social origin than
women of the baby-boom. In the UK, the opposite was
the case: social fluidity increased for women across the
three cohorts, but more men in Generation X were
limited by their social origin than was the case for baby-
boomers. 
Results show that in several countries it is men,
especially those of Generation X, who have started to
experience decreasing levels of social fluidity: this is the
case in the UK (as just mentioned) but it is also the case
in France, Sweden, Austria, Estonia and Bulgaria. In
contrast, social fluidity among men has increased in
Germany and Spain as well as in those countries where
the overall levels of social mobility have been high for
both sexes (the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland,
Slovakia, Belgium and Greece). 
Social fluidity has in general changed less for women
than for men. Social fluidity has increased for women in
the UK, Czech Republic, Finland and – most notably – in
Belgium and the Netherlands. In contrast, social fluidity
has decreased in Austria, Sweden, Germany and Spain. 
In general, the results from the empirical work are in
line with previous research, but they cover more
countries and provide new information, especially
regarding gender. More research is needed to
understand the drivers and determinants behind these
patterns and the factors that may influence different
patterns for men and women. 
Current policy agenda
and debate 
As part of its mission, this study aims to capture and
analyse the ongoing policy discourse and developments
in the Member States. In most instances, ‘social
mobility’ as a term is rarely mentioned explicitly in
policy debates (with the exception of a handful of
countries, including Greece and the UK). It has been
argued that – in the 20th century – policymakers usually
considered social mobility for all in terms of absolute
mobility and the modernisation of the occupational
structure. Today it seems that the idea of equal
opportunities for all – or relative social mobility – tops
the social policy agenda of many policymakers across
the EU. 
Closely related to the issue of equal opportunities is the
issue of fairness, which has been highlighted at both
national and EU level as a concept that should be at the
centre of debate. Many Member States witness
inequalities in income associated with intergenerational
transmission of poverty and wealth. A focus on fairness
has manifested itself in several ways, including
concerns in Italy regarding the relative security of
pensions for older generations as against the insecurity
experienced by increasing numbers of young people.
Similar concerns are expressed in Greece about the
widening generation gap. Likewise, in Bulgaria,
concerns regarding intergenerational unfairness in the
context of population ageing has been reported. 
The theme of the ‘squeezed middle class’ continues to
be strongly present and has been associated with slow
economic growth and the polarisation of labour markets
(Eurofound, 2016). Concerns about the loss of a middle-
class tier were voiced in reports from Hungary and
Slovenia; reports of diminishing numbers of people in
middle-class occupations also came from Latvia, Malta
and the Netherlands. For many people, it would appear
that they have a job that pays the bare minimum rather
than a career that brings prospects for advancement. A
number of country reports emphasised an increasing
number of social and economic ‘losers’, particularly
referring to people from the middle tiers of employment
who have moved into lower-tier occupations with less
secure and less rewarding prospects. The experiences of
those facing diminishing employment prospects have
been linked to a drop in engagement with society,
alienation from the ‘establishment’ and increasing rates
of self-destructive behaviour, reflected in poor health
and higher mortality rates.
Growing concerns over social cohesion, which are
particularly acute in light of economic and societal
turbulence, were visible in many countries. Increasing
residential and regional segregation, mainly by income
or economic situation, was reported specifically in the
Nordic countries but also in many central and eastern
European countries; in fact, it is a feature of many urban
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areas in most Member States. This has policy
implications in terms of access to public services,
particularly good-quality education and healthcare.
Furthermore, growing exposure to discrimination, and
even violence, clearly undermines opportunities for
ethnic minorities, most notably for the effective societal
integration of migrants and refugees. 
One of the most essential levers to foster social mobility
is access to education, yet in several Member States
there are concerns that the benefits of education are
diminishing, with declining occupational return on
investment in education and growing difficulties in
translating third-level qualifications into well-paid jobs.
In part, this is a result of the increasingly widespread
achieving of higher qualifications and their
correspondingly lower value in the competition for
employment. On the other hand, examples from many
Member States show a clear mismatch between the
skills acquired and the demands of the labour market.
Importantly, though, the report also shows that
increasingly it is the prestige of the educational
establishment from which the job applicant graduates
that counts (as well as other softer skills) in securing
jobs. Finally, in view of educational expansion, parents
resort to other instruments and resources (economic,
social or cultural) to ensure their children maintain an
edge in education and later on in the labour market. 
Factors and barriers influencing
social mobility 
Social background continues to matter even in the most
open, or fluid, Member States. This may begin before a
child is born but it continues with the transmission of
(dis)advantage in a number of ways: parents’ parenting
skills and their social capital during a child’s early years;
children’s cognitive skills and their parents’ social
capital in their school years; and their educational
attainment and soft, social skills by the time they reach
working age (as well as both their own social networks
and those of their parents).
Access to early education and childcare is a barrier in
many EU countries, especially in more rural areas. Even
in countries meeting the Barcelona objectives, access to
childcare is not necessarily equal, with children from
more disadvantaged backgrounds less likely to attend.
Furthermore, in some of these countries, the cost of
childcare can be a particular barrier (for example,
France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK).
In addition to formal access to early education and
childcare, it is the home environment and how parents
tend to interact with young toddlers that has a lasting
effect. At the same time, current family life is full of
pitfalls and strains – especially on those on low incomes
struggling to make ends meet. Despite their best
intentions, some families may need state support to
create a better family environment. 
This report identifies early selection and tracking as a
potential barrier to social mobility because children
from disadvantaged backgrounds are further deprived
by being excluded from educational opportunities.
However, when early selection is based on objective
standards and monitoring, it can also prevent early
school leaving for children of lesser scholastic ability.
The focus of the debate, therefore, should not be on
early selection as such, but on ensuring that it is
organised in such a way that students of all abilities
benefit from it.
Cost barriers are important for education, especially in
countries with fee-paying schools (particularly in Ireland
and the UK, but also France), where children from
privileged backgrounds are able to attend the ‘right’
schools. In these countries, the educational system is
overtly elitist and closed. Even where there are no
financial barriers per se, parents may select for better
schools by moving to live in specific school districts.
However, financial barriers (particularly at tertiary level)
are also found in countries with more open educational
systems. Another emerging issue related to both
education and to geography is that of better schools
moving to more affluent neighbourhoods, thus denying
higher-quality education to less affluent pupils. 
The transition from school to work is a crucial stage,
influencing prospects for future occupation, and one for
which barriers are present in nearly all EU Member
States. Even in the Nordic countries, where most other
inequality factors have been minimised, school-to-work
transitions and the interrelated issue of youth
unemployment are a key barrier. Especially in periods of
economic downturn and labour market shrinkage, the
impact of transmitted, societal barriers is greatest for
young people from lower social strata. 
Even in countries that aim to promote equal
opportunities, women and people from minority
backgrounds are less likely to gain access to certain
jobs. In addition to discrimination, nepotism and social
networks still clearly favour certain groups of people in
accessing specific occupations in many EU countries.
Policies to facilitate
social mobility
Patterns of social mobility depend on many factors,
including changes in occupational structure and
sectoral changes in the labour market; at the same time,
they are also crucially a result of policy decisions. Public
policymakers can and do implement measures to foster
social mobility and support equal opportunities. A
review of the literature and of previous studies clearly
identified three areas where policymakers can make a
difference: childcare and early education, formal
education and the labour market. 
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Early childhood education and care
Measures to improve access to childcare over the last
decade include:
£ establishing a right to be enrolled (and therefore an
obligation for service providers) in Portugal
£ making services free of charge – in Malta, in the
case of the 0–3 years age group 
£ adjusting the timing of hours, as in Cyprus
£ making preschool mandatory to ensure universal
ECEC in a set of countries. 
Mandatory preschooling emerges as a policy that has
been implemented or considered in a number of
countries over the last few years. This seems to be right
across the Member States, including the Nordic
countries, Greece and other Member States.
In a number of central and eastern European Member
States with a sizeable proportion of Roma population, it
is a specific challenge to develop policies that focus on
the inclusion of children from minority groups. 
Only some countries, Spain included, have sought to
introduce measures to regulate parents’ work–life
balance, this is despite the importance that research
findings have placed on extensive, good-quality parent–
child interaction for early childhood development.
There seems to be a lack of systematic evaluation of this
type of measure.
Secondary and tertiary education
There is a belief among many policymakers that
education is one of the key instruments in fostering
upward social mobility. The impact of education has
been widely studied in the literature, including the set-
up of the system, the value of education, the impact of
parents’ education on children’s educational outcomes
and the role of tracking. 
In a number of Member States and educational systems,
children undergo tracking grouping – being segregated
into different education streams. This is a crucial
juncture, at which children’s chances on the labour
market can be determined. This approach is engrained
in many countries despite the evidence that – overall – it
hampers social mobility. Some countries have
attempted to modify their systems by, for example,
raising the age at which segregation happens (as in
Austria and Finland). Others have tried to implement
changes but have faced a series of challenges in doing
so (Belgium). It is important to ensure that tracking is
organised in such a way that it benefits all children, and
does not disproportionally affect disadvantaged
children. 
Financial constraints may hold back a family’s decision
to invest in tertiary education and social mobility may
hence be hampered; however, evidence also shows that
higher education may not necessarily guarantee a good
job. The design and availability of loans and grants, and
decreasing dependence on the family income, can help
mitigate obstacles faced by students in accessing higher
education. Financial assistance in the form of grants is
being offered to students mainly from low-income
families in Lithuania and Poland. In Ireland and the UK,
despite evidence that social mobility is weakened by the
existence of fee-paying schools, there seems to be little
appetite for a major overhaul of the private/public
school system. 
More attention has been placed on the vocational path,
even in countries without a strong vocational track
record, such as the Nordic countries. This may be due to
the still-high levels of youth unemployment throughout
Europe and the growing ambition to better align
educational qualifications with the skills needed by the
labour market. A number of stakeholders point out that
a broader set of institutional establishments offering a
wider range of learning options is a better match.
However, more should be done to boost the image of
vocational education in the labour market and in
society. Both students and employers must be
convinced that it is not a second-best option. One way
to achieve this is to make sure that the quality of the
vocational education is of the highest standard: as
demonstrated in Chapter 7, a number of countries have
started reforms to that effect (Germany and the UK).
Also important is ensuring a better alignment between
vocational and educational training and labour market
needs. This can be achieved by, for example, companies
offering work practice placements when students are
still in school. This has been put into action in Slovakia.
Some countries (Germany, Sweden) are putting policies
in place that pay more attention to the quality of
teaching and of the resources available. Others have
introduced tougher qualification criteria to become a
teacher (Sweden). A priority when instituting such
policies is that schools located in disadvantaged areas
or with a high proportion of pupils from a
disadvantaged background do not lose out in the race
for the best teaching talent. 
This story is not only about the role of the state and
public authorities, but also the importance of family and
social networks. Parents provide both the hard
resources of money and materials and the softer
resources associated with culture, aspirations, contacts
and networks. The significance of these softer resources
is particularly evident in terms of gaining readier access
to quality schools and jobs. In this respect, policies have
focused on the family or on assistance with homework
(Sweden) or offering activities outside of term-time to
support low-income families (Cyprus). 
Labour market 
With regard to labour market-related policies and
measures, a majority of Member States focus on policies
that aim to facilitate a smoother transition from
education to work. Today the main instrument
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identified in most countries is the recently adopted
Youth Guarantee. Within this broad tool, particular
attention has been given to better aligning the skills
that students have and the demands of the labour
market. Some countries have translated this into
reforming vocational training and apprenticeships. 
The second set of policies and measures more directly
addresses access to the labour market. Here, policies
focus on breaking the cycle of disadvantage in accessing
jobs and have predominantly tackled the issue of
discrimination in access to the labour market –
particularly concerning women and migrants. 
Mentoring is an important element in easing access to
professions. This can include using well-known figures
within the business community to mentor potential
candidates, as happens in Slovenia. Mentoring can
include focusing mentees’ attention on the importance
of soft skills. 
Another important route of entry to the labour market is
through work experience and internships. In many
sectors, however (especially those most in demand),
people from disadvantaged areas may be unaware of
internship possibilities, and are effectively excluded
from them (especially for internships in those sectors
most in demand). Importantly, they may not be able to
afford them, as many internships are unpaid. It is also
often the case that such work placements are offered to
friends and family members. Programmes that have a
broad outreach and aim to go beyond the usual pool of
candidates should be encouraged.
The role of recruitment bodies should also be at the
centre of policymakers’ attention. Much can be done to
improve the quality of career advice that is available on
site at educational institutions so that they offer more
comprehensive advice to students (including those from
lower socioeconomic backgrounds) about the set of
skills (including soft skills) needed for different jobs. 
More recently, the issue of broader socioeconomic
background as a barrier to social mobility has been
brought into the policy arena. Paying more attention to
and being more open about the importance of
socioeconomic background and its impact on access to
and progression within the labour market is key to the
policies’ success. One useful instrument would be data
collection, perhaps at the company level, to help in
understanding the challenge and in designing policies
to address it.
Policy pointers 
The policy debate on social mobility should be carefully
framed in order to distinguish absolute social mobility
from relative social mobility and to understand what
these concepts mean for policy. The interpretation of
research results for policy measures must take into
account the characteristics and quality of data, the
population assessed and how mobility is defined by
other methodological issues – all these make a
substantial difference to results. As the findings show
that social background continues to have a profound
effect on life chances, policymakers at EU, national and
regional levels should recognise its importance and
implement measures to promote equal opportunities
for upward social mobility so that everyone, regardless
of background, has the opportunity to realise their
potential. 
Furthermore, policymakers should reflect on the
indicators of social mobility: most common indicators
to measure social mobility, including both income and
occupation, have been chosen to capture standards of
living. One drawback is that they relate to people who
have a mature occupational or income status.
Stakeholders could reflect on the need to adjust and
develop the indicators further to reflect on changes at
earlier life stages, such as education or employment
status.
Reflect on the indicators of social mobility:  Most
common indicators to measure social mobility include
either income or occupation. Stakeholders could reflect
on the need to adjust and develop the indicators further
to take into account changes taking place on the labour
market (for example, changing jobs structure and new
forms of employment) and broader societal
developments (for example, the growing importance of
wealth). 
Investigate the reasons for success or failure in
Member States’ achieving social fluidity: Six countries
(Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands
and Slovakia) managed to maintain high levels of social
fluidity for both men and women over the last decades.
Research should examine the key drivers behind those
patterns and investigate the reasons for stagnating –
even decreasing  fluidity in many countries (especially
among those born after 1964). 
Incorporate gender dimension into research: There are
different social mobility patterns for men and women,
so further research into determinants of those patterns
should consider the gender dimension and examine
social mobility only for father–son patterns. 
Prioritise men of Generation X in policymaking: More
attention should be given to the decreasing life chances
among men born after 1964, whose prospects have
significantly deteriorated in many countries. Policies
should be put in place to reverse this trend. 
Tackle inequality of opportunity: Public policies should
aim at correcting inequality of opportunity by putting in
place policies that promote institutional equality of
opportunities and promote equality of opportunity
through social investment. Institutional equality of
opportunities can be promoted through measures
aimed at increasing openness of closed occupational
groups or professions, including fair and transparent
Social mobility in the EU 
75
access to occupations and the prevention of nepotism.
(Meanwhile, in some countries, more effort is needed to
reduce discrimination based on gender and ethnicity.)
Social investment can be used to promote equality of
opportunity by investing in the quality of early
education and schools. It may also mean more
compensatory measures for the least well-off, such as
pupil premiums. And it may encompass investing in
better access to health and healthcare and reducing
out-of-pocket payments in healthcare. 
Ensure that the most developed Member States retain
their existing social fluidity: Social fluidity is not likely
to continue indefinitely upwards; it may have stagnated
in the most developed EU Member States. Nevertheless,
these countries should strive to remain socially fluid
and pay attention to the opportunities of its newcomers
(ethnic minorities and immigrants).
Boost investment in childcare: This report highlights
the importance of inequality of opportunity in the early
years – in particular, the importance of equal access to
childcare and the urgent need to invest in more
childcare places. Such investment appears to pay off,
particularly for children in more disadvantaged families. 
Recognise the central importance of home
environment: Public policy should concern itself more
with the importance of the parental role and the home
environment, and support families with assistance and
guidance (as several countries are doing). 
Encourage young people to take up vocational paths:
With youth unemployment still alarmingly high in many
European countries, Member States are responding to
concerns about a lost generation. This is key in making
sure that young people remain encouraged about the
prospects of social mobility and maintain trust in the
fabric of European societies. One solution is to attract
more young people into traditional vocations: these
must be of high quality and offer proper career choice.
To achieve this, the image of vocational education must
be improved; this could be done by putting more
emphasis on the quality of teaching as well as creating a
better alignment between VET and labour market
needs. 
Organise educational tracking to benefit all pupils:
This report identifies early selection and tracking as a
potential barrier to social mobility. However, when early
selection is based on objective standards and
monitoring, it can also prevent early school leaving for
less academic children. The focus of the debate,
therefore, should not be on early selection as such, but
on ensuring that it is organised in such a way that
students of all abilities benefit from it.
Use mentoring and placement schemes to facilitate
broader access to professions: Mentoring and work
placement can be used as channels to broaden access
to elite professions for graduates from more
disadvantaged backgrounds. Companies should
actively try to tap into potential from a more diverse
pool of talent.
Set out proposals for ensuring universal access to
public services: The European Pillar of Social Rights has
identified unequal access to childcare, education and
health as the main barriers to social mobility, so the
follow-up actions within the framework should
decisively follow up with concrete proposals on how to
make these public services accessible to all – especially
to those most in need. 
Work to tackle residential segregation: Territorial
disparities matter: the concentration of disadvantaged
households in particular areas negatively affect
people’s life chances. And researchers have pointed to
the importance of community setting as a key factor in
fostering social mobility. Policymakers, especially at the
local level, should pay more attention to the creation of
cohesive areas with more mixed housing and different
types of schools where all kinds of residents can mix.
Such mixed developments can mitigate the effects of
social and economic inequalities and help tackle the
increasing sense of a ‘them and us’ society. (European
Structural and Investment Funds could pay more
attention to actions that equalise the chances of those
who are more likely to be left out.) 
Build social mobility into the country-specific
recommendations: Given that the broad objectives of
social mobility are to promote fair and equal life
chances, the main elements are in keeping  with the
recommendations of the Annual Growth Survey 2016
regarding investment in people and services. The
country-specific recommendations should include
recommendations to the Member States to encourage
them to promote social mobility. 
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